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PROTECTING BRAND IMAGE OR GAMING
THE SYSTEM? CONSUMER GAG CONTRACTS 
IN AN AGE OF CROWDSOURCED RATINGS
AND REVIEWS
LUCILLE M. PONTE*
Traditionally, businesses developed and controlled brand image
through company-sponsored advertising and marketing cam-
paigns. With the rise of social media, brand communications have
become more interactive, especially on crowdsourced review sites.
This increased interactivity helps companies to gain valuable in-
sight into the consumer experience and to improve their brand
image and customer engagement. Businesses soon learned that
positive consumer ratings and reviews often translated into en-
hanced brand reputation and increased revenues. Some mer-
chants and professionals seek to burnish their brand image by
paying for positive reviews while others try to silence disgruntled
customers through adhesive nondisparagement clauses. These
gag clauses may rely upon dubious intellectual property claims,
monetary penalty clauses, and other financial threats in order to
prevent unhappy consumers from posting negative reviews.
Certain businesses justify these provisions as legitimate actions
needed to protect their brand image and goodwill in a social
media environment fraught with fake negative reviews from
unscrupulous competitors and libelous consumers. This Article
examines the rise of consumer nondisparagement clauses and
considers the legality of such agreements under contract, free
speech, and intellectual property principles. Issues of freedom of
contract and concerns about deceptive advertising, fair use, and
copyright misuse are also addressed. This Article concludes with
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a review of self-regulatory proposals that balance freedom of
contract and legitimate branding concerns with customer speech
interests and issues of good faith and fair dealing.
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INTRODUCTION
Businessesinvestagreatdealoftime, effort, andexpenseinto
developing their brand and building customer relationships.1
Traditionally, businesses shaped their brand image through
company-sponsored advertisingand marketingcampaigns.2 With
theriseofsocialmedia, brandcommunicationshavebecomemuch
m ore complicated, with greaterconsumerinteractivity3 through
online and brick and m ortarwebsites, socialm edia platform s,4
aswellasindependentcrowdsourcedreview sites, such asYelp,5
1 Billions of dollars are spent annually to promote positive consumer
recognition ofbrands. PaulW. Garrity, Advertising Regulation in the Web 2.0
World, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.metrocorpcounsel
.com/articles/13197/advertising-regulation-web-20-world [http://perma.cc/SF5Q
-6QBH]. Itis estimated thatU.S. consumers engage in approximately 100
million discussions aboutbrandsevery hour, and aboutthree billion brand
conversationseach day. JONAH BERGER, CONTAGIOUS:WHY THINGS CATCH ON
7, 64(2013). Overall, wordofmouth betweenordinaryconsumersisten times
moresuccessfulthantraditionaladvertising. Id. at8.
2 Garrity, supra note1. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Anti-
branding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 795
96, 80304 (2010). Professor Katyal states that branding strategies m ake up 
a significantportion ofgeneralcorporate strategy;financialanalysts claim
thatbrandequitymakesupatremendousamountofcompanyvalue. Attimes,
a com panys brand equity has been m ore im portant than the book value 
ascribed to a particular product. Id. at804. See generally JENNIFER GILLAN,
TELEVISION BRANDCASTING:THE RETURN OF THE CONTENT-PROMOTION HYBRID
24562 (2015) (discussing the historical role of television as brand recom-
mendation m achine and content-promotion hybrids on digital platforms as ve-
hiclesforgeneratinganew waveofonlinebrandrecommendations).
3 Kaitlin A. Dohse, Note, Fabricating Feedback: Blurring The Line
Between Brand Management and Bogus Reviews, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POLY
363, 365 (2013);KendallL. Short, Note, Buy My Vote: Online Reviews for
Sale, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 441, 44243 (2013). About 87 percent of 
Americansuse new media technologies, with about86 percentpreferring to
interactwith brandsonline. 2010 Cone Consumer New Media Study 2, CONE
COMMCNS, INC., http://www.conecomm.com/stuff/contentmgr/files/0/61d7fb20ef6
d001b5b77a4308eeb986b/files/consumer_new_media_fact_sheet_final.pdf [http://
perm a.cc/79NU-9NXJ][hereinafterNew MediaStudy].
4 Andrew Bluebond, When the Customer Is Wrong: Defamation, Interactive
Websites, and Immunity, 33 REV. LITIG. 679, 68283 (2014).
5 California-basedYelpstatesthatithasabout83 million monthlyunique
visitors, with over83 million customerreviewsoflocalbusinesses. About Yelp,
YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about[http://perma.cc/PD7M-2ENR].
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TripAdvisor,6 and Angies List.7 The one-way push ofbrand
m arketing campaigns has given way to a diverse, lively con-
sum erdialoguein a varietyofonlinesitesoutsidethecontrolof
brand owners,8 with increased consum er reliance on online
sources of product and service information especially customer 
reviews both dom estically9 and internationally.10 Thisreliance
6 Massachusetts-based TripAdvisorhostsmore than 200 million reviews
and opinionsofmore than 5.2 million hospitality businessesand touristat-
tractions in 45 countries. About TripAdvisor, TRIPADVISOR, http://www.trip
advisor.com/PressCenter-c6-About_Us.html[http://perma.cc/A8QY-QURB]. Its
siteindicatesthatitreceivesabout375 million uniquemonthly visitors, ex-
cludingvisitorstoitsChinesetravelreview site, daodao.com. Id.
7 Subscription-based Angies List has m ore than three m illion subscribers 
with customerratingson over720 differentlocalservices. About Us, ANGIES
LIST, http://www.angieslist.com /aboutus.htm [http://perm a.cc/EW9J-Q9AM].
Memberspenaboutsixtythousandreviewspermonthonthesite. Id.
8 Despite formalbranding efforts, consumers are more often turning to
crowdsourced consumerreviewsand ratingssitestoinform theirpurchasing
decisions, andnotbrand advertising. Consumers Turn to Online Ratings and
Reviews, as Sites Respond to Concerns, PRWEB (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.pr
web.com/releases/2008-02-28/ratings/prweb729043.htm [http://perma.cc/PF4C
-8D3F]. In2011, approximately64percentofconsumerssearchedforconsumer
reviews before making a purchasing decision, up from 55 percentin 2010.
Game Changer: Cone Survey Finds 4-out-of-5 Consumers Reverse Purchase
Decisions Based on Negative Online Reviews, CONE COMMCNS, INC. (Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.conecomm.com/stuff/contentmgr/files/0/286c351989671ae74
994fec139863bb2/files/2011_cone_online_influence_trend_tracker_release_and
_fact_sheet.pdf[http://perma.cc/VA8H-4GMM][hereinafterCone2011 Survey].
About20 to50 percentofallpurchasingdecisionsaroseoutofword-of-mouth
referrals. BERGER, supra note1, at7. Yetoverallword ofmouth occursmost
often in theofflineworld, with onlinewordofmouth accountingforonlyabout
7 percent. Id. at11. Onlineword-of-m outh marketing may seem ubiquitous,
butBergerassertsthat
[w]e   tend to overestim ate[ ] online word of m outh because 
its easier to see. Social m edia sites provide a handy record of 
alltheclips, comments, andothercontentweshareonline. So
when we look at it, it seem s like a lot. But we dont think as 
much about allthe offline conversations we had over that
sam e tim e period because we cant easily see them . 
Id. at11.
9 About89 percentofconsumersfindonlinereviewstobetrustworthychan-
nelsforassessingproductsandservices, an increasefrom 67 percentin 2010.
Cone2011 Survey, supra note8;see Dohse, supra note3, at364;Short, supra
note3, at444. A recentstudy found thatconsum ersflock toonlineresearch
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m aybem isplaced, asaboutone-third ofreviewsarethoughtto
befake,11 includingcustomerassessmentsofnonexistentoryet-
to-open businesses.12 Consumersmayeasilybeabletospotdupli-
cativeorirrelevantpostingsasopinion spam , butitisbecom ing
overin-store interactionswith salesassociatesbecause itisfasterthan in-
personefforts, bolstersconsumerconfidencein buyingdecisions, andoffersmore
credibleinformation toconsumers. Justin Malbon, Taking Fake Online Con-
sumers Seriously, 36 J. CONSUM. POLY 139, 140, 14344 (2013); Short, supra
note 3, at 44546; Press Release, PowerReviews, Consumers Prefer to Conduct 
Research Online vs. Speak to Store Associates:Few and Lack ofNegative
ReviewsDegradeConsumerTrust(May3, 2010), http://www.e-tailing.com/con
tent/?p=1193 [http://perma.cc/U6UM-UJSM]. Further, consumers may not
trustcompaniesthathavescantnumbersofonlinereviewsorhavefew orno
negativereviewstoconsider. Malbon, supra, at149;PowerReviews, supra.
10 Press Release, The Nielsen Co., PersonalRecommendations and Con-
sumer Opinions Posted Online are the MostTrusted Forms ofAdvertising
Globally (July 7, 2009), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en
/newswire/uploads/2009/07/pr_global-study_07709.pdf [http://perma.cc/7GHC
-UVDW]. A 2009 surveyof25,000 onlineconsumersfrom fiftycountriesindi-
catesthat70 percentofonlineshopperstrustconsumerreviewsin makingtheir
buyingdecisions. Id. Thehighestlevelsoftrustin onlinereviewswerefound
in Vietnam (81 percent), Italy (80 percent), China and France (77 percent).
Id. Online consumers were the most skepticalabout customer reviews in
Argentina and Finland. Id. U.S. trustlevelswere also relatively high at72
percent, ranked twelfth outofthe fifty surveyed countries. Id. See Malbon,
supra note 9, at 14243 (reviewing Nielsen study and discussing Australian 
focusgroupresearch on consumertrustofonlinereviews). Consumerreviews
areparticularly helpfulwhen a consumerisbuying onlinefrom a remotelo-
cation, asthey can help balancetheinformation asymmetry between online
consumersandsellers. Malbon, supra note 9, at 13940, 149. 
11 Dohse, supra note 3, at385;David Streitfeld, The Best Book Reviews
Money Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, atB1. Onestudyestimated that
1015 percent of Yelp reviews were bogus. L. David Russell, Christopher C. 
Chiou & Zain A. Shirazi, Fake It Until You Make it? Battling Fake Online
Reviews, LAW360 (June 9, 2014, 12:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/545366/fake-it-until-you-make-it-battling-fake-online-reviews [http://perma.cc
/9XT5-P72J].
12 See generally GrantMartin, Fake Nautical Restaurant on TripAdvisor
Gets Glowing Reviews, FORBES (July 29, 2013, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/grantmartin/2013/07/29/fake-restaurant-on-tripadvisor-gets-glowing
-reviews/?utm _campaign=techtwittersf&utm_source=twitter&)%3B [http://
perma.cc/M9ZX-CCBR];RaphaelBrion, Graham Elliots Unopened Resto Gets a 
Negative Yelp Review, EATER (Sept. 1, 2010, 4:55 AM), http://eater.com/archives
/2010/09/01/graham-elliots-grahamwich-gets-negative-yelp-review.php [http://
perma.cc/RVB2-U7HZ].
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challenging todeciphermoresophisticated formsoffakeonline
reviews.13 Yetthe desire to share information online aboutour
experiencesandviewpointscontinuestogrow.14
Thisincreasedinteractivityhashelpedsomebusinessestogain
valuableinsightintotheconsumerexperience, toim provetheir
brandim age, tostrengthen customerengagem entandlong-term
relationships,15 andtolearnaboutproductqualityissues.16 Others
haveviewed socialmedia and crowdsourced reviewsasanother
perilous obstacle to their brand im age and business or profes-
sionalsuccess.17 Research studiesshow thatpositive consumer
13 Nitin Jindal& Bing Liu, Opinion Spam and Analysis, WSDM PROC.
(Feb. 2008), http:/184pc128.csie.ntnu.edu.tw/presentation/09-04-06/Opinion%20
Spam %20and%20Analysis.pdf[http://perm a.cc/SP2K-MQ87];Malbon, supra
note 9, at149;Myle Ott, Yejin Choi, Claire Cardie & Jeffrey T. Hancock,
Finding Deceptive Opinion Spam by Any Stretch of the Imagination, 49 ASSN
FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 309, 30910 (2011). Professors Jindal and 
Liu studiedmillionsofreviewson Amazon.com andconcludedthatdetermin-
ing real from  bogus reviews by simply reading the reviews is very hard, if not 
impossible, becauseaspammercan carefullycraftaspam review topromote
a targetproductortodam agethereputation ofanotherproductthatisjust
like any other innocent review. Jindal & Liu, supra.
14 See BERGER, supra note 1, at 3334. Neurological research indicates that 
self-sharing activates the same pleasure sensors in our brain associated with 
food and money, so itmay be difficultto dialback thisdesire in oursocial
media age. Id. About87 percentofAmericansuse new media technologies,
with about86 percentpreferring tointeractwith brandsonline. New Media
Study, supra note 3, at 12. 
15 Dohse, supra note 3, at 387; Ann Marie Marciarille, Hows My 
Doctoring? Patient Feedbacks Role In Assessing Physician Quality, 14
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 390, 40102 (2012). Research shows that 
unhappycustomersmay amend orremovea negativepostifa companyacts
quicklytoresolveaproblem. Short, supra note3, at451. About40 percentof
consumerswould think aboutpatronizing businessesthatrespond promptly
tonegativereviews. Short, supra note3, at451.
16 Dohse, supra note3, at364;Marciarille, supra note15, at390.
17 Paresh Dave, Small businesses struggle to manage online image, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tech-savvy-online
-reviews-20130810-story.html[http://perma.cc/7SJQ-6WD7];DaniGirl, Why
Yelp sucksYelp survival guide, BOSSHAWAII (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www
.bosshi.com/why-yelp-sucks/[http://perma.cc/S27B-SECD];Brad Tuttle, Guess
Whos Getting Some Pretty Awful Reviews: User Review Sites, TIME (Sept. 21,
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/09/21/guess-whos-getting-some-pretty-awful
-reviews-user-review-sites/[http://perma.cc/RY9A-P8X3]. See also Stefan Rutzel,
Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal Problems
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ratingsandreviewsoften translateintoenhancedbrandreputa-
tion and increased revenues,18 while bad ratings and reviews
could devastate ones reputation and financial future.19 Thesere-
search findings, coupledwithanecdotalbusinessexperiences, have
led to a rush forpositive consumercommentaries.20 In lightof
thesepressures, somebusinesseshavetriedtoburnishtheirbrand
im age by paying forpositive reviews,21 orfornegative reviews
Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 36
(1995) (rem arking that [r]eputation and im age are fragile com m odities). 
18 BERGER, supra note 1, at18;Cone2011 Survey, supra note 8, at1, 3.
Thissurveyfoundthat87 percentofconsumersindicatedthatpositiveonline
information helped to confirm a decision to buy a productor service. See
Dohse, supra note3, at370;Short, supra note3, at453;Russelletal., supra
note11.
19 About80 percentofcustomersstated thatnegativeonlineinformation
changed the consumers m ind about buying that product or service. Cone 2011 
Survey, supra note8, at1, 3. Brandingexpertshavesuggestedthateven one
negativereview can resultin a 25 percentdecline in revenues. Dave, supra
note 17. Other researchers have also found that online reviews can make or 
break both new and established com panies. Short, supra note3, at443.
20 TrustYou, ahospitalityreputation managementcompany, indicated that
a businesss ratings largely remain static after the initial twelve reviews, so 
earlypositivereviewsarecritical. Dave, supra note17.
21 Katyal, supra note 2, at 83334; Short, supra note3, at443, 447;Robert
Sprague& MaryEllen Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling
a Web of Deceit, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 42024 (2010); Insurance Coverage Impli-
cations of Internet, Technology and Social Media, 7, 11, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING
ISSUES ANALYSIS, Sept. 29, 2011, available at 2011 EmergingIssues5928. The
scramble forpositive reviews only worsens a cycle known as the feedback 
loop. 
The feedback loop is the phenomenon in which people are
more likely to selectbusinessesorproductsthathave many
positivereviewsandavoidthosethathaveneutralornegative
reviews, oreven thosethatonly havea few positivereviews.
The companies or products thathave more positive reviews
garnermorerealcustomers, whothenpostrealreviews, thereby
drawing in even more customers. Therefore, itbenefitscom-
panies to pay for initial reviews either very good reviews for 
themselvesorverybadreviewsfortheircompetitors. Thosecom-
panies thatactethically, however, and refrain from partici-
patingin thispractice, suffer. Theyeitherbecomethetargetof
a malicious campaign ofnegative reviews, which can drive
awaycustomersfrom even established businesses, ortheylack
enough exposuretoreceivelegitimatepositivereviewsfrom a
feedbackloop.
Short, supra note3, at444(footnotesomitted).
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aim ed attrashing theircompetitors,22 in violation ofstate and
federallaws.23
Othershave tried to silence disgruntled customersvia legal
actionsunderavarietyoflegaltheories24 orbyinstitutingadhe-
sive speech suppression contracts or gag contracts.25 Thesekinds
ofagreem entsare typically notpurely contractsofsilence that
prohibitallspeech,26 aspositivereviewsand com mentsarenot
only desirable but good for a businesss custom er relationships 
andbottom line. Rather, anondisparagementclausepreventscon-
sumersfrom makingorpostinganynegativeremarks, criticism s,
orridiculeaboutabusiness, itsgoods, and/oritsservices.27 These
clauses usually do not prevent all speech only negative views 
that might harm or reflect poorly on a brands image even if the 
statementsarelegallyprotectedtrueoropinion speech aboutthe
consumers experience.28
22 Short, supra note3, at443, 447.
23 See infra notes 36178 and accom panying text; see generally LucilleM.
Ponte, Mad Men Posing as Ordinary Consumers: The Essential Role of Self-
Regulation and Industry Ethics in Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Rat-
ings and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 46871 (2013) 
(discussing issues of stealth marketing and astroturfing in social m edia). 
24 See infra notes 16269, 18594, 20209 and accom panying text. See gen-
erally Eric Goldman, Doctor Lawsuits over Online Reviews by Patients (or
their family members), SANTA CLARA L. DIGITAL COMMONS (May21, 2014), http:/
digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1736&context=historical
[http://perma.cc/S3ED-YY8J];MattKellogg& Simon Frankel, Trends in Defa-
mation Cases Involving Online Reviews, LAW360 (Nov. 27, 2013, 5:55 PM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/490334/trends-in-defamation-cases-involving-online
-reviews[http://perma.cc/6BCE-57TW].
25 Dohse, supra note3, at385.
26 Can Nondisparagement Clauses Silence Negative Online Reviews?, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June26, 2014), http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm
?contentID=37&itemID=3352 [http://perma.cc/3KLG-9LWE][hereinafterLEGAL
INTELLIGENCER].
27 Id. See infra notes 8291 and accom panying text. 
28 See Dohse, supra note3, at386;LyrissaBarnettLidsky, Silencing John
Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 90304, 91920, 
94546 (2000) (proposing broader application of opinion privilege to protect on-
linespeech byordinarypeople). ItisimportanttonotethatthisArticlefocuses
on nondisparagementclausesthatsilenceprotectedformsofonlinespeech, but
notillegalones, such asfalseordefamatoryspeech. Termsofserviceandother
contractclausesthatforbid falseordefamatoryspeech arenotgagcontracts,
astheyonlyprohibitspeech thatisalreadyillegal. In addition, such clauses
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Nondisparagementtermsoften restupon dubiousintellectual
propertyclaims, broadconfidentialityclauses, excessivemonetary
penalties, and other financialthreats in order to prevent un-
happyconsumersfrom postingnegativereviews.29 Certain busi-
nessesjustifythesegagcontractsaslegitimateactionsneededto
protecttheirbrand and goodwillin a socialmedia environm ent
fraughtwith fakenegativereviewsfrom unscrupulouscom peti-
tors, libelouspostings, threatsoflibelouspostingsbyconsumers
seekingtoextractunfairadvantages, anddeeplyflawedfiltering
andratingsystem son crowdsourcedreview sites.30
Despitethesheernumberofconsumerreviews, research in-
dicatesthattheseratingsdolittletoinform consumerscontem -
plating purchasesaboutapplicable contractterm s, orto better
balance these adhesive term s between consum ers and mer-
chants.31 Although consum ers and public interestgroups m ay
help toprom oteprotected truthfuloropinion speech whileavoidingfaked or
untruespeechthatharmsbothbusinessesandconsumers. See infra notes 324
28 and 37478 (discussing endorsem ent guides on honest opinions needed to 
retainclausesforbiddingfalseordefamatoryspeech).
29 See infra notes 8291 and accom panying text. 
30 See infra PartII andaccompanyingtext.
31 Nishanth V. Chari, Note, Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms
through Online Information Flows: An Empirical Study, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1618, 162122, 164550 (2010). Law and econom ics legal theorists contend 
that contract term s are part and parcel of the consum ers bargain with the 
merchant, alongwith priceand productquality. Id. at 162526. Yet the con-
sum ers failure to read or to understandthetermsofstandardform contracts
createsa marketfailure. Id. at 162628. In the authors analysis of software 
productratingson Amazon.com and Epinions.com , she found scantsupport
thattheseonlinereviewswouldimpactthepro-sellertermsandconditionsin
adhesive end userlicensing agreements (EULAs). Id. at 164550. Her em -
piricalanalysischallenged argumentsfrom law and econom icsexpertsthat
the marketplace alone willeffectively discipline sellerswhose adhesive con-
tracttermsaretooharsh andone-sided.
Onlineproductratingwebsitesdolittletoguideconsumersre-
gardingthecontractterm sthataccompanytheproductsthey
purchase. Thus, to the extentthatonline inform ation flows
may discipline sellers, online productratingsare unlikely to
servethisrolein shapingEULA terms. Absentothersourcesof
marketpressuretodisciplinesellers, onlineproductratingsdo
not alone support the argument that it is unnecessary for
courtsandlegislaturestointervenetoprotectconsumers.
Id. at 164647; 161922; see infra notes 285315 and accom panying text. She 
concludedthatlegislaturesandcourtsneedtoprotectconsumersfrom one-sided
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decrynondisparagementclauses, itisnotclearwhethersuch pro-
visionsin privateparty contractsareactually illegal.32 Because
contractlaw isacreatureofstatestatutesandcaselaw, eachstate
willneed tograpplewith itsview ofthelegalityofthesenondis-
paragement clauses in private agreem ents.33 Well-established
notions offreedom ofcontract, the parties duty to read before 
signingcontracts, and respectfortheintegrityofwritten agree-
ments34 are com ing into conflictwith concernsaboutconsumer
online agreements, as productreviews did little to improve more balanced
termsbetweenbuyersandsellers. Id.
32 Carol Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements
Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 639 (1999);Alan E. Garfield,
Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 26364 (1998). Professors Bast and Garfield posited concerns about 
contractsofsilence when considering the censorship ofa CBS episode with
Jeffrey Wigand, a whistlebloweron the tobacco industry, who had signed a
confidentiality agreementwith his employer, Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Company. Prof. Garfieldstatedthat
[s]incepartiesaregenerallyfreeundercontractlaw tostrike
whatever bargain they please there is freedom of contract  
the centralconundrum contracts ofsilence pose is whether
theirsuppression ofspeech makesadifference. Istheresome-
thing inherently troubling about a prom ise to suppress ones 
speech thatwarrantsregulation, orshouldonebeabletocom-
mittokeepingsilentasreadilyasonecommitstosellingcotton
orplaying football?Arepromisesofsilencedifferentbecause
theyimplicatetheFirstAmendmentorviolateapublicpolicy
favoring freedom ofspeech, or are these constitutionaland
policy concernsirrelevantwhen a private party agreesto si-
lencehimself?
Recenteventssuggestthattheanswerstothesequestions
are notsolely a matterofacademicconcern. Contractsofsi-
lencearebeing used effectively tokeep relevantand possibly
importantinformationoutofthepublicdomain.
Garfield, supra, at264(footnotesomitted).
33 See infra PartsII andIII andaccompanyingtext.
34 See OmriBen-Shahar, The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract 
Law, 27 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 23 (2009); Richard E. Speidel, Unconscio-
nability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 364, 375
(1970). Prof. Ben-Shaharstatesthat
[c]ontractlaw isobsessivelyengaged with thisproblem ofen-
hanced opportunity to read, in the name ofprinciplesofau-
tonomy and individual power, but ironically   the solutions 
currently offered do nothing to promote competition and ro-
bustassent. Opportunitytoreadfineprintissterileammuni-
tionagainstthepowerandsophisticationofcontractdrafters.
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protection, unconscionability, and publicpolicy issues,35 such as
the protection oftruthfuland opinion speech and the chilling
effectofsuch clauses in the online and offline m arketplace of
consum erideas.36
Ben-Shahar, supra, at27. Effortsatmoredisclosureshaveseldom aided aver-
ageindividualsin understanding theadded information. DanielE. Ho, Fudg-
ing the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE
L.J. 574, 57879 (2012). In most instances, more simplified disclosures are more 
effective in aiding party decision-m aking. Id. at 57879, 58081. See gen-
erally LucilleM. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap
Dispute Resolution Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality of These
Online Consumer Products, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 119, 15967 (2011) 
(proposing a variety ofmethodsforsimplified disclosuresin onlinecontracts
ofadhesion).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §211, cmt. c(1981). Comments
on thissection on standardized agreementsrecognize the challengesofbal-
ancing the interestsofboth contractdraftersand consumers. The comment
considersboth regulatory and judiciallimitson overreaching by draftersof
form contracts:
c. Review of unfair terms. Standardized agreem entsarecom-
monly prepared by oneparty. Thecustomerassentstoa few
terms, typically inserted in blankson the printed form, and
gives blanketassentto the type oftransaction embodied in
the standard form. He is commonly notrepresented in the
drafting, and the draftsman may be tempted tooverdraw ....
The obvious danger ofoverreaching has resulted in govern-
mentregulation ofinsurance policies, bills oflading, retail
installmentsales, smallloans, and otherparticulartypes of
contracts.... Apartfrom such regulation, standard termsim-
posed by oneparty areenforced. Butstandard termsmay be
supersededby... theoverridingobligationofgoodfaith(§205)
andtothepowerofthecourttorefusetoenforcean unconscio-
nable contractor term (§ 208). Moreover, various contracts
andtermsareagainstpublicpolicyandunenforceable.
Id.
36 Itisimportanttorecognizethatwhilesubstantialtruth isan absolute
defense to defamation, opinion is notviewed as an absolute privilege. The
SupremeCourtstatedthatpastprecedentdidnot
create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that
m ight be labeled opinion. ... Not only would such an inter-
pretation becontrarytothetenorand contextofthepassage,
but it would also ignore the fact that expressions of opinion 
mayoftenimplyanassertionofobjectivefact.
If a speaker says, In m y opinion John Jones is a liar, he 
impliesaknowledgeoffactswhich leadtotheconclusion that
Jonestoldan untruth. Even ifthespeakerstatesthefactsupon
which hebaseshisopinion, ifthosefactsareeitherincorrect
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In PartI, thisArticleprovidesan overview oftheriseofnon-
disparagementclausesin privatecontracts. Thissection examines
effortstoimportnondisparagementprovisionsfrom othertypesof
agreementsintoconsumercontractsin therealm ofcrowdsourced
consum er review sites.37 PartII addresses some ofthe m ulti-
faceted underlying factorsthatmay be contributing to the reli-
ance on these clauses by some businesses and professionals.38
PartIII addressesthelegality oftheseconsumergag clausesin
lightofbasicprinciplesofcontractform ation, unconscionability,
and publicpolicy, and differentiates them from other form s of
legally protected nondisparagem entclauses.39 Proposed federal
optionsfora uniform responsetodealwith theissueofnondis-
paragementclausesareconsidered in PartIV.40 In PartV, this
Article willconcludewith proposalsforboth regulatory options
andself-regulatorybestpracticesthatseek tobalancetheprotec-
tion ofcustom erspeech interests with the legitimate branding
concernsofbusinessesandprofessionals.41
I. CONTRACTS OF SILENCE AND THE RISE OF
NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES
In asocietythatsohighlyprizesfreeexpression, itm ayseem
paradoxicalthatourlegalsystem toleratesa wide rangeofcon-
tractsofsilencebetweenprivateparties.42 Courtshavelongupheld
orincomplete, orifhisassessmentofthem iserroneous, the
statement may stillimply a false assertion offact. Simply
couching such statementsin term sofopinion doesnotdispel
these im plications; and the statem ent, In m y opinion Jones is 
a liar, can cause as m uch dam age to reputation as the 
statem ent, Jones is a liar. As Judge Friendly aptly stated: 
[It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could 
escapeliabilityforaccusationsof[defamatoryconduct]simply
by using, explicitly or im plicitly, the words I think. 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1819 (1990). See Lidsky, supra
note 28, at 91930 (discussing opinion privilege and concerns that Milkovich
createdfurtherconfusionaboutthisprivilege).
37 See infra PartI andaccompanyingtext.
38 See infra PartII andaccompanyingtext.
39 See infra PartIII andaccompanyingtext.
40 See infra PartIV andaccompanyingtext.
41 See infra PartV andaccompanyingtext.
42 Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence,
36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 152 (1998);Garfield, supra note 32, at 26566. 
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the validity ofspeech suppression agreements in employment,
settlement, franchise, and personalrelationship situations.43 In
part, thisjudicialacceptancereflectsarelianceon thetraditional
principlesoffreedom ofcontract, thedutytoreadacontractbefore
signing it,44 and deference to the integrity of written agree-
ments.45 These contractsofsilence may also be viewed asper-
missiblein ordertovindicatesomeotherlegallyrecognizedright
orduty, such asthe protection oftradesecretsand otherintel-
lectualproperty,46 theconfidentiality ofemployer-em ployeeand
other fiduciary relationships,47 the preservation of individual
privacy,48 orthenondisclosureofnationalsecurityconcerns.49 In
addition, in the settlementcontext, the contractofsilence may
serve asan incentive to settle and to reduce the strain on lim-
itedjudicialresources.50
Clearly, contractsofsilencemaybeinvalidatedin certain cir-
cum stancestoavoidillegalorundesirablepublicends, such asa
43 Garfield, supra note 32, at 26874. See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra
note26.
44 See supra note34andaccompanyingtext. Itiswell-recognizedthatmost
consumers do notread adhesive contracts and those thatdo may lack the
ability to understand them, creating a marketfailure in preventing unfair
sellerterm s. Chari, supra note 31, at 162223. But such form  agreem ents are 
adailystaplein consum erdealingstopromoteefficiencyandtoreducetrans-
actionalcosts. Chari, supra note31, at1624. ProfessorLeffarguedthatadhe-
sivecontractsarenotcontractsatall, but products that should be properly 
regulated toavoid fallingbelow minimum standardsofquality. ArthurAllen
Leff, Unconscionability and the CrowdConsumers and the Common Law 
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 352, n.18 (1970);Arthur Allen Leff,
Contract as Thing, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 157 (1970);but see William J.
Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently
Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 45457 (2004) 
(assertingthatcontractsofadhesion in theonlineworldareprimafacievalid
once a user clicks I Agree). See infra note295 andaccompanyingtext.
45 See supra note34andaccompanyingtext.
46 Bast, supra note 32, at 63641; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note42, at
15355; Garfield, supra note 32, at 26872, 30001; Anthony G. Read, DeWitt
Clauses: Can We Protect Purchasers Without Hurting Microsoft?, 25 REV.
LITIG. 387, 39697 (2006). 
47 See Bast, supra note 32, at 63336; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note42,
at 15152, 161; Garfield, supra note 32, at 265, 270, 30102, 305, 308, 33638. 
48 See Garfield, supra note 32, at 27274, 33942. 
49 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note42, at162 & n.67;Garfield, supra
note32, at274.
50 See Garfield, supra note 32, at 266, 33234. 
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contractofsilencetoconceala crime51 orothertortiousorlegal
wrongdoing,52 such as deceptive trade practices.53 In People v.
Network Associates,54 a software company included restrictive
clausesthatprohibited usersfrom publishing benchm ark tests
or any product reviews without the firms perm ission.55 Thedis-
putedtermswerelocated on thesoftwarediskettesand thecom -
panys website.56 An online magazine requested permission to
publish areview aspartofacomparison with othersimilarprod-
ucts.57 NetworkAssociatesdenieditsapproval, andthemagazine
published theirreview anyway, which contained unsatisfactory
ratings.58 Network Associatessentalettertothemagazinecom-
municatingitsconcernsandreferencingtherestrictivelanguage
in itslicensing agreem ent, which prom pted the states attorney 
generaltoinvestigatethematter.59
51 See Bast, supra note32, at649;Garfield, supra note 32, at 30609. 
52 See Bast, supra note 32, at 64546, 64849; Dworkin & Callahan, supra
note 42, at 17679; Garfield, supra note 32, at 32526. 
53 See CenterforDemocracy& TechnologyComplaint& RequestforInvesti-
gation, InjunctionandOtherReliefbeforetheFederalTradeCommission, In the
Matter of Medical Justice Corp. 1, 9 (Nov. 9, 2011)[hereinafterCDT Complaint].
54 758 N.Y.S.2d466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
55 Id. at467. Thedisputedprovisionstated:
Installingthissoftwareconstitutesacceptanceofthetermsand
conditionsofthelicenseagreem entinthebox. Pleasereadthe
licenseagreementbeforeinstallation. Otherrulesandregula-
tionsofinstallingthesoftwareare:
a. The product cannot be rented, loaned, or leased you are 
thesoleownerofthisproduct.
b. Thecustomershallnotdisclosetheresultofanybenchmark
test to any third party without Network Associates prior 
writtenapproval.
c. Thecustomerwillnotpublish reviewsofthisproductwith-
outpriorconsentfrom NetworkAssociates, Inc.
Id. See Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech
Rights: The Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POLY 37, 39
45 (2007)(warningofgrowinguseofgagwrapclausesin softwareindustryto
chillconsumerand journalistspeech on productcomparisons);Read, supra
note 46, at 40002 (discussing the use of DeWitt clauses to prevent publica-
tionofbench-markingtestresultsfordatabasesoftware).
56 Network Associates, 758 N.Y.S.2dat467.
57 Id. at467.
58 Id.
59 Id.
74 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
The court determined that the rules and regulations language 
im properly suggested thatposting reviews withoutpermission
violated state or federal laws which was not accurate and that 
consumers may be deceived into abandoning their right to publish 
reviews and results of benchmark tests.60 TheNew YorkSuperior
Courtultimatelyheldthataconfidentialityclausethatprevented
anycustom ercom mentaryon theantivirusandfirewallsoftware
program wasa deceptivetradepractice.61 However, thedecision
didnotinvalidateallconfidentialityclausespreventingconsum er
speech only deceptive ones.62
Thedesirabilityofcontractsofsilenceisstillhotlycontested,
especiallywhentheseagreementsposeriskstoothernon-contract-
ing parties, such as the generalpublic.63 For exam ple, public
safetymaybeendangeredwhentherisksofadefectiveproductare
concealedin tortsettlementagreementsorwhen whistleblowers
areprevented from speakingoutagainstemployerwrongdoing.64
Courtsandlegalscholarshavelongwrestledwith differentlegal
testsand proposed approachesto setting the properbalance in
evaluatingthevalidityanddesirabilityofcontractsofsilence.65
Unlikemany contractsofsilence, nondisparagem entclauses
mayallow foracertain am ountortypeofspeech. Usually, posi-
tivespeech isperm issible, whilenegativeexpressions, critiques,
or remarks harm ful to another partys im age and interests are 
forbidden.66 Theseprovisionsarecommonlyfoundin caseswhere
m utualtrustand confidentiality arekey featuresofan existing
orpriorlegalrelationship, and continued com municationsm ay
60 Id. at469.
61 Id. at470.
62 Id. at470. Thecourtindicated thatthecompany would berequired to
provide thirty days advance notice to the Attorney Generalofany future
language seeking to restrict consumers rights to publish their assessments. Id.
at 47071. 
63 See Garfield, supra note 32, at 33334. 
64 See Bast, supra note 32, at 64446, 649, 65253; Garfield, supra note32,
at334, 344, 361.
65 See generally Garfield, supra note 32, at 266, 31518 (calling for stronger 
judicialregulation through balancingtestofcontractsofsilencewith refusal
to uphold contracts ofsilence when public interestin disclosure outweighs
anylegitimateprivateinterestsincontractenforcement).
66 See Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at45.
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be necessary in the relationship. Forexample, in a separation
agreement, ex-spousesm ay agree notto disparage one another
to protectthe interestsoftheirchildren and to promote family
harmony. Similarly, in thecontextoftheemployer-employeere-
lationship, a nondisparagem entclausem ay beseen asan effort
to supportthe duty ofconfidentiality and loyalty already owed
by the em ployee to the employer.67 A nondisparagem entclause
in an em ployee severance agreementmay also extend existing
fiduciarydutiesaftertheterm ination ofthepriorrelationship.68
These contractualcurbs on speech m ay also be considered
partofthebargained-forexchangebetween theparties, with the
m uzzledpartybeingfinanciallycom pensatedin som ewayforits
silence. An ex-spouse may agree notto criticize a co-parentas
partofa broaderexchangeaim ed atfinalizing a distribution of
assets and otherproperty rights between the divorcing couple.
Further, an em ployeewhoiscurrentlybeingpaidbyan employer
orseekingcom pensation from aformeremployerundera sever-
anceagreem entm ayagreenottocriticizethatemployer.69 How-
ever, such nondisparagementclauses may be lim ited by other
existinglawsorregulations, such astherecentcrackdown bythe
NationalLaborRelationsBoard(NLRB)on overlybroadnondis-
paragementclausesin employersocialmediapolicies.70 TheNLRB
67 See Bast, supra note 32, at 66162; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note42,
at153.
68 See Garfield, supra note32, at265;see infra notes 290302 and accom -
panyingtext.
69 See Alison Frankel, Congress, whistleblower lawyers urge SEC to police
de facto gag clauses, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison
-frankel/2014/10/29/congress-whistleblower-lawyers-urge-sec-to-police-de-facto
-gag-clauses/[http://perma.cc/A7QJ-TZLK];Yin Wilczek, SEC Officials Warn
Against Contracts to Discourage Employee Whistle-Blowing, BNA BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 14, 2013). TheSecuritiesandExchangeCom mission (SEC)recentlyin-
dicated concernsaboutseverance agreementsthatmay include gag clauses
thatm ay preventformeremployees from reporting financialm isconductto
SEC whistleblowingprogramsandmayviolatetheFalseClaimsAct. In addi-
tion, theSEC mayfileactionsagainstattorneystocensureorbarthem from
practicing before it for drafting egregious confidentiality clauses in severance 
agreements. See Wilczek, supra.
70 Reportofthe Acting GeneralCounselConcerning SocialMedia Cases,
N.L.R.B. Memorandum OM 12-59 (May 30, 2012);ReportoftheActing Gen-
eralCounselConcerningSocialMediaCases, N.L.R.B. Memorandum OM 12-31
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hasinvalidatedanumberofexpansivenondisparagementclauses
that infringe upon an employees righttoconcerted action with
co-workerstoaddressworkplacetermsandconditions.71
Nondisparagem entclauses have also been litigated in con-
textswherethesilencedpartyisnotreceivinganycom pensation
fortheirsuppressedspeech, andmayeven bepayingthebusiness
foraproductorservicewhilecensoringtheirown speech. In the
softwarerealm, therehavebeen frequentbattlesovertheright
ofsoftware companiesto silence criticismsoftheirproductsin
databasevendorcontractsandbetatestingagreementsnegotiated
between comm ercialparties.72 In the database context, speech
suppression provisionshave been justified asprotecting a com -
panys brand and product reputation from the users inadequate 
orpoortestingenvironments.73 Further, in thebetatestingsitu-
ation, software companies have argued that confidentiality is
needed to elicitproprietary feedback and avoid unfairproduct
criticismsaboutproductbugsandotherdefectsthatmaybecor-
rectedduringthethird partytestingphase.74 Thisapproach has
alsospread tonon-negotiated consumercontractsofadhesion or
enduserlicensingagreem ents(EULAs).75 ManyEULAsbroadly
(Jan. 24, 2012);ReportoftheActingGeneralCounselConcerningSocialMedia
Cases, N.L.R.B. Memorandum OM 11-74(Aug. 18, 2011).
71 See Belm as& Larson, supra note 55, at 38, 4041; Read, supra note46,
at 39597. 
72 See Belm as& Larson, supra note 55, at 38, 4041; Read, supra note46,
at 39597. 
73 See Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at38;Read, supra note 46, at 39697. 
74 See Read, supra note 46, at 39697. 
75 See Belmas& Larson, supra note 55, at 4445; Read, supra note46, at
389, 40002; Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A Users Guide to EULAs,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide
-eulas[http://perma.cc/XSE6-FB9W][hereinafterEFF GUIDE]. ProfessorsBelmas
and Larson raised early alarm saboutnondisparagementclausesin EULAs
forconsumer-orientedsoftware:
Disparage can be read in both its com m on meaning of 
speak[ing] of in a slighting or disrespectful way; belittle[ing], 
which could includetruthfulstatements, orin itslegalsense
of m aking false and injurious statem ent[s] that discredit or 
detract from  the reputation of anothers property, product, or 
business. Imposing restrictions on disparagement, in the former 
sense, oftheFrontPageproductm ay seem alarm ing enough;
theclausegoesfurther, extending theban on disparagem ent
ofMicrosoftand itsbusinesspartners. Itishardtoimaginea
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prohibitanycriticismsofsoftwareproductseven aftertheyhave
been marketedanddistributedtothegeneralpublic, undermining
assertionsaboutsafeguardingproprietaryinterestsand avoiding
unfaircriticismsoverpre-releaseproducts.76
Outsideofthesoftwarecontext, confidentiality clauseswere
nottypically found in the consum errealm . In part, businesses
did notwantto lose outon valuable word-of-mouth marketing
between custom ers.77 In addition, somebusinessownerswantto
know aboutcustomerissuesin ordertoresolvethem andimprove
custom er experiences and relationships longer-term.78 Other
businessesand professionalsmayhaveoriginallysoughttobring
defamation actionsagainstonlinereviewerstosilencecriticisms,
butthisapproach isboth expensiveanddifficulttoprove.79 With
thesurgein consumerreview andratingwebsites, confidentiality
and nondisparagementclauses have become an inexpensive al-
ternativeto litigation. Although these clausesm ay im pactboth
offlineandonlinedialogue, theirprimarytargetistosquelchcrit-
icism on a growing num berofcrowdsourced rating and review
sites.80 Theaveragecustomermayhavelittleornoawarenessthat
theyhavelimited theirspeech rightsorwaived opportunitiesto
justificationforMicrosofttoexactsuch apromisefrom itscus-
tomers, andyetithasbeendoingsoforatleastthreeyears.
Consideringthepower, pervasiveinfluence, and financial
resourcesofthesesoftwarecompanies, andthedangerthatthey
may beabletosuppresstruthfulspeech abouttheirproducts
and even aboutsubjectstotallyunrelated totheirproducts, it
isessentialthatgagwrapclausesbeevaluatedcritically. In at
leastsomecases, theyshouldbeheldunenforceable.
Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at45 (footnotesomitted).
76 See Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at75;Read, supra note46, at389,
40002; EFF GUIDE, supra note75.
77 See Russelletal., supra note11.
78 Id.
79 TheRestatementdefinesdefam ation as:
a falseand defam atory statem entconcerning another;(b)an
unprivileged publication toa third party;(c)faultamounting
atleasttonegligenceon thepartofthepublisher[with respect
to the actofpublication];and (d)either actionability ofthe
statementirrespectiveofspecialharm ortheexistenceofspe-
cialharm causedbythepublication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §558.
80 See infra PartII andaccompanyingtext.
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reporton negativeexperiences. Recentlegalactionsandnewsar-
ticlesaboutbusiness-consumerskirmisheshavehighlightedsome
ofthekeyfeaturesofthesetypesofnondisparagementclauses.81
Someoftheseconsum ercontractsincludeadhesiveconfiden-
tiality provisionsthatwarn consum ersup frontthatthey m ust
seek prior approval potentially in writing before discussing 
theirconsum erexperiences.82 In these situations, the business
servesasthegatekeeperofitsbrandimage, grantingspeechrights
toconsumerswhowillsing theirpraisesand rejecting requests
from those who may post negative critiques. Ifthe consum er
postsanyway withoutconsent, then the custom erm ay be sued
forbreach ofcontract. However, itisunlikelythatabusinesswill
sue a consumerm aking positive rem arks forviolating a confi-
dentiality provision,83 leaving only those consumers who make
derogatory remarksto face potentiallitigation. Yet, in general,
businessesdesire the positive buzzofconsum erword ofmouth
both onlineand offline, sobroad confidentialityclausesmaynot
suittheirm arketing needs. Itis also adm inistratively difficult
and costlyforabusinesstoreview everyrequesttocomm enton
aconsumerexperience.
In lightoftheseconcerns, nondisparagementclauseshavebe-
comeaquick, cost-effectivewaytohandlethisgatekeepingfunc-
tion by broadly allowing positive speech and only suppressing
negativecommentary. Nondisparagementprovisionsarepopping
up in a widerangeofadhesiveconsumercontracts, from online
shopping venues to hotels and rentals84 to wedding photogra-
phersand medicalprofessionals.85 In som einstances, an initial
81 See infra notes 92171 and accompanying text; see generally Marciarille,
supra note 15, at 390, 395, 40102 (discussing term s of earlier Medical Jus-
ticeCorporation contractformsutilized bysomem edicalprofessionals);CDT
Complaint, supra note 53, at 58 (reviewing various form s of nondisparage-
mentclausesinthemedicalcontext).
82 See CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 67. 
83 See infra PartII andaccompanyingtext.
84 ChristopherElliott, New confidentiality clauses can influence vacation
rental reviews (Apr. 14, 2012), http://elliott.org/blog/new-confidentiality-clauses
-can-influence-vacation-rental-reviews/[http://perma.cc/GNS9-HBCW].
85 Eric Goldman, Fining Customers For Negative Online Reviews Isnt 
New... Or Smart, FORBES TECH (Aug. 8, 2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/08/07/fining-customers-for-negative-online-reviews
-isnt-new-or-smart/[http://perma.cc/C5MG-DZEL].
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consumercontractm ay notincludea nondisparagementclause,
butan unhappycustom ermaylaterberequiredtoagreetosuch
a clause to obtain a refund on products and services.86 These
clausesareusuallybroadlywordedtopreventonlynegativecom-
mentary, whilelaudatoryspeechisallowed.87
Often, nondisparagementprovisionsarefram ed in a manner
thatkeepstheprimary focuson thebusinessinvestm entin the
brands developm ent and establishment of its goodwill in the 
marketplace, whileobscuringtheefforttolimitconsumerspeech.88
Negativecritiquesareframed ascausing tangiblelossesin rev-
enuesand damaging brand reputation.89 Many consumersmay
notrecognizethateven theirhonestlyheld opinionsorfactually
true statementsabouttheirexperiencesare being relinquished
undertheseprovisions. Theseclausesmayalsoindicatethatthey
bind not only the consum er, but also m em bers of the consumers 
familywhoarenotsignatoriestotheagreem ent.90
In som e ofthese agreements, consumersare furtherthreat-
enedwith liquidateddamagesclausesthatsetoutdailypenalties
forposting a criticalreview untilthe posting isrem oved.91 For
exam ple, in Palmer v. KlearGear.com,92 plaintiffJohn Palm eror-
dered small-dollarChristmasgiftsfrom KlearGear.com .93 When
86 See FTC v. Ivy Capital, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42369 (D. Nev.
Mar. 26, 2013)(rulingthatconditioningrefundofbusinesscoachingprogram
on subsequentnondisparagem entclauseisadeceptivepracticewhen notdis-
closedatoutsettoconsum er).
87 Elliott, supra note84;see also Goldman, supra note85.
88 Goldman, supra note85;CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 67. 
89 CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 67. 
90 CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 67, 11. 
91 See supra notes 8485 and accom panying text; LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26;SongmeeL. Connolly, Dont Disregard Calif.s Non-Disparage-
ment Clause Ban, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.law360.com
/articles/585252/don-t-disregard-calif-s-non-disparagement-clause-ban [http://
perma.cc/LK8F-7QXC];Tim Cushing, Online Retailer Says If You Give It A
Negative Review It Can Fine You $3,500, TECHDIRT (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:58 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131113/06112425228/online-retailer-slaps-un
happy-customers-with-3500-fee-violating-non-disparagement-clause.shtml[http:/
perma.cc/SNM3-HZ9R].
92 OrderEntering DefaultJudgment, Palmerv. KlearGear.com, No. 1:13-
cv-00175)(D. UtahJuly1, 2014).
93 Connolly, supra note91;Cushing, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26.
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theitemsneverarrived, hetried tocontacttheonlinemerchant,
but was unsuccessful.94 His spouse, Jennifer Kulas, posted a
negativereview ofKlearGear.com on RipoffReport.com .95 About
three years later, Palm erreceived a billof$3,500 from Klear-
Gear.com claiming violation ofits nondisparagement clause.96
When Palmerrefused to pay, KlearGear.com reported theirre-
fusalasan unpaiddebttocreditreportingagencies.97 Thecouple
disputed the claim ed delinquency, butwere unsuccessfulin re-
movingitfrom theircreditreport.98 Theunresolveddebtharm ed
the couples ability to obtain credit for a car loan and furnace 
repair.99 PublicCitizen, on behalfoftheplaintiffs, filedanaction
seekingadeclaratoryjudgm entthattheclausewasinvalid100 as
unconscionableandin violation ofFirstAmendmentrights.101 In
adefaultjudgment, theUtahDistrictCourtultimatelyinvalidated
theclause,102 declaring thatPalmerand Kulasowed nodebtto
94 Cushing, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
95 Cushing, supra note91.
96 Id. Thereportedcontractclausestatedthefollowing:
Non-Disparagement Clause
In an efforttoensurefairandhonestpublicfeedback, and
topreventthepublishingoflibelouscontentin anyform, your
acceptanceofthissalescontractprohibitsyou from taking any
action thatnegativelyim pactsKlearGear.com, itsreputation,
products, services, m anagementoremployees.
Should you violate this clause, as determined by Klear-
Gear.com in itssolediscretion, you willbeprovidedaseventy-
two(72)houropportunitytoretractthecontentin question. If
thecontentremains, inwholeorin part, you willimmediately
be billed $3,500.00 USD for legalfees and courtcosts until
such completecostsaredeterminedin litigation. Shouldthese
chargesremain unpaid for30 calendardaysfrom the billing
date, yourunpaid invoicewillbeforwardedtoourthird party
collection firm andwillbereportedtoconsumercreditreport-
ingagenciesuntilpaid.
Id.
97 Connolly, supra note91;Cushing, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26.
98 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
99 Connolly, supra note91;Cushingsupra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26.
100 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
101 Connolly, supra note91.
102 OrderEnteringDefaultJudgment, Palmerv. KlearGear.com, No. 1:13-
cv-00175)(D. UtahJuly1, 2014). See Connolly, supra note91;Cushing, supra
note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
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KlearGear.com 103 and awarding them over$300,000 in compen-
satoryandpunitivedamages, alongwithcostsandattorneyfees.104
In otherinstances, thelanguagemaysuggesttoaconsumerthat
theclauseisrequiredunderlaw orisnecessarytoprotectan im-
portantlegalright, asin Network Associates.105 Theaveragein-
dividualmay decidenottocritiquea businessoutofa desireto
complywith lawsoutsideoftheprivateorderingofthecontract,
includingtradem ark, copyright, andprivacylaws.106
In addition, som ebusinesseshavetried toassertdubiousin-
tellectualproperty claim s to avoid criticism oftheir business
activities.107 Copyrightassignmentclausesmaybefeaturesofcer-
tainnondisparagementprovisions.108 Underthesetypesofclauses,
consumersagree to assign theircopyrightsto theirrem arksto
the business.109 Ifthe consumerposts something thatthe busi-
nessdoesnotlike oragree with, the businessm ay contactthe
consum ertorem oveapostingorelsefacelitigation forbreach of
contractand thespecificcopyrightassignmentclause.110 A con-
sumermaydeletetheirpostingtoavoid litigation withoutrecog-
nizing theirfairuse rightsundercopyright.111 In addition, cus-
tomerswhorefusetoeliminatetheirreviewsrisklitigationormay
seetheirpostingsexpunged in responsetoa DigitalMillennium
CopyrightAct(DMCA)takedown notice.112 Thistakedown notice
mayviolateboth ethicaldutiesandlegalobligationsbydisclosing
103 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26. ThecourtdeterminedthatKlear-
Gear.com wasliabletoPalmerand KulasforviolationsoftheFairCreditRe-
portingAct, aswellasfordefamation, intentionalinterferencewith prospec-
tivecontractualrelations, andintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress. Id.
104 Connolly, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
105 Network Associates, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 468470. 
106 See supra notes 5259 and accom panying text. 
107 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39598; CDT Com plaint, supra note53,
at 78. 
108 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39598; CDT Com plaint, supra note53,
at 78. 
109 Marciarille, supra note15, at395.
110 Id.; see, e.g., Connolly, supra note91.
111 Marciarille, supra note15, at395.
112 Sean D. Lee, I Hate My Doctor: Reputation, Defamation, and Physician-
Review Websites, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 574, 59395 (2013); Marciarille, supra note
15, at395;CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 1113, 17. About one-third of 
DMCA takedownnoticesarelegallysuspect. Marciarille, supra note15, at395.
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the existence ofa confidentialassociation, such asthe doctor-
patientrelationship.113
Attimes, agagclausemayalsolooktotrademarklaw toshield
abusinessfrom criticism.114 A businessmayassertownershipof
a tradem ark in the name ofitsbusiness, products, orservices.
Asthetrademark holder, theclausemay indicatethatthecon-
sum erisnotpermitted tousea businesss name or marks with-
outpriorapproval. Itwouldbeimpossibletoreporteffectivelyon
aconsumerinteractionwithamerchantorotherprofessionalifthe
nam eofthebusiness, product, orservicecannotbem entioned. A
consumerm aybereluctanttopostanegativereview outofcon-
cern aboutpossibletrademark infringem entordilution actions.
However, theseclausesdonotindicatethata consumerretains
a right of fair use for a businesss trademarks.115
Similarly, in health caresituations, somemedicalprofessionals
have utilized so-called m utual privacy agreem ents to deter pa-
tientcriticisms.116 Medicalprofessionalsalreadyhaveboth legal
duties and professionalethics that require them to m aintain
patientconfidentiality.117 Thesecontractshaveinitiated further
debateaboutthecontoursofprivacyforboth patientsanddoctors
in thisintimate relationship.118 Underthese privacy contracts,
113 See Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39192. By sending out a takedown 
notice orsuing a patientforviolating these clauses, a medicalprofessional
maybein violation ofHIPAA bytakingan action perceived asretaliatoryor
intimidatingagainstapatient. See 45 C.F.R. §164.530(g)(2013).
114 Belmas& Larson, supra note55.
115 See 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4)(2014). See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. WalkingMoun-
tain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 799800 (9th Cir. 2003) (use of Barbie tradem ark 
asnominativefairuseaspointofreferenceforartisticparody and critique);
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)(parody
ofBarbie trademark in song as fair use);Sunm ark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray
Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1056, 105859, 1061 (7th Cir. 1995) (use of 
ordinarywordsin trademark permissibleasdescriptiveterms);AugustStorck
K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 61820 (7th Cir. 1995) (use of tradem ark 
forproductcomparisonasnominativefairuse).
116 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36263; CDT Com plaint, supra note53,
at 38 (discussing term s of earlier MedicalJusticeCorporationcontractforms
utilizedbysomemedicalprofessionals).
117 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39192; Lee, supra note 112, at 57980; 
CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 1113, 17. 
118 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39293. 
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thedoctorordentistpromisestoprovideadditionalprivacyprotec-
tionstopatientrecords, such asnotsellingorsharingpatientin-
formation withthirdpartymarketers, in exchangeforthepatient
notposting criticalrem arksanywhereon theWeb.119 Thistype
ofdisclosureisaviolation oftheprivacyandsecurityrulesofthe
Health InsurancePortabilityandAccountabilityAct(HIPAA),120
soonly themedicalprofessional, notthepatient, isgaining any
added privacy protections.121 These speech suppression efforts
may also contravene aspects ofthe Affordable Care Act(ACA)
and data collection by health care insurersin which surveysof
patientexperiencesplayan importantrolein determiningmedi-
calservices, quality, andcostreim bursem ents.122
119 Id. at 36263; CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 38. 
120 TheOfficeofCivilRights(OCR)oftheU.S. DepartmentofHealth and
Human Services previously determined thatthese types ofmutualprivacy
agreem entsviolateHIPAA. TheOCR reportstatedthat
[a]physicianpracticerequestedthatpatientssignanagreement
entitled Consent and Mutual Agreement to Maintain Privacy. 
Theagreementprohibitedthepatientfrom directlyorindirectly
publishingorairingcommentaryaboutthephysician, hisexper-
tise, and/or treatment in exchange for the physicians compliance 
with the Privacy Rule. A patients rights under the Privacy Rule 
are not contingent on the patients agreem ent with a covered 
entity. A covered entitys obligation to comply with all require-
mentsofthe Privacy Rule cannotbe conditioned on the pa-
tients silence. OCR required the covered entity to cease using 
the patient agreem ent that conditioned the entitys com pli-
ance with the Privacy Rule. Additionally, OCR required the
coveredentitytoreviseitsNoticeofPrivacyPractices.
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND SECURITY RULE COM-
PLIANCE FOR CALENDAR YEARS 2009 AND 2010 15 (2010), http://www.hhs.gov
/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/compliancerept.pdf[http://perma.cc/YE9E-PSZH].
See 45 C.F.R. §164.530(h)(2015)(individualsmay notberequired towaive
theirrightsasa condition oftreatment, payment, health plan enrollmentor
benefitseligibility). See also Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39394, 40203; 
Lee, supra note 112, at 57980;CDT Complaint, supra note53, at13.
121 Marciarille, supra note15, at363, 391.
122 Id. at 36465, 37983. Despite current efforts to im prove the collection 
andaccesstopatientexperiencedata, somemedicalprofessionalsutilizeacom-
bination ofspeech suppression efforts to thwartnegative patientonline re-
views. Id. at 36465. Prof. Marciarille states that
[t]hemechanismsofthreatened control copyright law, defa-
mation law, and HIPAA are interesting. But the timing is even 
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Theclassaction ofLee v. Makhnevich123 bringstogetherdiffer-
entthreadsofthesequestionablenondisparagementclausesin a
billingdisputebetween apatientandadentist.124 Theleadplain-
tiff, Lee, soughtem ergencydentalcarefrom Dr. Makhnevich.125
Herofficerequired Leetosign amutualprivacyagreementthat
prom ised the above-noted additionalprivacy protections in ex-
change for her continued protection ofhis patientinformation
from third party marketing firms.126 The agreementalso con-
tained a copyrightassignmentclauseand a liquidated dam ages
provision tohelpenforcethegagclause.127 Leepaidabout$4,800
moreso. Justasan industryarisestopoliceonlinephysician
reviews, thefederalgovernmentpushesitsown largestgovern-
mentfunded insurance programs to begin to collectpatient
satisfaction and patientexperiencedataand tomakeitavail-
able online thus setting up a collision between the irresistible 
forcepushing forincreased transparency on patientsatisfac-
tion data and the imm ovable objectofphysiciansclosing the
examinationroom doorevermoretightlyagainstasociety-wide
trendtowardonlineinformationsharing.
Id. at 36465 (footnotes om itted). See also CDT Complaint, supra note53, at
18 (discussingDepartmentofHealth and Human Serviceseffortstopromote
patient engagem ent and patient-centered care). 
123 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013). See Complaint, Lee
v. Makhnevich, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013)(No. 11-
civ-8665), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Lee-v-Makhnevich-complaint.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D4ZU-58H6][hereinafterLeeComplaint].
124 See GerganaKoleva, Dentist to the Stars Sued for Suppressing Bad Re-
views Online, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:10 PM)http:/www.forbes.com/sites/gerga
nakoleva/2011/12/08/dentist-to-the-stars-sued-for-suppressing-bad-reviews-on
line/;DinaElBoghdady, Some doctors try to squelch online reviews, WASH. POST
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/some-doc
tors-try-to-squelch-online-reviews/2011/11/29/gIQA2KQhYQ_story.html[http://
perma.cc/DG4R-J87V];EricGoldman, You Shouldnt Need a Copyright Lawyer 
to Pick a Dentist, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013, 1:14PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/ericgoldman/2013/04/17/you-shouldnt-need-a-copyright-lawyer-to-pick-a-dentist/.
125 LeeComplaint, supra note123, at2.
126 Id. at 2, 56. The com plaint contended that the prom ises of additional 
privacy falsely stated protectionsfrom loopholesin theprivacy provisionsof
HIPAA. Lee Complaint, supra note 123, at5. MedicalJustice had provided
these forms, which the firm indicated have now been retired. ElBoghdady,
supra note124;Koleva, supra note124. However, thesecontractsm aystillbe
in effectforpatientspriortothechangein theseforms. See CDT Complaint,
supra note 53, at 35. 
127 LeeComplaint, supra note123, at2, 8. Theclausein disputestated, in
part:
2016] CONSUMER GAG CONTRACTS 85 
directly tothedentistforhisdentalcareand had toseek reim-
bursementfrom hisdentalinsuranceprogram .128 Monthslater,
Leecontendedthathewasunabletoreceivereimbursementunder
his dentalinsurance because Makhnevichs office had failed to 
provide the insurer with the needed paperwork.129 Lee posted
criticismsofMakhnevich on DoctorBase, Yelp, and othercrowd-
sourced rating sites.130 Makhnevich sentLee a warning letter
aboutbreachingtheterm softheirmutualprivacyagreem ent131
and began assessing him $100 per day under the liquidated
damagesclause forinfringing hercopyright.132 In addition, the
complaintalleged thatshesenttakedown noticestothesesites
demanding the removal of Lees posts and disclosing personal 
informationinviolation ofHIPAA.133
Theconsum errightsorganization PublicCitizen took on the
classaction becauseofitsconcernsabouttheimpactofsuch gag
In consideration for treatm ent[,]   [p]atient agrees to refrain 
from directly or indirectly publishing   com m entary upon 
Dentistand his practice, expertise and/or treatment[sic]If
Patient does prepare commentary for publication about
Dentist, thePatientexclusively assignsallIntellectualProp-
erty rights, including copyrights, to Dentistforany written,
pictorial, and/or electronic com m entary . This agreem ent 
shallbeoperativeand effectiveatthetimeofcreation (prior
to publication) of the comm entary . In addition, Patient will 
notdenigrate, defame, disparage, orcastaspersionsupon the
Dentist; and   will use all reasonable efforts to prevent any 
memberoftheirimmediatefamilyoracquaintancefrom engag-
inginanysuchactivity.
Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *34 (quoting Lee Com plaint Ex. A ¶ 3). 
128 Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at*4. Thecomplaintassertsthattheser-
vicesshould onlyhavecostthepatient$200. LeeComplaint, supra note123,
at2. See Koleva, supra note124;ElBoghdady, supra note124.
129 Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at*4. See ElBoghdady, supra note124.
130 Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *56. See Lee Complaint, supra note
123, at 78; Koleva, supra note124.
131 Koleva, supra note124. See LeeComplaint, supra note 123, at 78. 
132 Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at*5. See LeeComplaint, supra note123,
at8;Koleva, supra note124.
133 Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at*6. See LeeComplaint, supra note123, at
8. Thecomplaintindicated thattakedown noticessenttoYelpandDoctorBase
disclosed the plaintiffs personal information, including date of birth, height, 
weight, address, andphoto, in violation ofHIPAA. LeeComplaint, supra note
123, at8.
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clauses on patients free speech and privacy rights, along with 
thepotentialm isuseofintellectualpropertylaw.134 Makhnevich
sought to dismiss Lees case, but the court refused, allowing 
Lees claims of contract invalidity based on a lack ofconsider-
ation and hisassertion offairuseforthe copyrightassignm ent
tomoveforward.135 Eventually, Makhnevich seemstohaveclosed
herdentalpractice, andshebecameunavailableforthecontinu-
ationoftheclassactionagainsther.136
Itisimportantto note thatthese recentconsum ervictories
come largely through defaulting businesses, ratherthan a full-
throated defenseoftheseclauses, soitisunclearifothercourts
willcontinue tofollow thisnascentpath. Further, contractlaw
isa state-by-state endeavorand otherstatesmay notem brace
thisconsum er-friendlyapproach.137
A businesss use of these adhesivegag provisionspresentsa
number ofserious issues for both consum ers and com petitors.
First, these clauses squelch allform s ofnegative commentary,
including truthfuland opinion speech. Courtshaveconsistently
recognizedthattheseformsofspeech, both positiveandnegative,
arelegallyprotected.138 Inaddition, substantialtruth139 andopin-
ion speech140 aredefensestoclaim sofdefam ation. Theseclauses
prohibitcritiques, regardlessofveracity.141
Second, theseprovisionschillfurtherconsumerspeech, result-
ingin concernsaboutconsumerdeception. Alongwith attacking
134 Koleva, supra note 124. The com plaint also indicated that Lees cri-
tiquesofhisdentalcareexperiencefellunderfairuse. LeeComplaint, supra
note123, at3.
135 Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2, *8, *1617. 
136 Koleva, supra note124.
137 See supra notes 6487 and accompanying text. 
138 See, e.g., Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moodys Invr Servs., 175 
F.3d 848, 85256 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing First Am endm ent protections of 
opinion speech and upholding dismissalofdefamation claim based on opin-
ions in Moodys article on school bonds evaluation); Kellogg & Frankel, supra
note24, at1.
139 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra
notes 28, 36, 7287 and accom panying text. 
140 See supra notes 28, 38, 7287 and accom panying text. 
141 David Farren, What is a Non-Disparagement Clause and Why You 
May Not Want to Sign One, JABURG WILK, http://www.jaburgwilk.com/news
-publications/what-is-a-non-disparagement-clause-and-why-you-may-not-want
-to-sign-one[http://perma.cc/F45T-S3BD].
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protected categories of speech, other consum ers speech will be 
discouraged overconcerns aboutaggressive business tactics in
enforcing thesegag contractsagainstnegativereviewsand rat-
ings and fear oflitigation based in defam ation for expressing
ones views.142 Overall, consum er speech willbe lessened and
availableinform ationreducedaboutproductandservicequality,
which harms informed decision making by other customers.143
Consum erswillalsobedeceivedbecausetheseclauseswillskew
ratings and reviews toward positive feedback with little or no
criticism availableforconsum erconsideration.144
Third, notonlydoconsumerssufferharm, butothercom peti-
tors are also unfairly disadvantaged on crowdsourced review
sites.145 Manybusinessesinviteconsumerdialogue, positiveand
negative, asawaytolearn aboutthecustom erexperienceandto
determine areas for needed improvem ent.146 Merchants and
professionals who utilize nondisparagem entclauses falsely in-
flatetheirrankingsand reviewsoverbusinessesseekingcandid
142 Shauna L. Spinosa, Note, Yelp! Libel or Free Speech: The Future of
Internet Defamation Litigation in Massachusetts in the Wake of Noonan v.
Staples, 44SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 748, 754(2011). Spinosawarnedthat
[t]hethreatoflitigation tobloggersandonlinereviewerschills
freespeech by exposing internetuserstoliability forposting
any criticalopinionsorexperienceson the internet, whether
trueornot. Increased accessibilitytocustomerreviewsorin-
formation on an individual or their services via internet
search enginesmakescriticalblogsormessagesaperm anent
reputation blight, thereby affecting em ploymentpossibilities
or customer-based business. Defamed individuals and busi-
nessesoften threaten litigation againstcriticalposters, which
sometimesresultsin hostsitestakingdown negativeposts, or
bloggersnotpostinganynegativeopinionsatall.
Id. at748 (footnotesomitted). See DMCA Notices, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://
www.chillingeffects.org/topics/29 [http://perma.cc/44PF-YB78](providing DMCA
notices to inform public about aggressive copyright holders); Trademark,
CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/topics/6 [http://perma.cc/EN
8S-Y6RU](providingonlineaccesstoaggressiveceaseanddesistlettersfrom
trademarkholders).
143 Belmas & Larson, supra note 55, at38;Spinosa, supra note 142, at
75455. 
144 CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 1516. 
145 See Short, supra note3, at444, 447.
146 Dohse, supra note3, at387.
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consumerfeedback.147 Thisapproach providesan unfairadvan-
tageforbusinessestryingtosquelch consumerspeech.
II. KEY MOTIVATORS FOR UTILIZATION OF
NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES
On the surface, businesses instituting nondisparagem ent
clausesseem toview anynegativecritiquesasseriousthreatsto
brand imageandvalue, ratherthan constructivefeedback on the
custom er experience. Although im portantspeech ramifications
are atstake, thiscontentiousdebate m ay be more complicated
than itinitially appearson itsface. Theunderlying reasonsfor
the developmentand use ofthese kindsofclausesgo beyond a
desiretosuppressnegativespeech andraiseanumberofconcerns
about crowdsourced review sites. As disputes over nondispar-
agem entclausescontinue toarise, thereisa need to addressa
morecom pletepictureofthedriving forcesbehind such clauses
in ordertoeffectivelydealwiththeseissues.
Many smallbusinessesand professionalsfeelthey arebeing
victimized byparticipantsin and ownersofcrowdsourced rating
sites.148 With thedemandsofrunning ones own enterprise, many 
businessownersmayfocustheireffortsanddollarson marketing
through more traditionaloutlets, such as postcards, neighbor-
hood shoppingguides, coupon books, and localnewspapers. The
switch from theone-waymarketingoftraditionalchannelstothe
multi-sidedconsumerdialogueofsocialmediahasbeen adifficult
challengeforsmallbusinesses.149 Unlikelargecorporations, mom-
and-pop businessesm ay lack thetim e, ability, and resourcesto
grapplewith thegrowingpresenceofonlinesocialmedia.150 This
lack ofcontroloverbrand presentation on crowdsourcingreview
sitesmay overwhelm sm allbusinessesthatoften cannotafford
147 See CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at19 (nondisparagementclauses
perm it doctors to falsely curate their online reputations, which is harm ful 
topatientsandcompetitors).
148 See AndreaChang, Tempers flare at Yelps town hall for small business 
owners in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013
/aug/21/business/la-fi-tn-yelp-town-hall-reviews-20130820 [http:/perma.cc/A73P
-HT8D];Dave, supra note17.
149 Dave, supra note17.
150 Id.
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the assistance ofprofessionalmarketing agenciesorreputation
managem entfirm s.151
Thisconfusion oversocialmediainteractionsisfurtherexacer-
batedbyconcernsabouttherampantflow offraudulentreviews
from libelousconsumersand unscrupulouscom petitors. Crowd-
sourcedreview siteshavebecomeunregulatedwarehousesofrep-
utationalinformation.152 Research indicatesthataboutone-third
ofonlineconsumerreviewsarefakeevaluations, andpay-per-post
services generate m ountains ofbogus reviews.153 Som e crowd-
sourced review sitesmaymakeeffortstofilteroutfakereviews,
sometimesbyrem ovinglegitimatepraises, ormissinginaccurate
orlibelousjeers.154 Spottyenforcementeffortsbystateattorneys
generalunderconsumerprotection lawsand theFederalTrade
Commission underitsEndorsementGuidelinesprovidelittleas-
sistancetosm allbusinessesbeingunfairlyattacked. Recently, a
Virginia carpetcleaning com pany, Hadeed CarpetCleaning, be-
camesuspiciousofarash ofanonymousnegativereviewson Yelp
and tried tom atch them up with currentcustomerinformation
and service dates.155 Unable to make the service connections,
Hadeed successfully sued tolearn theidentitiesoftheallegedly
unhappy customersin supportofitsdefamation claims, despite
Yelps promise of anonymity.156
Although disclosurethrough subpoenaesmay aid businesses
bringingdefamationclaims, thisapproachraisesconstitutionalcon-
cernsabouttheprotection ofanonymousspeakers.157 In addition,
151 Id.;Dohse, supra note 3, at 37273; Short, supra note3, at452.
152 Marciarille, supra note15, at376.
153 See supra note1 andaccompanyingtext.
154 See infra notes 10733 and accompanying text. 
155 Yelp, Inc. v. HadeedCarpetCleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d554, 557 (Va. Ct.
App. 2014).
156 See, e.g., Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 25356 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(denyingmotion toquash subpoenatounmask anonymousposters, asplaintiffs
madetheprimafaciecaseoflibeland FirstAmendmentrightstoanonymity
notabsolute).
157 Lidsky, supra note 28, at 88990; Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits
and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity And Accountability In Cyber-
space, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 49596 (2001). Professor 
SpencerrecommendedamendingtheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct
(ECPA)toprovidea thirty-day noticeperiod toanonymousspeakerstopro-
videthem an opportunitytochallengeasubpoenain courtin ordertoprotect
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somedefamation plaintiffsmaynotwantdamages, buttheymay
seekahumiliatingonlineapologyaimedatvindicatingtheirlegal
action andchasteningotherswhomightdarecriticizeabusiness
or professional.158 Stripping away anonymity may chillcandid
onlinespeech andmayinfluenceconsumerwillingnesstopostre-
viewsforfearofa businessorcom m unity backlash.159 Itisim-
portanttonotethattheburden ofproofforgrantingasubpoena
isrelativelylow intheCommonwealthofVirginia, whichdoesnot
havean anti-SLAPP statute.160 However, in otherstates, such as
California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, itm aybequitediffi-
cultto succeed in unmasking an anonymous reviewer without
clearevidencetosupportaprim afaciecaseofdefamation.161
Legalexpertssuggestthatdefamationlawsuitsarethewayto
handlefalseordefam atorycustom erreviews.162 Butm anysm all
businesses already lack the ability to access and pay forlegal
services. Furthermore, defamation can bea difficulttorttopur-
suesuccessfully, anddamagesmaybehardtoproveortocollect
from averageindividualstoremedytheharm suffered.163 In some
theirrighttospeakanonymously. Spencer, supra, at 50912. He warned that 
afailuretoprotectanonymousspeakersonlinemaydrivemanyInternetusers
toseek outanonymizingservices, which wouldonlyfurtherhamperlegitimate
defamationclaim s. Spencer, supra, at519.
158 Lidsky, supra note 28, at 876, 88183; Spencer, supra note157, at498.
159 Lidsky, supra note 28, at 88990; Spencer, supra note 157, at 49899. 
160 Russelletal., supra note11.
161 Id. Some review sites, like Angies List, do not allow anonymous reviews. 
Marciarille, supra note15, at376.
162 See Dohse, supra note 3, at 38182; LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note
26, at10, 11. Somebusinesseshaveutilized ceaseand desistlettersand take-
downnoticesasalternativestomoreexpensivelitigation. LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note 26, at10, 11. See, e.g., Fireworks Restoration Co. v. Hosto, 371
S.W.3d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that former co-founders posting of three 
fakederogatoryonlinereviewswasdefamation resultingin $1 in actualdam-
agesand$150,000 inpunitivedamages).
163 Kellogg & Frankel, supra note 24, at2;Lee, supra note 112, at583;
Lidsky, supra note 28, at 87276; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPU-
TATION:GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 118 (2007);Joanna
Schorr, Note, Malicious Content On The Internet: Narrowing Immunity under
the Communications Decency Act, 87 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 733, 73738, 75152 
(2013). See Goldman, supra note24;but see Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th
1354, 137075 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting dentists action to proceed 
againstpatientwho posted Yelp review afterprima facie showing oflibel).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §588 (1977)(elementsofdefamation).
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instances, businesseshavesufferedapublicrelationsdebaclefor
bringingadefamation claim againstacustomerwhen theircourt
com plaintswentviralonline.164
Forexam ple, in Dietz Dev., LLC v. Perez,165 a Virginia con-
tractor brought a defamation claim against a custom er, Jane
Perez, whopostednegativerem arksabouthisservices.166 In her
criticism , she indicated thatDietzhad billed herforwork that
wasnevercompleted, thathehadtrespassedonherproperty, and
shesuggestedthathehadstolen jewelryfrom herhome.167 In re-
spondingtohercritique, Dietzm adeanum berofclaim sagainst
Perez, includingcontendingthatshehadstolen from him bynot
payingforhisgoodsandserviceson thatproject.168 Dietzfiled a
defamation action againstPerez claiming $300,000 in business
losses and seeking $750,000 in dam ages.169 Ultim ately, a jury
found that both the plaintiffand the defendant had defamed
each other in their fiery online posts, and no dam ages were
awarded to eitherparty.170 Both partiesexpended considerable
effortand resources in taking the matter to court.171 Butthe
cost, tim e, and uncertainties ofa defam ation lawsuitm ake it
problem atictorelyupon atortaction toeffectivelyaddressfalse
ordefam atorypostings.
164 Russelletal., supra note11.
165 No. 2012-16249 (FairfaxCo., Va. Cir. Ct. filedDec. 7, 2012).
166 Justin Jouvenal, Fairfax jury declares a draw in closely watched case
over Yelp reviews, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/in-closely-watched-yelp-case-jury-finds-dual-victory/2014/01/31/2d174580
-8ae5-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html[http:/perma.cc/W4PV-RGXK][here-
inafterJouvenal1];Justin Jouvenal, In Yelp suit, free speech on Web vs. repu-
tations, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com /local/crim e
/2012/12/04/1cdfa582-3978-11e2-a263-f0ebffed2f15_story.html [http://perma.cc
/X8AF-3PVV][hereinafterJouvenal2];AditiMukherji, Yelp Defamation Law-
suit Ends in a Draw, FINDLAW (Feb. 3, 201411:54AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com
/free_enterprise/2014/02/yelp-defamation-lawsuit-ends-in-a-draw.html[http://
perma.cc/5CW2-W4G3].
167 Jouvenal1, supra note166;Jouvenal2, supra note166;Mukherji, supra
note166.
168 Jouvenal1, supra note166;Jouvenal2, supra note166;Mukherji, supra
note166.
169 Jouvenal, supra note166.
170 Id.
171 See supra note166 andaccompanyingtext.
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Even ifthey arenotvictimsoffake ordefam atory postings,
businessownersare likely aware thatreviewsand ratingscan
haveasubstantialimpacton theircurrentand futurerevenues.
A 2011 Harvard BusinessSchoolstudy found thatindependent
restaurantsreaped a 5 to 9 percentincrease in theirrevenues
whentheirYelpratingsroseaboutonestarhigher.172 Conversely,
thepostingofasinglenegativereview onlinecouldcausebusiness
revenuestoplummetabout25 percentorm ore.173 Becausecon-
sumerstend togivegreaterweighttonegativecommentary and
retain itbetterin theirm emories, businessesareconcernedthat
evenafew fakeorrealnegativereviewswilldoom theirfuture.174
Itisoften difficult, expensive, orimpossibletohaveafalsere-
view rem oved from a website.175 In addition, som e customers
mayusethethreatofnegativereviewstogain unfairconcessions
from am erchant.176 Forexample, a vacation rentermaytrash a
rentaland then dem and back a damagedepositwith threatsof
negativeonlinereviews.177 In someinstances, a businessorpro-
fessionalmayuseanondisparagementclauseasaninformalsort-
ingm ethod tohelp determinewhoisa trustworthypatron.178 If
you sign theagreem ent, then you aresomeonethey can engage
172 Dave, supra note17. Similarly, aBerkeleystudyshowedthatahalf-star
improvement led to decreased reservation availability of19 percentduring
peakdiningperiods. Id. Additionally, San Franciscorestaurantswere50 per-
centmorelikely tobebooked up with reservationsaftera half-starincrease
onYelp. Russelletal., supra note11. Seattlerestaurantssaw a10 percentjump
intheirrevenueswithaone-starincreaseonYelp. Russelletal., supra note11.
173 Russelletal., supra note11. TrustYou, ahospitalityreputation manage-
mentcompany, indicated thatabusinesss ratings largely rem ain static after 
theinitialtwelvereviews, soearlyreviewsarecritical. Id.
174 Malbon, supra note9, at144;Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38283, 393
94;Short, supra note 3, at 45051. For psychological reasons, angry online 
rantsaboutproductsand servicesaremorelikelytotap intounderlyinghos-
tilitiesandgoviralm oreoften than othersharedemotions, such assorrow or
disappointment. BERGER, supra note1, at120.
175 Kathleen Richards, Yelp and the Business of Extortion 2.0, E. BAY
EXPRESS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/yelp-and
-the-business-of-extortion-20/Content?oid=1176635&showFullText=true[http://
perma.cc/97JY-VLL3];Tuttle, supra note17.
176 Elliott, supra note84.
177 Id.
178 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 37576. 
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with ifdisagreementsarise, and willwork with thatbusinessto
iron outdifficultiesratherthan airingdisputesonline.179
This fearofnegative reviews m ay have created a panicked
survivalresponseamongsomebusinessesthatm ayturn tonon-
disparagem entclauses to defend them selves againstboth real
andfakereviewsonline. Yetconcernsaboutnegativeratingsmay
be overblown, asm ostwebsite postingsare positive reviews.180
However, unlike traditional word of mouth, online rants and
raveshavean imm ediacy and perm anency notfound in theoff-
line world.181 With the rise ofm obile devices, an ordinary con-
sum er possesses an instant m egaphone that reaches a much
wideraudiencethan word ofmouth.182 Even ifonly a few users
see an initialpost, itm ay be republished repeatedly and could
goviral, becom ingaccessibletom illionsofusersin abriefperiod
oftime.183 A businessm ayfindthatithasbeencriticizedbeforeit
hastheopportunity tolearn aboutortry toresolvea consumer
com plaint. In addition, onlinepostingshavea permanency that
179 Id.
180 Lee, supra note112, at574.
181 Id.;Lidsky, supra note 28, at 86263; Marciarille, supra note15 at371,
377, 394. As to the informality and immediacy ofonline communications,
ProfessorLidskynotesthat
[b]ecause communication can occur almost instantaneously,
participantsin onlinediscussionsplacea premium on speed.
Indeed, in many fora, speed takesprecedence overallother
values, includingnotjustaccuracybutevengrammar, spelling,
and punctuation. Hyperbole and exaggeration are common,
and venting is at least as com m on as careful and considered 
argumentation. ThefactthatmanyInternetspeakersemploy
online pseudonym s tends to heighten this sense that anything 
goes, and som e com m entators have likened cyberspace to a 
frontiersocietyfreefrom theconventionsandconstraintsthat
limitdiscoursein therealworld. Whilethisview isundoubtedly
overstated, certainlytheimmediacyandinformalityofInternet
communicationsm aybecentraltoitswidespreadappeal.
Lidsky, supra note 28, at 86263. 
182 Dave, supra note17;Lee, supra note112 at574;Lidsky, supra note28,
86263; Marciarille, supra note15, at371. Therelativeeaseandinexpensive
accessofonlinecommunicationsprovidesan opportunitytorebalanceunequal
powerdynamicsintherealworld. Lidsky, supra note 28, at 89497. 
183 BERGER, supra note 1, at 11920, 20607; Lidsky, supra note 28, at
86364. 
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tends to view businesses as fixed and unchanging entities.184
Effortstoimproveoperationsortorespondtocustomerconcerns
m ay beburied in websitepostingsand notreadily accessibleto
consumers hoping to learn current information about a businesss 
additionalorim provedpractices.
Somebusinesseshave challenged websiterating and review
systemsasseriouslyflawed, eitherin termsofhow ratingsarede-
terminedorin how reviewsarefilteredandpresented. Forexam-
ple, in Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC,185 Seaton wastheownerofthe
GrandResortHotelandConvention CenterinPigeonForge, Ten-
nessee, which ended up on TripAdvisors 2011 Dirtiest Hotels 
list.186 Seaton broughtan action fordefamation, tortiousinterfer-
encewith businessrelationships, and false-lightinvasion ofpri-
vacyagainstTripAdvisor.187 Thetravelwebsitemoved todismiss
Seatons complaint as protected speech under the First Amend-
ment.188 Seaton asserted that the travel websites list of the dirt-
iest hotels was inaccurately determined based on unsubstantiated 
rum orsand grosslydistorted ratingsand m isleadingstatem ents
to be used by consum ers.189 He added thatTripAdvisor could
quantitativelydeterm inethedirtiesthotelsthrough astatistical
analysisofnegativehotelreviews.190 Hefurthercontended that
this ranking on TripAdvisors website and its republication by a 
hostofmedia outlets caused irreparable harm to his business
anditsgoodwill.191
Inreviewingthecase, theSixthCircuitdecidedthattheterm
dirtiest was not an assertion of fact, buthyperbolicfigurative
speech derived from the subjective evaluationsofcustom ers.192
184 Lee, supra note112, at574;Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38283, 394. 
Prof. Marciarille notes that for m edical professionals, [w]hat may be m ost 
challenging aboutthenever-forgotten negativereviewsishow inhuman and
impersonaltheyare. A postingin internetperpetuityimpliesthatthephysician
is static incapable of growth or development. Marciarille, supra note15, at
394. Someobservershavesuggestedthatonlinereviewsshouldhavesometype
ofexpirationdate. Marciarille, supra note15, at394.
185 728 F.3d592, 594(6thCir. 2013).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 59496. 
189 Id. at 59495. 
190 Id. at595.
191 Id. at594.
192 Id. at 59698. 
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The court stated that TripAdvisors methodology in ranking hotels 
wasinherently subjectivebecauseitwasbased upon individual
assessmentsthatcouldnotbeconsideredprovablestatementsof
fact.193 Withtheexplosion oftoptenlistsonline, theSixth Circuit
concludedthatsuch listingsarenotfactualinform ation butpro-
tected opinion speech, andthusarenotactionableunderlibelor
othertortclaims.194
Proprietary filtering programs on review sites have also
stirred controversy with business owners.195 Some businesses
havecomplainedthatthesefilteringprogramspush negativere-
viewstothetop, whilepositiveonesaresuppressed orm oved to
seldom-viewedsecondarywebpages.196 Foritspart, Yelpdidstate
thatitsfilteringsystem doesnottreatallpostingsidentically, but
deniedanyefforttomanipulatereviewsintentionally.197 Underits
filteringprogram, thepostingsof so-called elite reviewers (some 
ofwhom arestaffmembers, whileothersareunpaidvolunteers)198
arehighlighted orm oved tothetop ofthatsite.199 Am ongother
undisclosed factors, such reviewers achieve elite status by con-
tributing substantialcontenttoYelp and garnering positivere-
marksfrom othersitevisitors.200 However, Yelp and othersites
m ay notdisclose the details oftheiralgorithms outofconcern
193 Id. at 598600. 
194 Id. at600.
195 SandyBanks, Turning a critical eye on Yelp, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/20/local/la-me-banks-yelp-20130420 [http://
perma.cc/65WW-H2B2];Richards, supra note175;see also Ho, supra note34,
at587 (in review ofrestaurantgrading, arguingforsimplification notonlyin
how information isdisclosed, butalsoin how such gradingdataisaggregated
andanalyzed).
196 Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note175.
197 Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note175. See infra notes 226
32 andaccompanyingtext.
198 Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note 175. Recently, som e elite 
volunteersbroughtaclassaction againstYelp claimingviolationsoftheFair
LaborStandardsAct(FLSA), alleging thatthey should be classified asem-
ployeeswhoshouldhavereceivedpayandbenefitsinsteadofnon-cash awards
and socialevents. See ClassAction Complaint, Panzerv. Yelp, Inc., CV 13-
07805 (C.D. Calif. filed Oct. 10, 2013), http://skift.com/wp-content/uploads/2013
/10/180014238-Panzer-v-Yelp.pdf[http://perma.cc/LEP8-EEFZ].
199 Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note175.
200 Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note175.
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thatsom e businesses willuse thatinformation to try to game
ratingsystem stofalselyinflatetheirrankings.201
In Demetriades v. Yelp,202 a restaurateur challenged Yelps 
advertising claim s aboutits filtering program , rather than its
proprietaryalgorithm, in an unfaircom petition and falseadver-
tisingaction.203 Thebusinessaccused Yelpofim properlymanip-
ulating reviews, failing to remove inaccurate or false reviews,
and m aking wrongfulclaimsaboutthe reliability and accuracy
ofits reviewsand filtering program.204 The trialcourtgranted
Yelps m otion to strike down the lawsuit under the states anti-
SLAPP statuteand found thatany oftheclaimed Yelp m isrep-
resentationswereunactionablepufferyandopinion.205
However, athree-judgeappellatepanelreversedon theissue
oftheanti-SLAPP motion.206 The appeals court recognized Yelps 
battlewithfakereviewsandeffortstoestablish aproprietaryfil-
tering system aimed atdeterring fake reviews,207 and discussed
thefactthatYelp doesnotdiscloseitsalgorithm in ordertopre-
ventusersand businessesfrom trying toavoid itsfiltering pro-
cess.208 Thedecision ultimatelystatedthatYelpisapublicforum
with itscustomerreviewsbeing m attersofpublicconcern, but
notitsown advertisingassertionsaboutitsfilteringsystem.209
In contrasttoitsconsumerpostings, Yelps statem ents about 
thereliabilityandtrustworthinessaboutitsfilteringprogram 210
201 Banks, supra note 195;Richards, supra note 175. See Jindal& Liu,
supra note13 (computerscienceresearchersproposed automated modelsfor
detecting high probability ofopinion spam in evaluating customerreviews);
Ottetal., supra note 13, at 30910, 31617 (proposing a m ixed model of psy-
chologicaland computationallinguisticstodetectwell-crafted opinion spam).
See infra notes 51821 and accompanying text. 
202 228 Cal. App. 4th 294 (2014). See EricGoldman, Yelp Defeats Legal
Challenge to Its User Review Filter, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/02/06/yelp-defeats-legal-challenge-to-its
-user-review-filter/[http://perma.cc/NT2X-DJJS].
203 Demetriades, 228 Cal. App. 4that298.
204 Id. at 298, 30002. 
205 Id. at298, 304.
206 Id. at299, 313.
207 Id. at 299300. 
208 Id. at300.
209 Id. at310.
210 Id. at 30001. 
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were notsales puffery, butstatements ofquantifiable factthat
werem adein thecourseofitsbusinessservicesand intended to
induce consumers to use and businesses to advertise on its
site.211 Yelps representations about its filtering regime were 
viewed ascom mercialspeech exem ptfrom protection underthe
states anti-SLAPP statute.212 Theappellatecourtalsoeschewed
Yelps contention of federal CDA (Com munications Decency Act) 
immunitybecauseitsown words, notthoseofthirdpartyreview-
ers, were being questioned.213 Subsequently, Yelp appealed the
action totheCaliforniaSupremeCourt, which hasnotyetruled
onthedispute.214
Othershavebroughtlegalactionsclaimingthatwebsitestaff
are penning negative reviewsand then following up with sales
calls offering to ameliorate the reviews ifthe business owner
advertiseswith thesite.215 Somebusinessesbelievethatnegative
postswritten by Yelp employeesare being used to create sales
leads for that sites advertising staff.216 InLevitt v. Yelp,217 aclass
action wasbroughtbasedon allegationsofunfairbusinessprac-
tices and civilextortion.218 The plaintiffs contended thatYelp
extorted orattem pted to extortadvertising dollarsthrough the
211 Id. at 31112. See Malbon, supra note9, at146 (discussingUK Adver-
tising Standards Authority ruling that TripAdvisors trusted advice from 
real travelers was m isleading due to persistence of fake, unverified reviews). 
212 Demetriades, 228 Cal. App. 4that312.
213 Id. at 313. With regard to Yelps assertion of Section 230 im munity, the 
court decided that Yelps argum ent is m isplaced. Nowhere does plaintiff seek 
toenjoin orhold Yelp liableforthestatementsofthirdparties(i.e., reviewers)
on itsWeb site. Rather, plaintiffseeksto hold Yelp liable foritsown state-
m ents regarding the accuracy of its filter. Id.
214 Def. and Respts Pet. for Review, Demetriades v. Yelp Inc. (No.
S220885)(Cal. filedAug. 28, 2014). See MelissaJ. Sachs, Yelp asks California
high court to slap down restaurateurs suit over review filter, WESTLAW J.
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/yelp-asks-califor
nia-high-court-to-slap-down-restaurateurs-suit-over-review-filter/ [http://perma
.cc/9FKF-BBTU].
215 Richards, supra note175.
216 Id.
217 Levittv. Yelp, 765 F.3d1123 (9thCir. 2014). See Richards, supra note175;
Stephen L. Carter, Give This Column Five Stars on Yelp, Please, BLOOMBERG
TECH (Sept. 4, 2014, 12:56 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com /articles/2014
-09-04/give-this-column-five-stars-on-yelp-please[http:/perma.cc/B3NM-UZCG].
218 Levitt, 765 F.3dat1126;see Carter, supra note217.
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manipulation ofuserreviewsand by creating negative reviews
oftheirbusinesses.219 The trialcourtalso determ ined thatthe
parties had failed to provide sufficient facts to support their
claim sandthatSection 230 imm unitypreventedlegalaction for
extortion against Yelp for not removing certain negative re-
views.220 The districtcourtdismissed the lawsuitand the busi-
nessownersappealed.221
The appellate court determined that Yelps solicitation of ad-
vertisingwasnotwrongfulconductrequiredforthenarrow legal
requirements for civilextortion.222 Further, Yelps actions did 
notam ounttoeithertheanticom petitiveorantitrustviolations
needed to support claims ofunfair business practices.223 The
courtadded thattheplaintiffshad alsofailed toshow thatYelp
staffershadcreatedthenegativepostsabouttheirbusinesses.224
However, thecourtleftopen theoption thatotherlegalactions,
ifproperlypled, m ightbesustainableagainstYelp.225
Similarly, in Reit v. Yelp!,226 adentistchallengednegativere-
viewson Yelp, assertingthatYelp notonly keptup thenegative
review, butrem oved allthe positive postings.227 Based on lan-
guage in Yelps guide to business owners, the dentist contended 
that Yelps filtering program deceived consum ers because it was 
subject to human bias through Yelps manipulation of consum er 
reviews.228 He also argued that this procedure of rem oving posi-
tive reviews and highlighting negative ones is part of Yelps 
businessmodel, used asleverage to coerce businessesand pro-
fessionals into paying for advertising on Yelp.com.229 However,
the courtdetermined thatthe statementsin the businessguide
did not m aterially mislead consumers because the guide was
219 Levitt, 765 F.3d at 112729; see Carter, supra note217.
220 Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1126, 113536. 
221 Id. at1126, 1129.
222 Id. at 113033. The court added that the businesses had not proven 
thatYelp authored any ofthenegativereviewsatissue. Id. at 113536. See
Carter, supra note217.
223 Levitt, 765 F.3d at 113637. 
224 Id. at 113436. 
225 Id. at1137.
226 907 N.Y.S.2d411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
227 Id. at412.
228 Id. at412, 414.
229 Id. at 41213. 
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geared toward merchants, notconsum ers.230 Even ifthe plain-
tiffscouldprovetheirclaim thatYelphadmanipulatedconsumer
reviewsto generate advertising revenues, thisclaimed conduct
was nota deceptive practice because itwas business-oriented,
not consumer-oriented.231 Therefore, the court concluded that
Yelps filtering regime for reviews was not likely to deceive rea-
sonableconsum ers.232
Certain licensed professionals also chafe against customer
ratingsasinappropriate challengesto theirprofessionalauton-
om y, especiallydoctorsanddentists.233 Them edicalprofession is
centeredprim arilyonpeerevaluationsandreferralsasthebasis
forprofessionalreputation, notpatientevaluations.234 Research
studiesindicate thatmedicalprofessionalsoften think thatpa-
tientslacktheexpertisetofairlyandaccuratelyassessthequal-
ity ofm edicalservices.235 In general, survey analyses indicate
230 Id. at415.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Lee, supra note 112, at 57780; Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38485. 
Prof. Marciarilles research found that 
[t]hereisa sensethatreportingon directobservation ofphy-
sician and physician staffquality by patients is inherently
demeaning. Itisalsoan inescapableundercurrenthere, even
spilling overinto the popularpress. Inviting directobserver
orconsumercommenton providerbehaviorimpliesthatthe
observationsofordinaryuntrained peoplearevaluabletopa-
tients, providers, andpayorsalike.
Som eofthisrelatestoa vision ofprofessionalautonomy,
where the very meaning of professional conjures up an im age 
ofindividualjudgmentexercisedwith littleprocess-basedfeed-
back. Thecultureofmedicinehasbeen described asonethat
is deeply rooted, both by custom and by training, in high stan-
dards ofautonomous individualperformance and a commit-
menttoprogressthrough research. Alternatively, some of this 
relatestoavision ofhealth carethatfocuseson theinherently
collaborative nature ofthe provision ofhealth care services.
Underthisvision, placingqualityobservation solelyatthefeet
ofthephysician seemstonegatethemutualtaskofcreatinga
successfulorunsuccessfulphysician-patientrelationship.
Id.
234 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36263, 37071. 
235 Lee, supra note 112, at 58081; Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36263. 
Marciarillebelievesthatitisodd thatdoctorsshould besodismissiveofpa-
tientreviewsoftheirservices:
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thatdoctorsanddentistsdonotwanttobejudgedbytheoverall
patient experience, such as waiting times in reception areas,
respectfulpatientinteractionswith the doctorand staff, physi-
cian attentivenesstopatients, and medicalinformation and edu-
cation providedtothepatient.236 Manydoctorsanddentistsprefer
anemphasisontechnicalmedicaloutcomesratherthan softerpa-
tientexperiencesasareflection oftheirprofessionaltrainingand
autonom y.237 Nevertheless, such layperson reviewscan alsopro-
videawindow intowaystoimprovethepatientexperience.238
However, thisresistancetopatientreview iscom ing intodi-
rectconflictwith importantchangesin the m edicalfield. More
and more patients are seeking to arm themselves proactively
with medicalinformation beforeconsultingadoctor.239 About80
percent of Am ericans search for medical information about
health conditionson theInternet,240 aswellaspatientreviewsof
medicalprofessionals.241 Therisein patientconsum erism isthus
pushingback againstthetradition ofapassive, compliantrolein
It is ironic that physicians cham pions of the validity of indi-
vidualized approachestopracticeand thevalidityofanecdotal
evidence are the fiercest opponents of patient-generated anec-
dotalevidenceon physician performance. Thisisparticularly
surprising in light ofthe fact that most graduates ofU.S.
medicalschoolsarefirsttrained in clinicalskillsthrough the
use ofanecdotalpatientfeedback gained from practicing on
each other and through the use of standardized patients.
Patientfeedback from physician orphysician-in-training pa-
tientsand from professionalpatientsis, apparently, lesssus-
pectthanfeedbackfrom realpatients.
Marciarille, supra note15, at389.
236 Lee, supra note112, at581;Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36869, 38182. 
237 Lee, supra note 112, at 58081; Marciarille, supra note 15, at 363, 368
69, 385.
238 Lee, supra note112, at582.
239 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36567. 
240 Id. at366.
241 Patientscannow accesscrowdsourcedreview sites, suchasRateMDs.com,
Angies List, and Yelp, to gain insight into patient opinions about a particular 
physicianordentist. Lee, supra note 112, at 574, 57677; Marciarille, supra note
15, at 362, 36667, 37273. Dentists, in particular, have been in the firing line 
ofconsum erratingsbecausemanypatientsdonothavedentalinsuranceand
havetopayout-of-pocketfortheirdentalservices. Marciarille, supra note15,
at 37273. Dentists also have been involved in a number of defamation and 
nondisparagementclauselawsuitsregardingpatientonlinereviews.
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thephysician-patientrelationship.242 In addition, theprovisions
ofthe ACA243 and effortsby providerinsurers244 prom ote data
collection on thepatientexperiencetoevaluatephysician quality
and perform ance metrics, such asmedicaloutcomes, office effi-
ciencies, and patientevaluations oftheirinteractions.245 Some
medicalprofessionalsalsofearthatnegativepatientreviewswill
affectoverallpayandreim bursementrates246 ortheircontinued
participation in certain health insurance program s.247 Oddly
enough, mostpatientreviews ofdoctors on crowdsourced sites
areoverwhelminglypositive.248
III. AVOIDING ENFORCEMENT UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
Clearly, the reasons behind the use of nondisparagement
clausesm ayvarydependinguponthenatureandconcernsofthe
individualbusiness. Even though onemightdisapproveofthese
clausesasinherentlyunfairorpracticallymisguided, itremains
242 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36566. 
243 Id. at363, 381.
244 Id. at 37779. 
245 Id. at363. Unlikeothertypesofservices, medicalcareisa privateac-
tivitywith enormouspublicconsequences. Id. at369;CDT Complaint, supra
note53, at15. UndertheACA, theCentersforMedicareandMedicaidServices
(CMS)sponsorsthePhysician Comparewebsite, which collectspatientreviews
on thepatientexperienceforfuturepublicaccess. Marciarille, supra note15,
at363. Concerned aboutthequalityand veracityofpatientassessments, the
American MedicalAssociation advocatesthatCMS permitdoctorstoreview any
assessments before any posting ispublished. Marciarille, supra note 15, at
36364, 388. Hospitals are also worried that they will be evaluated like hotels, 
with expectations of hotel-like am enities. Marciarille, supra note15, at382.
246 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38082. 
247 Insurers have long soughtto collectdata on the patientexperience,
som etim es referred to as the patient voice, to determ ine the quality of care 
and whether to retain physicians under their health plans. Id. at 37879. 
Insurersutilizesurveystohelpdeterminewhethertodisenrollmedicalpractices
from theirinsurance program s, leading to litigation aboutthe methodology
andaccuracyoftheseinternalanalyses. Id. at 37879. Onewouldexpectthat
insurersmightconsidertextanddatam iningon crowdsourcedreview sitesto
helpquantifypatientvoicemetricsonmedicalprofessionals. Id.
248 Lee, supra note 112, at 57778; Marciarille, supra note 15, at394;
ElBoghdady, supra note124. A 2009 review ofthirty-threecrowdsourcedrating
sitesofabout300 doctorsand specialistsin theBoston areadetermined that
positivereviewsmadeup88 percentofthepostedcommentaries. ElBoghdady,
supra note124.
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unclearas to whetherthese clauses are invalid underexisting
contractlaw. One could posita num berofargum entsto defeat
nondisparagementclauses, includingonesgrounded in issuesof
consideration, unconscionability, publicpolicy, excessive penal-
ties, andprivity.
A. Lack of Consideration
Consideration isabedrockelem entofanyvalidcontract.249 It
requiresa bargained-forexchangeofsomethingoflegallyrecog-
nized valuebetween contractingparties.250 Am ongotherthings,
consideration mayconsistofan exchangeofpromisesorapromise
in return for anothers forbearance. In many contracts of silence 
ornondisparagementclauses, onepartyreceivescom pensation251
through settlem entfundsorseverance pay in exchange fornot
speaking orforsuppressing negativecritiques. Thetypicalcon-
sumercontractinvolvesanexchangeofpromisesbetweenthemer-
chantand the custom er, such asthe provision ofproductsand
servicesin return forpaym ent.252 The utilization ofnondispar-
agementclausesaddstherequirem entthatconsumersnotpost
anynegativecommentsorridicule. Focusingon thebargained-for
exchange, courtstypicallywillnotanalyzetheadequacyorvalue
ofthe consideration.253 The factthatconsumersare waiving or
limiting theirspeech rights withoutcom pensation does notin-
validate the contract.254 Consumers speech rights are bundled 
with theirexchangeofotherpromisesin purchasing goodsand/
orservices.
However, in certain circum stances, consum ersmaybeableto
claim alackofconsideration when apartyhasapre-existinglegal
duty astothebargained-forbenefit.255 Forexam ple, in Lee, the
249 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §71 (1981);see JOHN E. MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §56 (4thed. 2001).
250 MURRAY, supra note249.
251 Garfield, supra note32, at278.
252 MURRAY, supra note249.
253 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §79 (1981).
254 But see Belmas& Larson, supra note 55, at 7576 (arguing that there is 
a lack ofmutuality ofobligation assoftwarecompany doesnotgiveup any-
thing in exchange for consum ers prom ise of silence). 
255 See CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 1113. 
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dentists m utual privacy contract required herpatienttorefrain
from posting negativereviewsin exchangeforsafeguarding the
patients inform ation from  third party marketingfirms.256 How-
ever, thiskindofdisclosureofpatientinform ation isalreadyfor-
bidden underHIPAA withoutpatientconsent257 andtransgresses
theconflictofinterestprovisionsofmedicalethicscodes.258 There-
fore, thepatientcould challengethevalidity oftheprivacy pro-
visions as lacking consideration because medicalprofessionals
alreadyhaveapre-existinglegaldutytoprotectpatientprivacy.
InLee, the dentists promises could also be viewed as illusory259
and not in line with the requirement of consideration. The dentists 
privacycomm itm entism eaninglessin lightofherexistinglegal
andethicalobligations. Thedentistwouldbeofferingemptyprom-
isesofprivacywhilethepatientissubstantivelyboundtosuppress
hisspeech rightsandtohandoverhiscopyrighttohisdentist. In
response to the dentists motion to dismiss, the trial court refused 
to dism iss Lees claim s seeking to invalidate the nondisparage-
mentprovisionsofhercontractaslackinginconsideration.260
Furthermore, doctors and dentists typically enter into pro-
videragreementswith insurersforwhich thecovered patientis
256 See supra note 128, at 12; Lee Com plaint, supra note123, at2.
257 See CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 1113. 
258 See AM. MED. ASSN, AMA ETHICS CODE OPINION 8.03 CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST:GUIDELINES, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources
/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion803.page? [http://perma.cc/CRF7-V4
N6] (stating that [u]nder no circum stances may physicians place their own 
financialinterestsabovethewelfareoftheirpatients.... Ifaconflictdevelops
between the physicians financial interest and the physicians responsibilities 
to the patient, the conflict must be resolved to the patients benefit.); see CDT
Complaint, supra note53, at17.
259 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §77 (1981):
A promise orapparentpromise isnotconsideration ifby its
termsthepromisororpurportedpromisorreservesachoiceof
alternative performances unless (a)each ofthe alternative
performances would have been consideration ifitalone had
been bargained for;or(b)oneofthealternativeperformances
would havebeen consideration and thereisorappearstothe
partiestobeasubstantialpossibilitythatbeforethepromisor
exercises his choice events may elim inate the alternatives
whichwouldnothavebeenconsideration.
See MURRAY, supra note249, §57.
260 See Leev. Makhnevich, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2013), at*1, *4.
104 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
a third party beneficiary.261 Under these agreements, medical
professionalsare required to provide particularservicesatcer-
tain feeschedulestopremium-payingparticipants.262 Onecould
view the refusalto provide the requested medicalservices as a
breach ofcontract. Therefore, theseprofessionalsalreadyhavea
pre-existing legalduty to com ply with their insurer contracts
andtoprovidetheagreed-uponmedicalservices, regardlessofthe
patients agreement to a nondisparagementclause. In thiscon-
text, aplaintiffcustomerwilllikelyarguethatthereisa lack of
consideration, dependingupon thecircumstances.
B. Unconscionability
Groundedingoodfaithandfairdealing,263 courtsdetermineun-
conscionabilityasamatteroflaw,264 reviewingissuesofprocedural
261 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §302 (1981).
262 D. Ward Kallstrom , Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors:
Free Schedules and the Sherman Act, 27 DUKE L.J. 646 (1978).
263 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §208 cmt. a (1981). See gener-
ally CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS
IN CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 599601 (7th ed. Wolters Kluwer 
2010)(discussing evolution ofunconscionability undercivillaw and common
law legalsystems);Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing? What the
Numbers Tell Us about How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine
to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 78187 (2014) (providing 
historicaland statutory overview of unconscionability doctrine);Larry A.
Dim atteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1068, 107175 (2006) 
(reviewing developmentofunconscionability and its bifurcation into proce-
duralandsubstantiveforms).
264 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2000);RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS
§208 cmts. b, f(1981). Somelegalscholarshavequestioned theappropriate
roleofthejudiciary in applying unconscionability toinvalidateprovisionsof
adhesive consumercontracts. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 263, at 61012 
(discussing scholarly concernsaboutjudicialapplication ofunconscionability
and importanceofconsumerprotection lawstopoliceunfaircontracts);Leff,
supra note 44, at 35658 (questioning reliance on judicial determ inations of 
unconscionablecontractsthatarebetterleftuptolegislativebodiestoaddress);
Speidel, supra note 34, at 36365 (calling for greater emphasis on consumer pro-
tectionlawstopromotemorefairconsumercontractsratherthanwastingjudi-
cialresourcesonunconscionability). But see Landrum, supra note 263, at 78185 
(2014) (where the authors em pirical research suggests that unconscionability 
2016] CONSUMER GAG CONTRACTS 105 
and substantive unconscionability.265 The equitable principle of
unconscionability266 considersflawsinthecontractformationpro-
cess(proceduralflaws)andexaminesthesubstanceofclausesto
isappliedsparinglyoverallbymostcourtswithonlysmallnumberofstatesin-
validatingarbitration clausesunderunconscionability);John E. Murray, Jr.,
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 4043, 80 (1969)  
(calling forcourtstorecognizethevalueofjudicialinterpretationsofuncon-
scionabilitytodetermineitsparametersundertheU.C.C.).
265 See JOHN M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 332, 338
(West6th ed. 2009);Dimatteo & Rich, supra note 263, at 107275; Garfield, 
supra note 32, at 28586; Leff, supra note 44, at 48688; Debra Pogrun Stark, 
Jessica M. Choplin & Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the
Laws and Practices That Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 IND. L.
REV. 797, 79899 (2013). See generally ArthurAllen Leff, Unconscionability
and The CodeThe Emperors New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 48788, 
55889 (1967) (criticizing the U.C.C. for failing to clearly define unconsciona-
bilityandtocreateexpressprocedural-substantivebifurcationanalysis).
266 KNAPP ET AL., supra note 263, at 58485; PERILLO ET AL., supra note265,
at 33233; Leff, supra note 44, at 52829. An unconscionable contract is such 
asnoman in hissensesandnotunderdelusion wouldmakeon theonehand,
and as no honest and fair m an would accept on the other. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981)(citing Hume v. United States,
132 U.S. 406 (1889)(quotingEarlofChesterfieldv. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125,
155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750))). Both the Restatement(Second)of
ContractsandtheU.C.C. recognizetheconceptofunconscionability. Therele-
vantRestatementprovisionstatesthat
[i]facontractorterm thereofisunconscionableatthetimethe
contractismadeacourtmayrefusetoenforcethecontract, or
mayenforcetheremainderofthecontractwithouttheuncon-
scionableterm, ormay solimittheapplication ofany uncon-
scionableterm astoavoidanyunconscionableresult.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §208. TheUniform CommercialCode
indicatesthefollowingregardingunconscionability:
(1)Ifthe courtasa matteroflaw findsthe contractorany
clauseofthecontracttohavebeen unconscionableatthetime
itwasmadethecourtmayrefusetoenforcethecontract, orit
mayenforcetheremainderofthecontractwithouttheuncon-
scionableclause, oritmaysolimittheapplication ofanyun-
conscionableclauseastoavoidanyunconscionableresult.
(2)When itisclaimed orappearsto the courtthatthe con-
tractoranyclausethereofmaybeunconscionabletheparties
shallbeaffordedareasonableopportunitytopresentevidence
astoitscommercialsetting, purposeandeffecttoaidthecourt
inmakingthedetermination.
U.C.C. §2-302 (2000).
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seeiftheyaretooharshorone-sided(substantiveflaws).267 Courts
utilizea variety ofapproachestounconscionability,268 butm ost
requireapartyseekingtorescindanagreementtobeartheburden
ofshowingboth form sofunconscionability.269 Ifacourtmakesa
findingofunconscionability, itm ayrejectenforcementofan en-
tirecontract, seversolelytheharsh clauses, orrestricthow these
offendingprovisionswillapply.270
Proceduralunconscionability focuseson unfairsurprise and
theabsenceofmeaningfulchoicein contractformation.271 Courts
mayconsideranumberofissues, includingthelack ofpartyedu-
cation orsophistication, unequalbargaining powerbetween the
parties, unfairsurprisesin termsburiedin fineprintorobscured
byfontorextensivelegaljargon, orthelack ofan opportunityto
review andnegotiatecontractterms.272 A courtwillneedtoassess
267 U.C.C. § 2-302 cm t. 1 (Am . Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm n 2000); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §208 cm t. b(1981);KNAPP ET AL., supra
note 263, at 60507;PERILLO ET AL., supra note 265, at332, 338;Garfield,
supra note 32, at 28586; Leff, supra note44, at530;Stark, supra note265,
at824.
268 KNAPP ET AL., supra note 263, at 60507;PERILLO ET AL., supra note265,
at332, 338;Dimatteo& Rich, supra note 263, at 107275; Landrum, supra note
263, at 76769. State court analyses of unconscionability claim s are further 
complicatedbyexistingstateandfederalconsumerprotectionlaws.
269 KNAPP ET AL., supra note263, at605;Dimatteo& Rich, supra note263,
at1074;Landrum, supra note 263, at767. See William sv. Walker-Thomas
Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)(seminalcaserequiring showing of
both proceduraland substantive unconscionability in consumerinstallment
contractofadhesion forgoodstransaction). But see David Gilo& ArielPorat,
Viewing Unconscionability through a Market Lens (John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 489, 2009), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index
.html[http://perma.cc/KA9F-FYXE](reviewingvariousformsofoppressivecon-
tractterm s, butarguing thatcourtsshould notexaminepartiesornatureof
transactionsforcontractfairnessbutshould instead considerwhethermarket
competitionovercontracttermsexists).
270 U.C.C. § 2-302(1);RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 208. See
Landrum, supra note263, at764.
271 U.C.C. §2-302(1)cmt. 1;RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §208
cmt. d.
272 See Ben-Shahar, supra note34, at8;Landrum, supra note 263, at 768
69;Marciarille, supra note15, at365;Stark etal., supra note265, at825. In
themedicalfield, theremaybeaclearlyunequalbalanceofpowerbetweendoc-
torsandpatients, whichcanfactorintoproceduralunconscionability. Professor
Marciarillestatedthat
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how thecontractprovisionsarepresented, theavailabilityofprod-
uctand service alternativesin the consumermarketplace, and
traditionalprinciplesoffreedom ofcontract, which maymilitate
againstafindingofproceduralunconscionability. Becausethese
nondisparagementclausesarefoundin consumercontractsofad-
hesion, onemighteasilyargueproceduralunconscionabilitybased
upon thelackofm eaningfulchoicebecauseconsum ersoften lack
bargainingpower, businesssavvy, andan opportunitytonegoti-
ate contractterms.273 In addition, few consumersactually read
[p]atient-physician relationships have been framed by many
metaphors:parent-childrelations;seller-purchasertransactions;
teacher-studentlearning;relationsamong friends;orparties
enteringintocontractualrelations. Itisnotnecessarytoalign
an understandingofphysician-patientrelationshipswith only
oneofthesemodelstounderstandthatthereareaspectsofaser-
vice contract relationship to modern physician-patient rela-
tions. Ithasbeen observedthatcontractprinciplesgovern the
inception ofthe physician-patientrelationship butthatbar-
gainingpowerisalmostentirelyremovedfrom thepatientonce
therelationshipisformed, leavingtortlaw togovern theterms
ofthe relationship. The lack ofequitable bargaining power
withinthephysician-patientrelationshipisattributabletoinfor-
mationasymmetryandthecuriousintimacyoftherelationship.
Marciarille, supra note15, at365.
273 Ben-Shahar, supra note 34, at 12; Read, supra note 46, at 39294; 
Starketal., supra note265, at825. ProfessorBen-Shaharcorrectlystatedthat
[r]eal people dont read standard form contracts. Reading is
boring, incomprehensible, alienating, time consuming, but
mostofallpointless. We wantthe product, notthe contract.
Besides, lotsofpeopleboughttheproductortheservicealong
withthesamecontractandseem happyenough, sowepresume
thatthere mustbe nothing particularly importantburied in
thecontractterms. Andwhatiftheydidread?Surely, thereis
nothing they can do aboutthe bad stuffthey know they will
find. Are they going to cross outthe unfavorable term?Are
they going to call some semi-automatic custom er service agent 
and negotiate?Otherthan losetheexcitementaboutthedeal
and maybe walk away from it(to what?A bettercontract?),
thereisnotmuchindividualscando. Dedicatedreaderscanex-
pectonlyheartache, which isaverypoorrewardforengaging
in such time-consuming endeavor. Apartfrom an exoticindi-
vidualhereorthere, nobodyreads.
Ben-Shahar, supra note34, at2.
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adhesivecontracts, and even ifthey did read thecontract, m ost
donotunderstandfullywhattheseterm sm ean.274
Yetconsum er contracts ofadhesion are not autom atically
procedurally unconscionable, and are routinely enforced.275 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provision on standardized
agreementsacceptstheinherentvalueofadhesiveconsumercon-
tractsin a world ofmass distribution ofgoods and services.276
Enormoussavingsintime, cost, andeffortoccurwhenindividually
negotiatedcontractsgivewaytostandardform agreements.277 The
Restatementprovision also recognizes thatthe drafter ofstan-
dard contractformsknowsthatfew willread orunderstand the
terms ofa standardized contractand mustrely upon the good
faith ofitsdrafters.278
274 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 34, at 23; Read, supra note 46, at 39294; 
Stark etal., supra note 265, at 82829. Professor Stark and her co-authors 
also lamented thatcourts often failto address the basic reality thatmost
consumersdonotreadcontractsofadhesion. Theystatedthat
[c]ourts need to engage in this fiction because buyers could
otherwise argue thatthey failed to read or understand any
term ofthecontractthatthey laterregret, thus, eroding the
goalofcertaintyofcontract. Although courtsmayneed, in the
typicalcase, to engage in this fiction, they should be aware
thatitis, in fact, a fiction;in caseswherethetermsarevery
unreasonableandone-sided, courtsshouldkeepthisfiction in
mind.
Stark etal., supra note265, at828 (footnoteomitted). See supra notes34, 44
andaccompanyingtext.
275 Landrum, supra note263, at769.
276 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §211 cmt. a(1981):
a. Utility of standardization. Standardization ofagreements
servesmanyofthesam efunctionsasstandardizationofgoods
andservices;both areessentialtoasystem ofmassproduction
and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skillcan be de-
voted toa classoftransactionsratherthan todetailsofindi-
vidualtransactions.
See MURRAY, supra note249, at§97;Read, supra note 46, at 39294. 
277 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 211 cm t. ab. The Restatement 
provision also recognizesthatthe drafterofstandard contractformsknows
thatfew willread orunderstand thetermsofa standardized contract. Id. at
cmt. b.
278 Id. atcm t. b. Commentbstates:
b. Assent to unknown terms. A partywhomakesregularuseof
astandardizedform ofagreementdoesnotordinarilyexpecthis
custom erstounderstand oreven toread thestandard terms.
2016] CONSUMER GAG CONTRACTS 109 
Butgovernm entregulation and judicialreview m ay prohibit
oroverturn unfaircontracttermsthatfalloutsideofthereason-
ableexpectationsofthenon-draftingparty.279 Undersubstantive
unconscionability, thedisputedcontracttermsm aybeevaluated
todecideiftheyaretoooppressivelyharsh orone-sided in favor
ofthecontractdrafter.280 Someexam plesofsuchtermsareexces-
sive price provisions, exculpatory clauseson dam ages, unusual
warrantydisclaimers, unreasonableforum orvenuechoices,281 and
thelack ofmutualityin contractrem edies.282 In someinstances,
liquidated damages clauses associated with nondisparagement
clausesthatare disproportionate penaltiesmay be deem ed un-
enforceable. In Palmer, theplaintiffsarguedthatKlearGear.com
obscured these clauses from  view on a second page of the sites 
terms ofuse and wentbeyond the reasonable expectations of
consumers.283 Without explicitly mentioning unconscionability,
Oneofthepurposesofstandardization istoeliminatebargain-
ing overdetailsofindividualtransactions, and thatpurpose
would notbeserved ifa substantialnumberofcustomersre-
tained counseland reviewed the standard terms. Employees
regularlyusingaform often haveonlyalimitedunderstanding
ofitstermsandlim itedauthoritytovarythem. Customersdo
notin factordinarily understand oreven read the standard
terms. Theytrusttothegoodfaith ofthepartyusingtheform
and to the tacitrepresentation thatlike termsare being ac-
ceptedregularlybyotherssimilarlysituated. Buttheyunder-
stand thatthey are assenting to the terms notread or not
understood, subjecttosuchlimitationsasthelaw mayimpose.
Id. See MURRAY, supra note249, at§97;see also supra note35 and accompa-
nyingtext.
279 Section 211 specificallystatesthat, astoform contracts, aprovision will
not be enforced when the drafter has reason to believe that the party manifest-
ingsuch assentwould notdosoifheknew thatthewritingcontained a par-
ticular term , the term  is not part of the agreem ent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §211(3)& cmt. c.
280 See Starketal., supra note 265, at 82829. 
281 PERILLO ET AL., supra note 265, at 33940. See Dim atteo& Rich, supra
note 263, at1107 (describing em piricalstudy finding thatsuccessfulun-
conscionability claimsinvolved unsophisticated consumerswith agreem ents
containing one-sided clauses, often excessive in price orexculpatory clauses
favoringmerchant).
282 See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 60708 (E.D. Pa. 
2007); Com b v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 117374 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
283 Palmerv. KlearGear.com, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (D. UtahfiledJuly1, 2014).
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the court determ ined that the nondisparagem ent clause and
associatedliquidateddam agesremedieswereinvalid.284
Only Arizona hasdirectly addressed a consum ernondispar-
agementclauseunderunconscionabilityinacontractofadhesion,
in FreeLife Intl v. Am. Educ. Music Publns, Inc.285 In thatcase,
DavidLucasBurgesestablishedawebsitewith articlesandpost-
ingsthatcriticized FreeLife, itsbest-selling productHim alayan
GojiJuice, and itsmarketingand com pensation strategies.286 On
its own website, FreeLife wrote an open letter disputing Burgess 
commentarieswithoutmentioning him by name.287 Ataboutthe
sametimeofhiswebsitelaunch, Burgescom pletedan onlineap-
plication tobecomeam arketingexecutiveforFreeLifetosellits
products.288 In theapplication process, heconsented toan adhe-
sive clickwrap agreem ent289 thatincluded a nondisparagem ent
clause.290 Burgesnevertook on thatrole, butcontinued tocriti-
cizeFreeLife, and thecompany sued Burgesfordefamation, in-
tentionalinterference with contractualrelations, and breach of
contract.291 Hecounter-claimedin defamation regardingtheopen
response letter on FreeLifes website.292
Burges asserted that FreeLifes clickwrap contract was invalid, 
andthestandardizedclausewasunenforceableifthedrafterhad
reason to know orbelieve thatthe other party would nothave
agreed to thatterm ifhe had been aware ofit.293 Initially, the
courtstatedthatArizonaprecedentupholdsstandardizedagree-
ments unless the terms are outside of the parties reasonable 
expectations.294 Thecourtfound thatBurgeshad voluntarilyas-
sented to FreeLifes terms when he clicked I Accept.295 Further-
more, the courtdeterm ined thatBurges provided no evidence
284 Id.
285 No. CV07-2210-PHX-DGC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97680 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1,
2009).
286 Id. at 34. 
287 Id. at3.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 36. 
291 Id. at 35. 
292 Id. at3.
293 Id. at 56. 
294 Id. at5.
295 Id. at5, 7.
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that FreeLife knew or had any reason to know that Burges
would have objected to thisterm .296 Looking totraditionalcon-
tractprinciples, theArizonadistrictcourtdeterminedthatavalid
contractexisted and thatBurges had assented to the term s of
theclickwrapagreem ent.297
Burges also claimed the contract was procedurally uncon-
scionablebecauseitwasacontractofadhesion, helackedtheop-
portunitytonegotiateitsterms, andhedidnotpossessthelegal
expertise to understand the agreem ent.298 Recognizing these
factors, thecourtdeterm inedthatclickwrapagreem entsarerou-
tinelyenforcedin Arizonaandotherjurisdictions.299 In reviewing
the docum ents presentation, the courtfoundthattheagreem ent
wasclearly displayed beforeBurgesassented toitsterms.300 In
addition, thenondisparagementclausewaswritten in plain lan-
guage, soitwasnotprocedurallyunconscionable.301
In addition, Burgescontendedthattheadhesivenatureofthe
agreementand thefactthathem ightbeexposed tom illionsof
dollars in dam ages for m aking truthfulstatements supported
his assertion ofsubstantive unconscionability.302 However, the
appealscourtdecided thattheterm softheagreem entwerenot
too one-sided or oppressive.303 Analogizing to em ploymentsev-
erance agreem ents, the courtindicated thatitwas reasonable
forFreeLifetoprotectitsbusinessimagefrom itsown marketing
representatives.304 Thecourtadded thatBurgeshad voluntarily
agreed to the termsand could notnow claim they were unfair
becauseitmightmakehim liablefordam ages.305
The courtthen stated thatthe clause mustbe interpreted
based upon the plain meaning of the term  disparage.306 The
plain meaning would suggestthateven true statementsm ight
296 Id. at6.
297 Id. at5.
298 Id. at6.
299 Id. at 56. 
300 Id. at 67. 
301 Id. at6.
302 Id. at 67. 
303 Id.
304 Id. at6.
305 Id. at7.
306 Id. at7, 13.
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bedisparaging, subjectingBurgestopotentialliabilityforbreach
ofcontract.307 Theappellatecourtleftituptofuturejurydetermi-
nationsastowhetherBurgesdefamed FreeLife308 orifthecom -
pany suffered any damages from Burgess assertions.309 Lastly,
the appeals court quickly dispatched any First Amendment
claims, contending a lack oftherequisitestateaction toinvoke
thatconstitutionalrightin aprivatecontractsuit.310
With varied state approaches to unconscionability, itis un-
certain how nondisparagementclausesinconsumercontractswill
farein thefuture. In som eways, theapplication ofunconsciona-
bilitytonondisparagem entclausesmayfollow a sim ilarpath to
courtreviewsofarbitration clausesunderthisconcept, with state
determinationsallacrossthespectrum .311 Ifunconscionabilityis
thelegaldoctrineapplied, then consensusisunlikelytobefound
onthevalidityofsuch clauses.
C. Public Policy Concerns
Undercontractlaw, anagreementisvoidandunenforceableif
itviolatesawell-establishedorclearpublicpolicy.312 Publicpolicy
307 Id. at7. Thecourtlookedtothedictionaryfortheplain meaningofthe
term:
Disparage m eans [t]o bring discredit or reproach upon; to dis-
honour, discredit; to lower in credit or esteem . Oxford 
English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). As the Court previously
said, theordinarymeaningofthisterm doesnotrequirethat
the disparaging statementbe false (citation omitted). Sum -
m ary adjudication as to the interpretation of disparage will 
begranted.
Id.
308 Id. at10.
309 Id. at11.
310 Id. at 7. The court stated that [t]he First Amendment protects individuals 
from governmentinfringementon speech, notprivateinfringement. George v.
Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996). Thereisno
unconstitutionalrestrictionofFirstAm endm ent rights in this case. 
311 Landrum, supra note 263, at 75557. 
312 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §178 (1981):
WhenA Term IsUnenforceableOn GroundsOfPublicPolicy:
(1)A promiseorotherterm ofanagreementisunenforceableon
groundsofpublicpolicyiflegislation providesthatitisunen-
forceableortheinterestin itsenforcementisclearlyoutweighed
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may be derived from such sourcesasconstitutionalprovisions,
statutorylaw, and/orjudicialprecedent.313 In voidingacontract,
courts willconsider ifthe public policy concerns outweigh the
interests in enforcing the agreement.314 In certain instances, a
inthecircumstancesbyapublicpolicyagainsttheenforcement
ofsuchterms.
(2)In weighingtheinterestin theenforcementofa term, ac-
countistakenof
(a) the parties justified expectations, 
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement
weredenied, and
(c)anyspecialpublicinterestin theenforcementofthe
particularterm.
(3)In weighingapublicpolicyagainstenforcementofaterm,
accountistakenof
(a)thestrength ofthatpolicy asm anifested by legis-
lationorjudicialdecisions,
(b)thelikelihoodthatarefusaltoenforcetheterm will
furtherthatpolicy,
(c)theseriousnessofanymisconductinvolvedandthe
extenttowhichitwasdeliberate, and
(d)thedirectnessoftheconnection between thatm is-
conductandtheterm.
A balancingtestisinherentin theRestatementview ofpublicpolicy, which in-
evitablyleadstovaryingoutcomeson astate-by-statebasis. Belmas& Larson,
supra note55, at5256.
313 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §178(3)cmt. a(1981). See Bast,
supra note 32, at 67475, 678; Garfield, supra note 32, at 29697. Professor Gar-
field notes that [w]hile freedom  of contract m ight exist, there is no freedom to 
use contracts to underm ine important societal values. Garfield, supra note32,
at294.
314 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §178(1), (3)(1981). See Belm as
& Larson, supra note 55, at 7380; Garfield, supra note 32, at 29496. In eval-
uatingpublicpolicy, ProfessorGarfieldindicatedthat
The Restatem entdoesnotlistthe publicpoliciesthatcourts
can considerin thisbalance. Rather, acourtcan considerrele-
vantlegislation, caselaw, anditsown perception ofthepublic
welfare. An oft-quoted passage from a nineteenth-century
English decision bestcapturesthe open-ended natureofthis
public policy analysis, characterizing public policy as a very 
unrulyhorse, andwhen onceyou getastrideityou neverknow
where it will carry you. In fact, the public policy analysis is 
notonly open-ended, butitcan also lead to differentconclu-
sionsovertime.
Garfield, supra note 32, at 29798 (footnotes om itted). See also Dworkin &
Callahan, supra note 42, at 17273, 17982 (discussing balancing public policy 
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courtm ay decidetosevertheoffending clauseiftherem aining
contractprovisionsdonotoffendnotionsofpublicpolicy.315
1. First Amendment Issues
From a constitutional perspective, legal experts dispute
whetherthesetypesofcontractsand clausesviolatean individ-
uals First Amendment free speech rights.316 These restrictive
clauses not only impact ones right of free expression, but also 
therightsofotherstohearalternativeviews.317 In addition, both
true speech and opinion speech are protected under the First
Am endm ent.318 Substantialtruth and opinion speech can beas-
serted in defam ation actions, asa plaintiffcan only prevailifit
can beshown thattherewerefalsestatementsoffactthatdam-
aged an individuals or businesss reputation.319 Substantialtruth
disposesofclaim soffalsity, andopinion speech obviatesashow-
ingofobjectivefactsrequiredindefam ation situations.320
Somecaselaw and legalcomm entatorscontend thatbecause
privatecontractsareinvolved, thereisnostateaction necessary
to invoke FirstAmendmentfree speech claim s.321 Otherprece-
dentand legalscholars suggesta m ore expansive approach in
which stateaction isinvoked when courtsarecalled upon toen-
forceprivatecontractsofsilenceandnondisparagementclauses,322
especially if the governments coercive power is used to deny rec-
ognizedrights.323
concerns between confidentiality ofemploym ent relationship and whistle-
blowerstatutesaimedatpreventingwrongdoingandprotectingpublicgood).
315 Dworkin& Callahan, supra note42, at190.
316 Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at57;Garfield, supra note 32, at 31819. 
317 Belmas& Larson, supra note 55, at 5762, 6466. 
318 See supra notes28, 36 andaccompanyingtext.
319 Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at76.
320 See supra notes28, 36 andaccompanyingtext.
321 Garfield, supra note 32, at 34849;see supra note315 and accom pany-
ingtext.
322 Belmas& Larson, supra note 55, at 6769; Garfield, supra note32, at
319, 34748, 362. 
323 See Belmas& Larson, supra note 55, at 68 (asserting courts unwilling-
nesstoenforcerestrictivepropertycovenantsbasedon raceorcolorasimper-
missibleuseofstateaction).
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However, thisbroaderapproachmaybeunderminedbynotions
offreedom ofcontractinwhichpartiesoftenwaivewell-established
rightsin ordertogain somethingofvaluein return.324 Traditional
contractlaw allowspartiestofashiontheirbargained-forexchange
underfreedom ofcontract, including waiving ones legal rights of 
speech aspartofthatbargain.325 Contractcaselaw alsoimposes
thedutytoreadupon allcontractingparties, includingthoseen-
teringintoadhesiveconsum ercontracts.326 From existingprece-
dent, consumersunwillingtoenterintosuch nondisparagement
clauses may rejectthem and take their business elsewhere.327
Therefore, itmaybeproblematictoassertstateactionininstances
ofprivatecontracting.328 Thatsaid, freeexpression rightsmaybe
effectivelyprotectedthrough theapplicationofotherpublicpolicy
groundstostripawaynondisparagementclauses.
2. State Statutes Invalidating Nondisparagement Clauses
Thereareanum berofotherpublicpolicyissuesthatcouldbe
successfullyraisedtochallengetheseconsumernondisparagement
clausesasviolativeofa num berofstatutory laws. California is
thefirststatetooutlaw nondisparagementclausesin consum er
324 See Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at67.
325 Id.
326 Ben-Shahar, supra note34, at7.
327 Id. at12.
328 See Garfield, supra note 32, at 34849. Professor Garfield recognized 
thatcontractsofsilencecan only havepowerifcourtsarewilling toenforce
them asapossibleform ofstateaction. Id. at349. However, henotedthat
[t]heconsensualnatureofcontractlaw potentially affectsits
constitutionalsignificancein anumberofways. Onecan argue
thattheenforcementofacontractofsilenceinvolvesnostate
action, becauseacontractisthecreation ofprivatepartiesact-
ing independently ofthestate. Likewise, even ifstate action
ispresent, onecan arguethatanypartywhoagreestoacon-
tractofsilence has im plicitly waived his FirstAmendment
rights. Lastly, even ifthere is state action and no waiver of
FirstAmendmentrights, one can argue that state enforce-
mentofacontractofsilenceislegitimatecontent-neutralreg-
ulation ofspeech because the state did notselectthe speech
beingregulated.
Id. at34849.
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contracts by statute under its recent so-called Yelp Law.329
Thisstatutemakesitunlawfultooffercontractsforproductsor
servicesthatrequire a consum erto waive theirrightsto m ake
anystatem entaboutthecustom erexperience.330 A businessthat
threatenstoenforceawaiverortriestopenalizeaconsumerpost-
ing an online review issubjectto civilfines.331 The finesrange
329 CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.8 (2014). Thestatutestatesasfollows:
1670.8(a)
(1)A contractorproposedcontractforthesaleorleaseofcon-
sumergoodsorservicesmay notincludea provision waiving
the consum ers right to m ake any statem ent regarding the 
sellerorlessororitsemployeesoragents, orconcerning the
goodsorservices.
(2)Itshallbeunlawfultothreaten ortoseek toenforceapro-
vision made unlawfulunderthissection, orto otherwise pe-
nalizea consumerformakinganystatementprotected under
thissection.
(b)Anywaiveroftheprovisionsofthissection iscon-
trarytopublicpolicy, andisvoidandunenforceable.
(c)Anypersonwhoviolatesthissectionshallbesubject
toacivilpenaltynottoexceedtwothousandfivehundreddollars
($2,500)forthefirstviolation, andfivethousanddollars($5,000)
forthesecondandforeach subsequentviolation, tobeassessed
andcollectedin acivilaction broughtbytheconsumer, bythe
Attorney General, orby thedistrictattorney orcity attorney
ofthecountyorcityin which theviolation occurred. When col-
lected, thecivilpenaltyshallbepayable, asappropriate, tothe
consumerorto the generalfund ofwhichevergovernmental
entitybroughttheactiontoassessthecivilpenalty.
(d)In addition, for a willful, intentional, or reckless
violation ofthissection, aconsumerorpublicprosecutormay
recover a civilpenalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars
($10,000).
(e)Thepenalty provided by thissection isnotan ex-
clusiveremedy, anddoesnotaffectanyotherrelieforremedy
provided by law. This section shallnotbe construed to pro-
hibitorlimitaperson orbusinessthathostsonlineconsumer
reviewsorcommentsfrom removingastatementthatisother-
wiselawfultoremove.
Id. See Songmee L. Connolly, Dont Disregard Calif.s Non-Disparagement 
Clause Ban, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:44AM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/585252/don-t-disregard-calif-s-non-disparagement-clause-ban [http://perma.cc
/3Q5C-UGK9].
330 CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.8(a)(1), (2)(b)(West2014).
331 Id. §1670.8(2)(c).
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from $2,500 forthefirstviolation to$5,000 foreach subsequent
violation, compounded by a $10,000 fineforwillful, intentional,
orrecklessviolationsofthelaw.332 Thesepenaltiesarenotexclu-
siveremediesanddonotpreventotherformsofrelieforremedy.333
Thestatutealsoexpresslypermitsprivatecausesofaction, aswell
asenforcem entactionsbythestateattorneygeneral, district, or
cityattorney.334
Thelaw doesallow review sitestorem ovepostingsthatare
otherwiselawfultoredact,335 which mayincludeunprotectedob-
sceneand defamatory speech336 orconsumerpostingsthatdonot
comply with the FTCs Endorsem entGuidelines.337 Underthis
statute, nondisparagementandconfidentialityclausesinconsumer
agreem entswouldbeillegaland couldbevoidedasagainstpub-
licpolicyin California.338 Currently, severalotherstatesarecon-
sideringenactingtheirown statutesvoidingadhesiveconsum er
nondisparagem entclauses.339
However, as written, this newly enacted law protects any
consumerstatem entfrom beingwaivedbycontract.340 Butacon-
sumerdoesnothavealegalrighttopostanythingtheywishabout
abusiness, sothelaw mayneedfurtherjudicialinterpretation to
address the provisions conflicts with existingtortactionsin fraud,
misrepresentation, privacy, defamation, andunfaircompetition, as
well as compliance with the FTCs Endorsement Guidelines.341
In addition, thebroadlanguagewouldalsoinvalidateportionsof
Yelps contract with site users. Its terms of service incorporate 
contentrulesthatdonotallow consumerstopostanystatement
they wish regarding products and services.342 Contrary to the
new statute, Yelps own agreement with users forbids and per-
mitstherem ovalofcertainoffensivebutotherwiselegalformsof
332 Id. § 1670.8(2)(cd). 
333 Id. §1670.8(e).
334 Id. §1670.8(c).
335 Id. §1670.8(e).
336 See infra notes 15356 and accompanying text. 
337 See infra notes 36778 andaccompanyingtext.
338 CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.8(a), (2)(b).
339 See Connolly, supra note91.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Terms of Service ¶ 4 (B), 5(A), 6(A), YELP (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www
.yelp.com/static?p=tos[http://perma.cc/39GM-9XPY].
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speech, such as lewdness, discrim inatory orbigoted language,
andpornography.343
Thelaw willmostlyaffectCalifornia-basedbusinessesorthose
doing businessin California. However, many ofthesmallbusi-
nessesandprofessionalsreviewed on crowdsourcingsitesarelo-
callyownedandoperated.344 Otherstateswillhavetoweighinon
theissueofwhetherornotconsum ernondisparagementclauses
are legal. Asdiscussed earlier, an Arizona courtin FreeLife re-
jected Burgess public policy claim that FreeLifes contract violated 
Burgess First Amendm ent right of free speech.345 The decision
indicated thatFirstAm endmentrights applied to government
actorsand didnotapplytoprivaterestrictionson speech,346 and
concluded that the nondisparagement clause did not violate
Burgess First Amendment rights.347 In sum, theFreeLife court
upheld a nondisparagem ent clause in a clickwrap agreement
undertraditionalnotionsoffreedom ofcontract.348 However, the
courtrefused summaryjudgmenton theissueofwhetherBurges
disparaged FreeLife, contending that reasonable jurors might
differon assessingthesefactsabouthisspeech on hiswebsite.349
Because contract law is state-specific, it is unclear if Californias 
approach willbefollowedin otherstates, sochallengeswilllikely
follow onastate-by-statebasis.350
3. Anti-SLAPP Laws
State anti-SLAPP lawsmay also play a role in invalidating
defam ation claims based upon nondisparagem ent clauses.351
Theselawsareintended toallow thedism issaloflitigation filed
with theaim ofhalting participation in a publicforum.352 Some
343 Id. ¶6(A).
344 See supra notes 57. 
345 FreeLife Intl, Inc. v. Am . Educ. Music Publns, Inc., No. CV07-2210-
PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3241795, at*6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2009).
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id. at *45. 
349 Id. at*6.
350 See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
351 Dohse, supra note3, at386;Kellogg& Frankel, supra note24, at1.
352 Marciarille, supra note15, at377;Spencer, supra note 157, at 50001; 
Spinosa, supra note 142, at 75859; Russell et al., supra note11.
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anti-SLAPP statutesarelimitedtoformsofpoliticalspeech, such
aspetitioning thegovernmentorcomm unicatingwith publicof-
ficials.353 Otherstateanti-SLAPP statutesconsiderawiderange
ofmattersofpublicconcern andarenotlim itedtogovernmental
interactionsorpoliticalspeech.354 Each statestatutemayaddress
specificelem entsthatadefendantmustmeetin ordertoprevail
on a motion todism issa lawsuiton anti-SLAPP grounds.355 In
addition, some anti-SLAPP lawsperm itdefendantsto seek the
recovery of costs and attorneys fees356 or to sue plaintiffs for
abusing legal process under so-called SLAPP back sections.357
Regarding nondisparagement provisions, one could argue
under a broad anti-SLAPP rationale that the sharing ofcon-
sum erinform ation, onlineand offline, isa matterofpubliccon-
cern. Consumers m ay need inform ation aboutthe quality and
valueofcertain productsandservicesbeforemakingpurchasing
decisions. Onlinecrowdsourced review sitesarecommon vehicles
fordiscussingthisimportantinformationwithawiderangeofpo-
tentialcustom ers.358 Such clausespreventpublicdiscourseon the
issuesthatmattertoconsumers. In Demetriades, thetrialcourt
determined thatefforts to squelch negative online reviews vio-
lated Californias anti-SLAPP laws, and dismissed the case.359
Thatdecision waslateroverturnedunderthecommercialspeech
exception tothatlaw.360 Morestate-by-statechallengesareneeded
todeterm ineifanti-SLAPP statuteswillprovideadequatebases
forstrikingdowntheseadhesiveconsum erprovisions.
353 Spencer, supra note 157, at 50001; Spinosa, supra note 142, at 758
59;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26. Somestatesmayamendtheiranti-
SLAPP lawstocaptureothermattersofpublicconcern, which could lead to
invalidaton ofcertain consumernondisparagem entclauses. LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, supra note26.
354 Kellogg& Frankel, supra note24, at2;Spencer, supra note157, at501;
Spinosa, supra note 142, at 75859. 
355 See Spinosa, supra note 142, at 75859. See supra notes 16061, 206
14andaccompanyingtext.
356 Spencer, supra note157, at501.
357 Spinosa, supra note142, at758.
358 Dohse, supra note 3, at 36768. 
359 Dem etriades v. Yelp, Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 13334 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014).
360 See supra notes 16566, 20221 and accom panying text. 
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4. Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Aside from anti-SLAPP statutes, strong argum ents can be
made thatthese adhesive consumernondisparagementclauses
aredeceptiveandunfairtradepracticesperpetratedon consumers
andbusinesscompetitorsalike.361 Both federalandstatelawsad-
dressissuesofdeceptiveadvertisingandunfaircompetition, which
m ay arisethrough eitherintentionalspeech ornondisclosureof
materialfacts. Atthefederallevel, theFederalTradeCommission
(FTC)possessesthelegalauthoritytosafeguardconsumersunder
Section 5 oftheFederalTradeCom missionAct362 andtoaddress
competitors concerns under the Lanham Act.363 Theseactsautho-
rizetheFTC toadoptregulationsand instituteenforcementac-
tionsin ordertoprotectconsumersfrom unfairordeceptivetrade
practices,364 such asdeceptiveadvertising. Deceptiveadvertising
is a form ofillegal, unprotected speech, which includes faked
endorsements, andrelatedjurisprudencedatesback totheearly
twentieth century.365 Similarly, sinceitsearliestyears, the FTC
361 TheFTC hasdeterminedthatissuesofunfairnessanddeceptionin busi-
nessconductareindependentlegalbasesforenforcementactions, andconduct
maybechallengedasunfair, deceptive, orboth. FED. RESERVE, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT, SECTION 5:UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 1
(June 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NDU5-ZYYL]. See Short, supra note3, at444, 447.
362 16 C.F.R. §255.0(a)(2013);GuidesConcerningtheUseofEndorsement
andTestimonialsinAdvertising, 74Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,126 (Oct. 15, 2009)(to
becodifiedat16 C.F.R. pt. 255). See JessicaGodell, Consumer-Generated Media
and AdvertisingAre They One and the Same? An Analysis of the Amended 
FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. 205, 20709 (2010).
363 15 U.S.C. §1051 (2012). See Godell, supra note 362, at 20910. 
364 Traditionally, the courts defer to the FTCs adm inistrative expertise on 
issuesofunfairand/ordeceptivepractices, and certain stateshavepatterned
theirlawsbased on the FTC Actand FTC rulings. Brian D. Wright, Social
Media and Marketing: Exploring the Legal Pitfalls of User-Generated Content,
36 DAYTON L. REV. 67, 69, 71 (2010).
365 Federal Trade Com mission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 71921 (1914) 
(codified asamended at15 U.S.C. §45(a)). See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ.
Socy, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (faked custom er testim onials on encyclopedia ser-
viceisdeceptiveadvertising). Traditionally, in reviewingFTC actions, courts
have also upheld opinion speech grounded in an individuals honestly held be-
liefs, even ifapartyisbeingcompensated foritsspeech oreven ifthespeech
isinaccurate, butnotmotivatedbyfinancialgain. See Northam Warren Corp.
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hasaidedbusinessessufferingeconom icdamagefrom acompeti-
tors unfair or deceptive tradepracticesundertheLanham Act.366
In 2009, theFTC revised itsEndorsem entGuidestoaddress
online advertising messagesand endorsementsin socialm edia,
including disclosure requirem ents for compensated online rat-
ings and reviews.367 In part, the Endorsem entGuides support
and safeguard the individualrightto discusshonestly held be-
liefsoropinionsaboutactualuseorexperiencewith a product
orservice.368 Theserevised guidesrequiredisclosureofany ma-
terialconnections between the consumer and any sponsoring
parties, with thegoalofpromotingtransparencyandavoidingde-
ceivingconsumersaboutwhetherareview isasponsored adver-
tisem entorunsponsored consumeropinion.369 Initially, theFTC
broughtactionsagainsta publicrelationsfirm ,370 a sponsoring
v. FTC, 59 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1932)(failure to disclosecompensation to
celebrityendorsersoftoiletriesisnotunfairpracticeifbasedonhonestlyheld
opinions);Sci. Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124F.2d640, 644(3dCir. 1941)(upholdingdis-
tributionfalselycharacterizinghealthrisksfrom aluminum utensilsifhonestly
heldopinionsbypersonswith nofinancialinterestin commerceortrade);see
also Godell, supra note 362, at 21012; Short, supra note 3, at 45758. 
366 See Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946)(codified at15 U.S.C.
§§ 105172, 109196, 111129, 114141n (2012)); see, e.g., E. B. Muller& Co.
v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) (upholding FTC finding that com panys 
false disparagem ent of com petitors coffee as containing chicory as form  of un-
faircompetition);contra Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49, 5152 (6th 
Cir. 1928)(setting aside FTC enforcem entactionsforespionageand dispar-
agementwhich were viewed as notamounting to unfair competition). See
Godell, supra note 362, at 21011; Short, supra note 3, at 45657. 
367 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2013). See FTC Publishes Final Guide Governing
Endorsements, Testimonials, FED. TRADE COMMN (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.ftc
.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm [http://perma.cc/5GUC-5L4J]. See generally
Godell, supra note362, at207;Jason Goldstein, How New FTC Guidelines on
Endorsement and Testimonials Will Affect Traditional and New Media, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 609, 61213 (2011); Ponte, supra note 34, at 472
86;Short, supra note 3, at 45860. 
368 16 C.F.R. §255.1(a)(2013). See CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 12. 
369 16 C.F.R. §255. See generally Malbon, supra note 9, at 14748 (sum ma-
rizing UK and Australian rulesregarding fakeonlinereviewsasmisleading
anddeceptivepractices).
370 In re Reverb Com mcns, Inc. (No. C-4310) (F.T.C. Nov. 22, 2010), 2010 
FTC LEXIS 89, at*1. See Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges that It
Advertised Clients Gaming Apps Through Misleading Online Endorsements,
FED. TRADE COMMN (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/reverb
.shtm [http://perma.cc/UC36-33DK].
122 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
com pany,371 and an employm entscreening agency372 thatfailed
tocomplywith theserevisedguidelines, andwarnedothersabout
theirinadequaciesintheirpoliciesandsupervisionefforts.373
Although theEndorsementGuidesdonotexpresslydealwith
nondisparagementclauses,374 theexclusion ofhonestfeedback on
consum erexperiencesseems, ataminimum, toviolatethespirit
oftheseinterpretiverules. Nondisparagementclausesalsotend
toskew consumerratingstoward positivereviews, presenting a
form ofdeceptiveadvertising.375 Theseclausesintentionallyfilter
outnegativecustomerexperiences, therebypreventinginform ed
consumerdecision making.376 Similarly, theseclausesharm com -
petitorswhodonotusethem andaretransparentintheirdialogue
aboutconsumerconcerns.377 Thesebusinessesmayreceivemixed
reviewsoncrowdsourcedreview sites, whileotherbusinessesthat
employ theseclausesm ay unfairly achievehigh overallratings
andfalselyappeartodonowrongin theeyesofconsumers.378
5. Fair Use and Copyright Misuse
Asdiscussedabove, nondisparagementclausesmaybegrounded
inquestionableintellectualpropertyclaims. Copyrightassignment
clausestransferownershipofreview postingsfrom theauthoring
customertothemerchantorlicensedprofessional.379 Uponreceiv-
ingacommunication from abusinessoritslegalrepresentative,
manyconsum ersm ightquicklydeletereviewsorrankingsoutof
371 In re Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., No. C-4323, 2011 FTC LEXIS 112 at
*23 (F.TC. June 10, 2011). 
372 UnitedStatesv. Spokeo, No. 2:12-cv-05001-MMM-SH (C.D. Cal. June7,
2012). See Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA,
FED. TRADE COMMN (June 12, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/06/spokeo
.shtm [http://perma.cc/WEF9-R4W8].
373 See Ponte, supra note 34, at 46869, 48690. 
374 Thedefinition ofendorsem entm ightbeinterpretedtoincludenegative
com m entary about a com petitors products or services. However, the guides 
examplesallsuggestpositivereviewsin exchangeforsomematerialbenefit.
16 C.F.R. §255.2 (2013). See Ponte, supra note 34, at 49394. 
375 See Ponte, supra note 34, at 49394. 
376 See Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at38.
377 See Ponte, supra note 34, at 49394; Short, supra note3, at444.
378 Short, supra note3, at444, 447.
379 See Marciarille, supra note15, at395.
2016] CONSUMER GAG CONTRACTS 123 
fearofanexpensive, time-consuminglegalbattle.380 Ifacustomer
refusestoremovehisorherpostings, then thebusinessmaysend
aDMCA takedown noticetotherelevantwebsiteowner.381 Som e
socialmediasiteshaverefusedtohonortheselettersandrisklos-
ingtheirimmunityfrom copyrightliabilityunderthesafeharbor
provisions ofthe DMCA.382 Othersites may sim ply take down
the consumerpostingsforfearofrunning afouloftheirduties
underthesesafeharborprovisions.383
Similarly, clausesreferencing trademark rightsmay prevent
customers from naming a providers business, goods, and ser-
vicesiftheywish toavoidlitigation.384 Aswith DMCA takedown
notices, customers and crowdsourced websites may eliminate
postings in response to heavy-handed cease and desistletters
and threatened tradem ark infringement litigation. Therefore,
consumerspeech is effectively prevented orchilled due to con-
cernsaboutcopyrightinfringementandtradem arkinfringem ent
ordilution.385
Consum ersand ratingswebsitesm aynotbeawarethatthey
possessfairuserightsundercopyrightlaw, regardlessofthese
speech suppression clauses.386 Undercopyrightlaw, fairuse387
380 See supra notes 14244 and accompanying text. 
381 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39597. 
382 Id. at 39596. 
383 Id. at395, 397;CDT Complaint, supra note53, at15;see supra notes
14244andaccompanyingtext.
384 Spinosa, supra note142, at748.
385 See supra note147 andaccompanyingtext.
386 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entmt, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 
(3d Cir. 2003)(suggesting thatfairuseopportunitiesforcriticism and com-
mentexistdespitetermsofrestrictivenondisparagementclauses);Ty, Inc. v.
Publns Intl Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that fair use 
m ay prohibit tradem ark holders effort to control content of Beanie Babies 
guidesunderitscopyrightlicenses). See CDT Com plaint, supra note 53, at
1011; EFF GUIDE, supra note75;Read, supra note46, at406.
387 17 U.S.C. §107 (2014):
Limitationsonexclusiverights:Fairuse
Notwithstanding theprovisionsofsections106 and 106A [17
USCS §§106 and106A], thefairuseofacopyrightedwork, in-
cludingsuch usebyreproduction in copiesorphonorecordsor
byanyothermeansspecifiedbythatsection, forpurposessuch
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiplecopiesforclassroom use), scholarship, orresearch, is
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permits the use of copyrighted materialfor criticism or com-
ment.388 The Register ofCopyrights also previously indicated
that quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism  for purposes 
of illustration or com m ent is protected fair use.389 In such in-
stances, ones use of the copyrighted postings or reviews without 
a license orconsentfrom a copyrightholderisnotan infringe-
mentofcopyright.390 In addition, a person may makea fairuse
of anothers trademark in comm entaries or critiques without in-
fringingordilutingthatmark.391
As a com panion to fairuse, som e federalcircuits have also
recognized the equitable principle ofcopyrightmisuse to curb
theexcessesofthe termsand conditionsofcontemporary copy-
rightlicenses.392 While fair use addresses a purported infringers 
notan infringementofcopyright. In determiningwhetherthe
use made ofa work in any particularcase is a fairuse the
factors to be considered shall include  
(1)the purpose and characterofthe use, including whether
such useisofa commercialnatureorisfornonprofiteduca-
tionalpurposes;
(2)thenatureofthecopyrightedwork;
(3)theamountand substantialityoftheportion used in rela-
tiontothecopyrightedworkasawhole;and
(4)theeffectoftheuseupon thepotentialm arketfororvalue
ofthecopyrightedwork.
Thefactthataworkisunpublishedshallnotitselfbarafind-
ingoffairuseifsuchfindingism adeuponconsiderationofall
theabovefactors.
Id. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright, Commodification, and Censorship:
Past As PrologueBut To What Future?, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO. 6, 9,
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/haifa_priv_cens.pdf[http:/perma
.cc/J8L2-XGZN](raisingconcernsaboutfuturedemiseoffairuseduetotreaty
obligationsandprivatecontractingschemes).
388 See Samuelson, supra note387;CDT Complaint, supra note 53, at 1011. 
389 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FAIR USE (Nov. 2015), http://www.copyright.gov
/fls/fl102.html[http://perma.cc/KDN9-ZVC8 (quotingSTAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 24(Comm. Print1961).
390 Read, supra note 46, at 40610. 
391 See supra note115 andaccompanyingtext.
392 Read, supra note 46, at 40206; Jennifer R. Knight, Com m ent,
Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: and the Winner Is..., 73 TENN. L.
REV. 237, 23738, 246 (2006); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving
Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application
to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 893941 (2000). See Samuelson, supra
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conduct, copyrightm isuse, which isimportedfrom patentlaw,393
focuseson overreachingbyacopyrightholderthatresultsin adi-
minishmentofpublicaccesstocreativeexpressionsand knowl-
edge.394 Differinginterpretationsofcopyrightmisusehavecreated
severaldistinctdoctrinalstrains. In someinstances, acourtmay
require a showing ofantitrustviolations before applying copy-
rightmisuse.395 Othercourtsdonotrequireanexusbetweencopy-
rightm isuseandantitrustviolations.396
In som e of these cases, courts address whether a copyrights 
statutoryrightsarebeingutilizedtosubverttheunderlyingpub-
licpolicy ofcopyrightlaw.397 Underthispublicpolicy approach,
therightsholdersmay try toextend theirstatutory protections
orcopyrightmonopolybeyondtheintendedobjectivesandparam-
etersofcopyrightlaw.398 A courtm ay refusetoapply copyright
note387, at9. Contra Dorev. New Sensations, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144701, *9 & n.2 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2013)(stating thatfederallaw doesnot
recognize doctrines of copyright trolling or copyright abuse). 
393 Morton SaltCo. v. G. S. Suppiger, 314U.S. 488 (1942)(seminalcaseon
modern application ofpatentmisusedoctrinein antitrustcontext). See Belmas
& Larson, supra note55, at85;Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 392, at 868
69;Knight, supra note392, at240.
394 Frischmann& Moylan, supra note 392, at 81920, 89394; Knight, supra
note 392, at 23940. 
395 See, e.g., BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 6 & n. 9, 24(1979);
United Statesv. ParamountPictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 (1948);Saturday
Evening PostCo. v. Rum bleseatPress, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987);MitchellBros. Film Grp. v. Cinema AdultTheater, 604 F.2d 852, 865
& n.27 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980);SyncsortInc. v.
Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318, 33637 (D.N.J. 1999). 
396 See, e.g., Practice Mgm t. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Assn, 121 F.3d 516, 
521 (9th Cir. 1997); Assn of Am. Med. Colleges v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 
F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2004);MicrosoftCorp. v. Lutian, 2011 U.S. Dist.
Lexis109918 (N.D. OhioSept. 27, 2011);see infra note402 and accompany-
ingtext.
397 See, e.g., Altm ayer-Pizzorno v. L-Soft Intl, Inc., 302 Fed. Appx 148, 
15657 (4th Cir. 2008); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Hom e Entm t, 
Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 20306 (3d Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., 
Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 79394 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Napster, Inc. CopyrightLitig.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7236, *39*41 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Lexm ark Intl, Inc. v. 
StaticControlComponents, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 966 (E.D. Ky. 2003);
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 97576 (4th Cir. 1990). See
Belmas& Larson, supra note55, at85.
398 See supra note397 andaccompanyingtext.
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misuse when a party with unclean hands seeks to invoke this
equitableprinciple.399
Courtshaveadoptedthecopyrightmisusedoctrineininstances
whereplaintiffstried todeterthelegitim ateexerciseoffairuse
rightsthrough overlyrestrictivelicensingagreements.400 Forex-
ample, in WIREdata, copyrightmisusewasinvokedtoinvalidate
licensing agreements in which copyrightholders were seen as
abusingprocesswith unsupportablethreatsofcopyrightinfringe-
ment.401 Applyingthedoctrineofcopyrightmisuse, JudgePosner
admonished copyrightholders who m ightseek to overreach on
their statutory grant. He stated that hoping to force a settlement 
oreven achieve an outrightvictory overan opponentthatmay
lacktheresourcesorthelegalsophistication toresisteffectively,
is an abuse of process.402
The Third Circuits copyright m isuse analysis in Video Pipe-
line403 islikely them ostinstructivecaseon thevalidity ofnon-
disparagementclauseswhenapplyingcopyrightmisusewithin the
publicpolicycontext. Thecaseinvolvedawebsitethatstream ed
film trailersformoviesin ordertomarketvideorentals.404 The
websitebecameembroiledinalicensingdisputewith Disneyover
itslegalrighttostream Disneytrailersonlineandtocopymate-
rialsfrom Disneymoviestocreateitsown onlinemovietrailers
forstreaming.405 Thewebsiteclaimed fairuseoftheDisneyma-
terialsand asserted copyrightmisuseregardingrestrictiveterms
in Disneylicensingagreementsthatsoughttosuppressnegative
critiquesofDisney filmsortheentertainm entindustry,406 simi-
lartoadhesiveconsumernondisparagem entclauses.
Initially, the court determined that Video Pipelines use of 
themovieand trailer, both copyrighted m aterials, did notmeet
399 See, e.g., Intl Motor Contest Assn v. Staley, 434 F. Supp. 2d 650, 66869 
(N.D. Iowa 2006);AtariGamesCorp. v. NintendoofAmerica, Inc., 975 F.2d
832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
400 Assessm ent Tech. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 645
47 (7th Cir. 2003);Video Pipeline, 342 F.3dat203;see Knight, supra note392,
at 24344. 
401 WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3dat647.
402 Id.
403 See generally Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d. 640.
404 Id. at 19495. 
405 Id. at 19496. 
406 Id. at197, 203.
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threeoutofthefourrequirem entsforfairuse.407 Thecourtthen
addressed Video Pipelines claim that Disneys nondisparage-
mentclausetriggered a copyrightmisusedefensebecauseofits
harmfulim pacton fairuse critiquesand com m entaries.408 The
Third Circuitupheld theDisneylicensingterm s, reasoningthat
these term swere notanticom petitive409 and did notnegatively
affect a partys right to criticize Disney on other sites.410 Thecourt
alsodeterminedthatDisneymightfurtherlimitaccesstoitscre-
ativetrailersifthecompany wasnotperm itted toprotectitself
from derogatorylicensees.411 In thiscase, thenondisparagem ent
407 Id. at 198203. 
408 Id. at 20306. 
409 Id. at 20406. 
410 Id. at206. Unlike otherblanketnondisparagementclauses, licensees
wereabletocriticizeDisney on theInternet, butnoton theirsitesshowing
Disneytrailers:
Thelicensingagreementsin thiscasedoseek torestrictexpres-
sion by licensing the Disney trailers foruse on the internet
onlysolongasthewebsiteson which thetrailerswillappear
donotderogateDisney, theentertainmentindustry, etc. But
wenonethelesscannotconcludeon thisrecordthattheagree-
mentsarelikely tointerferewith creativeexpression tosuch
a degree thatthey affect in any significantway the policy
interestin increasingthepublicstoreofcreativeactivity. The
licensing agreementsdo not, forinstance, interfere with the
licensees opportunity to express such criticism  on other web 
sitesorelsewhere. There is no evidence thatthe publicwill
find itanymoredifficulttoobtain criticism ofDisneyand its
interests, oreven thatthepublicisconsiderablylesslikelyto
come acrossthiscriticism , ifitisnotdisplayed on the same
siteasthetrailers. Moreover, ifacriticwishestocommenton
Disneys works, the fair use doctrine m ay be implicated re-
gardlessoftheexistenceofthelicensingagreements.
Id.
411 Id. at206. In this instance, the nondisparagementtermsallowed for
greaterpublicaccesstocopyrightedmaterials:
Finally, copyrightlaw, and themisusedoctrinein particular,
should notbe interpreted to require Disney, ifitlicensesits
trailersfordisplayon anywebsitesbutitsown, todosowilly-
nilly regardlessofthecontentdisplayed with itscopyrighted
works. Indeed such an application of the misuse doctrine
would likely decrease the publics access to Disneys works be-
causeitmightasaresultrefusetolicenseatallonlinedisplay
ofitsworks.
Id.
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clausehelped toensuregreaterdistribution ofcopyrighted crea-
tiveworksand im provepublicaccesstothesecopyrighted mate-
rials, socopyrightmisusewasnoteffectivelyproven.412
Conversely, the Third Circuits emphasis on increasing crea-
tiveproduction andimprovingpublicaccesstocopyrightedworks
favorsconsumers, notbusinesses, in typicaladhesivenondispar-
agement clauses. Under the Third Circuits public policy approach 
tocopyrightmisuse, copyrightlaw seekstoexpand thenumber
anddiversityofcreativeworks, whilenondisparagementclauses
using copyrightassignmentschemesstrive forthe opposite out-
come. Theseclausesseek toreducetheoverallamountand vari-
ety ofauthored reviews and ratings. Unlike the Disney trailer
licenses, these clauses do nottry to maximize public access to
copyrightedworks, butseektopreventpublicdistribution ofand
accesstocopyrighted reviewsand ratings. Theseconsumerpro-
visionspervertcopyrightprinciplesin ordertocensorkeyproduct
and services information and provide unfaircommercialadvan-
tagesoverboth consumersand competitors, outsidethereason-
ableboundsofcopyrightprotections. Furthermore, theseclauses
underminecongressionalpublicpolicyfavoringand promotingthe
free flow ofideasin the online world, illustrated by the broad
imm unity afforded to websites hosting user-generated content
undertheCDA.
Despitethisanalysis, othercourtshaveupheldpartywaivers
oftheir fair use rights by contractwithoutapplying copyright
misuseorothercontractexcusesordefenses.413 Thesedecisions
pointtoward an emphasis on freedom ofcontractand private
orderingofintellectualpropertyrights.414 Therefore, thetension
betweencopyrightmisuseandfreedom ofcontractandrespectfor
theintegrityofcontractscontinuesonastate-by-statebasis.
D. Excessive Penalty Clauses and Privity Issues
A numberofthese nondisparagementclauses include liqui-
dateddamagesprovisions, them eaningandim pactofwhich few
412 Id.
413 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d. 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005);Bowers
v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See Knight,
supra note 392, at 25960. 
414 See Knight, supra note 392, at 26061. 
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consum ers understand.415 At the tim e ofcontract form ation,
liquidated damagesm ustbereasonablebased upon thelikelyor
actuallossessuffered from a breach and thechallengesofprov-
ingdamages.416 Publicpolicyisviolated ifa liquidated dam ages
clause is viewed as a penalty, or ifexcessive amounts are in-
volved, ratherthan an efforttoreasonablycom pensateforlosses
resultingfrom a breach.417 In Palmer, theconsumerspurchased
Christmasgiftsthatwerenotdelivered, andwerepenalizedmore
than $3,500 forpostinganegativereview.418 Ultimately, aUtah
courtinvalidatedtheliquidateddam agesprovision andasserted
thattheplaintiffsneverowedanymoneytoKlearGear.com under
thatclause.419
415 See Stark et al., supra note 265, at 809, 845. In their Consum er
RemediesExperim ent, theauthorssuggestthatthelegislatureshouldoutlaw
unfairterms, such asharsh remediesprovisions, thatfew consumerscompre-
hend. Id. In showingboth fairandunfairremediesclausestonon-lawyers, the
studyshowedthat
[b]ased on otherresultsfrom theConsumerRemediesExperi-
ment, itappearsthattheclearlyworded fair remediesclause
was som ewhat difficult for them  to understand because they 
did not precisely know what legal remedies were available to 
them  at law or in equity, legal term inology that any lawyer 
orjudgewhohastaken acontractscoursein law schoolshould
readilyunderstand butapparentlynotunderstandabletolay-
persons. Similarly, the clearly worded unfair remedy clause
was also somewhat difficult for them to understand, perhaps 
because m any were not precisely sure what words like sole 
remedy meant. Their admitted difficulties in understanding the 
clauses mostlikely accounts fortheir difficulties identifying
theportionsoftheremediesclausethatwould preventthem
from recoveringdamages.
Id. at809.
416 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 356(1)(1981). The provision
statesthat
[d]amagesforbreach byeitherpartym aybeliquidatedin the
agreementbutonly atan amountthatis reasonable in the
lightoftheanticipatedoractuallosscausedbythebreach and
the difficulties ofproofofloss. A term fixing unreasonably
largeliquidated damagesisunenforceableon groundsofpub-
licpolicyasapenalty.
Id. See MURRAY, supra note249, at 81219. 
417 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §356, Ill. 1.
418 Com plaint at 13, Palmer v. Kleargear, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (N.D. Utah 
2014).
419 OrderEnteringDefaultJudgmentat1, Palmerv. Kleargear, No. 1:13-
cv-00175 (N.D. Utah2014).
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Sim ilarly, couples planning weddings at the Union Street
GuestHousein theCatskillswererequired tosign an agreement
thatprevented them orany person in theirwedding party from
postinganegativereview online.420 Theagreementstatedthata
five hundred dollar fine would be deducted from the couples 
depositforeverynegativereview postedbythem oranym em ber
oftheir party staying atthe inn.421 The couple would only re-
ceive a refund of their deposit once the reviews were taken
down.422 Thisdam agesclausemay alsobeviewed asa penalty,
asin Palmer. These typesofclauseswilllikely failifthey are
viewed asunreasonablepenaltiesin lightofthebreach and are
being misused to detertrue or protected opinion speech about
thecustomerexperience.
Penalty clauses may also raise issues ofprivity ofcontract.
Privity ofcontractexistsbetween partieswhohavebargained for
and agreed upon thetermsofa contract.423 Traditionally, parties
wererequiredtobeinprivityofcontractinordertobringalegal
actionforbreachofthatagreement.424 Certain nondisparagement
clausestry toreach beyond thecontracting partiestocurtailthe
speech ofthirdparties, includingotherfamilyorhouseholdm em-
bersand friendswhoarenotpartiestotheinitialagreement.425
These contracts penalize a contracting party forthe actions of
third parties who are notin privity ofcontract.426 In addition,
thesethird partiesarenotagentsofthecontractingparties, nor
aretheythird partybeneficiariesoftheunderlyingagreement.427
TheUnion StreetGuestHouseagreementmakesitclearthatthe
420 Goldman, supra note85;Mara Siegler, Hotel Fines $500 for every bad
review posted online, N.Y. POST (Aug. 4, 2014, 1:03 a.m .), http://pagesix.com
/2014/08/04/hotel-charges-500-for-every-bad-review-posted-online [http://perma
.cc/Q7LS-UKFU]. See RogerR. Quiles, Esq., Why Fines for Negative Online
Reviews Are Not Legally Sound, RRQ LAW BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.rrq
law.com/blog/why-fines-for-negative-online-reviews-are-not-legally-sound [http://
perma.cc/7NJC-LGG2].
421 Siegler, supra note420.
422 Id.
423 MURRAY, supra note249, at870.
424 Id.
425 See, e.g., Complaint at 23, Palmer v. Kleargear, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (N.D. 
Utah2014).
426 Id.
427 Id.
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signingcouplebecomesliablefortheconductofthird partieswho
havenotenteredintothecontract.428 Itisdoubtfulthatapartyto
a contractcan forbid orwaivethespeech rightsofnonsignatories
duetothelackofprivityofcontractbetweentheparties.
Although notexpresslystatedin theKlearGear.com contract,
John Palm er ordered the goods from KlearGear.com , but his
spouse, Jen Kulas, subsequently posted a negative review on
RipoffReport.429 KlearGearsoughttocollecton itsclauseforher
postingeventhoughshehadnotagreed to KlearGear.com s terms 
ofservice.430 KlearGear.coms interpretation of its nondisparage-
mentclausetriedtobindnotonlythepartieswhoenteredintothe
contract, butalsothird parties, such asfamily, household mem-
bers, and friendswho were notcontracting parties.431 One may
arguethatKlearGear.com ortheUnion StreetGuestHousehasa
contractualrighttoenforceitsnondisparagementclauseagainst
thespecificpartyin privityofcontractwhoagreed nottoposta
negativereview. Yetitisunlikelythatthesem erchantscan sup-
pressthespeech ofindividualswhoarenotpartiestotheagree-
ment, nor can they penalize a signatory for a noncontracting
partys exercise of legal rights due toalackofprivityofcontract.
IV. FEDERAL OPTIONS ON NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES
Traditionally, contractlaw isstate-based, and effortstodeal
with nondisparagem entclausesface an extended state-by-state
evaluation. Thispiecemealapproach createsuncertaintyforboth
consum ersand businessesaboutthe validity ofthese adhesive
nondisparagementclauses. In ordertoprovideauniform approach
tothisissue, itmaybemoreappropriateforfederalregulation to
protectconsum ersaswellascompetitorsfrom theseunfairbusi-
nesspractices. Severaloptionshavebeen putforwardtoaddress
theseprovisions, includinga proposed federalstatuteoutlawing
consumer nondisparagement clauses, further revisions to the
FTCs Endorsement Guides, and amendm ents to website im mu-
nityundertheCDA.432
428 Siegler, supra note420.
429 Com plaint at 23, Palmer, No. 1:13-cv-00175.
430 Id.
431 Id.
432 ConsumerReview Freedom Act(CRFA)of2014, H.R. 5499, 113th Cong.
(Sept. 15, 2014).
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A. Enact Proposed Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2014
A federallaw addressing adhesive consumer nondisparage-
mentclausesisalready underconsideration, and would avoid a
more piecemealor state-by-state approach to these issues. In
September of2014, California Congressm an Eric Swalwellin-
troduced the proposed Consum erReview Freedom Actof2014
(CRFA).433 Much like Californias state law, the proposed federal 
law voidsany adhesivecontractthata businessoffersorenters
into thatrestrictsorforbidsa contracting party from posting a
covered comm unication.434 Covered comm unications include
written, oral, orpictorialassessmentsofbusinessproducts, ser-
vices, or interactions provided by electronic means.435 Penalty
clausesforcovered comm unicationsin thesenondisparagement
clauseswouldalsobevoidunderthisproposedstatute.436 Aswrit-
ten, thelaw doesnotaddresscontractsthattrytolimitorprevent
such com municationsin theofflineworld.437 Thelanguagecould
bebroadened toincludeboth offlineand onlinecom munications
underitsterms.
Furtherm ore, thislegislation indicatesthatanyviolationsof
itsprovisionsshould be viewed asunfairordeceptive practices
undertheFTC Act, which focuseson consumerprotection.438 Its
termscouldbefurtherbroadened toprotectcom petitorsfrom the
harm ofsuch clausesundertheLanham Act. Both theFTC and
stateattorneysgeneralarepermitted toenforcethelaw,439 but
privateactionsarenotallowed underthefederallaw.440 Yetthe
CRFA wouldnotpreemptanyexistingstatelawson thesetypesof
contractclauses.441 Therefore, statescouldalsodeterminewhether
topermitprivateactionsundertheirstatestatutes, asisallowed
under Californias statute. 
433 Id.;see EricGoldman, Congress May Crack Down On Businesses Ef-
forts To Ban Consumer Reviews, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/24/congress-m ay-crack-down-on
-businesses-efforts-to-ban-consumer-reviews/.
434 H.R. 5499, §§ 12(a). 
435 Id. §2(g)(4).
436 Id. §2(a)(2).
437 Id.
438 Id. §2(e)(2).
439 Id. §§ 2(e)(2)2(f). 
440 Id. §§ 2(e)2(f). 
441 Id. §3.
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Unlike Californias Yelp law, the federal law deals with the 
questionableuseofcopyrightortrademark rightsin nondispar-
agement clauses. The proposed law invalidates any adhesive
clausethatassignsorcreatesan exclusivelicensetoanothercon-
tracting partys intellectual property rights in ones own online 
communications.442 Although fair use rights are not explicitly
stated, onecan inferthatthenew law wouldprotectthoserights
as part of a partys existing intellectual property rights. However, 
thelaw doesnotinvalidatecontractsthatprohibitthedisclosure
oftradesecrets, proprietarycommercialorfinancialinformation,
humanresourcesandmedicalfiles, orlaw enforcementrecords.443
TheproposedCRFA alsoexcludesfrom itsprotectionsanycon-
tractthatcreatesan employer-employeeorindependentcontrac-
torrelationship.444 Thisexception would notpreventbusinesses
from continuing to include broad nondisparagementclauses in
theirworkplacepoliciesand contractswith employeesand inde-
pendentcontractors. Therefore, theNLRB, SEC, andotherregu-
latory agencieswould stillneed to carve outrulesto safeguard
whistleblowingand otherform sofprotected communications.445
TheCRFA couldbeimprovedbydefiningcoveredcommunications
toincludeformsoflegalspeech, suchastrueoropinionspeech, as
wellasspeech otherwiseprotected underlaw, such asconcerted
actionundertheNLRB orwhistleblowerstatutes.446
In addition, the CRFA language seems to protectconsum er
speech thatisnotlegal, such asfalseordefamatorystatements,
similar to the California law.447 This law would also imperil
websitesthatofferadhesivetermsofservicethatlimitorforbid
speech thatisillegal, such asfalseordefam atoryspeech, aswell
aslegalspeech, such asoffensivespeech undercomm unity con-
tentstandards. Ataminimum, thewordingshouldberevisedto
expressly exclude illegalspeech, such as false or defam atory
statem ents, from thedefinition ofcoveredcomm unications.448
Atthisearlystage, itisdifficulttodeterm inehow likelyitis
that this proposed legislation will be enacted. In todays highly 
442 Id. §§2(a)(1), 2(a)(3).
443 Id. §§ 2(b)2(c). 
444 Id. §2(g)(3).
445 See supra notes 6971 and accom panying text. 
446 See CRFA, supra note432.
447 See generally H.R. 5499.
448 See supra notes 34043 and accompanying text. 
134 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
politicizedenvironm ent, itmaybedifficulttopassanynew laws
thatmightbeviewedasburdensometobusinesses, ormoreprop-
erly handled on a statelevel. With thecurrentintransigenceon
som any issuesfacing Congress, a regulatory approach may be
fasterandmoreeffectiveinaddressingnondisparagementclauses.
B. Revise the Existing FTC Endorsement Guides
Underthe term softhe 2009 Endorsem entGuides, the FTC
soughttoclarify thelinebetween consumerdialogueand spon-
soredadvertisinginsocialmedia. TheGuidesdefinedan endorse-
mentas any advertising m essage thata reasonable consum er
would think reflected the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experi-
encesofthe online reviewer.449 The EndorsementGuidesman-
date that an endorsers statem ents m ust illustrate ones honest 
beliefs or opinions about ones actualuse or experience with
productsorservices.450 To avoid pay-to-postmanipulations, the
2009 revisions required disclosure ofany materialconnections
between the online reviewerand the sponsoring business.451 A
materialconnectionorrelationshipencompassesanyform ofcom-
pensation notoffered tothepublicatlarge, such asspecialdis-
counts, free samples, money, and sales commissions.452 These
typesofrewardsmayaffecta reviewers assessment, skewing it 
towards positive in order to continue to receive further bene-
fits.453 Disclosures are required to be clearand conspicuous to
449 Revised Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 255(b)(2009). Endorsementisdefined as
follows:
[A]ny advertising message (including verbal statements,
demonstrations, ordepictionsofthename, signature, likeness
orotheridentifying personalcharacteristicsofan individual
or the nam e or sealofan organization)thatconsumers are
likely tobelievereflectstheopinions, beliefs, findings, orex-
periences ofa party other than the sponsoring advertiser,
even ifthe views expressed by that party are identicalto
thoseofthesponsoringadvertiser. Thepartywhoseopinions,
beliefs, findings, orexperiencethemessageappearstoreflect
willbecalled theendorserand may bean individual, group,
orinstitution.
Id.
450 Id. §255.1.
451 Id. §255.5.
452 Id.
453 Id.
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promote transparency between ordinary consumerreviewsand
sponsored speech.454 By revealing theseconnectionswhen post-
ingareview, consumersaremadeawareoftherelationship and
can determ inewhatim pact, ifany, ithasupon thecredibilityof
therankingorevaluation.455 Thebusinessthatsponsored there-
view, aswellasitsagents, such asadvertisingagenciesandrep-
utation managem entfirm s, m ay be liable forfailing toeducate
and monitor compensated reviewers for compliance with these
regulatoryinterpretations.456
Although m any legalexpertswere criticalofthese interpre-
tiverules, the2009 EndorsementGuidesprovideafederalvehicle
foraddressingnondisparagementclausesthatencroach upon or
forbid protected trueoropinion speech. Sim ilartotheproposed
federallegislation, these guidescould be revised to assertthat
adhesiveconsum ernondisparagem entclausesareunfairandde-
ceptivetradepractices. In prohibitingtheiruse, theguidescould
furtherexplain whysuch provisionsnegativelyimpactboth con-
sumersandcompetitorsin themarketplace. In addition, theFTC
couldexpresslystatethatsponsoringnegativereviewsisalsoan
unfairand deceptivetradepracticetofurtherassuagebusiness
concernsaboutfake, negativereviews. Asaresult, theFTC could
more quickly respond to thisem erging issuewithoutthe possi-
ble lengthy delaysin awaiting congressionalaction on the pro-
posedCRFA.
C. Amend Section 230 Immunity
UnderSection 230 oftheCDA,457 Congresssoughttopromote
the robust development ofonline discussions and to support
454 Id.
455 FTC Policy Statementon Deception, LettertoTheHonorableJohn D.
Dingell, Chairman, Com mittee on Commerce and Energy (Oct. 14, 1983),
appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 17475 (1984), http:// 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystm t/ad-decept.htm [http://perma.cc/M432-7B7W]; see
Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-
Generated Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 750
51, 757 (2010).
456 See supra notes 36973 and accompanying text. 
457 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2013). Section 230 states that no 
cause ofaction may be broughtand no liability m ay be imposed underany
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section. See generally Jeff
Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15 J.
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self-regulation byonlinespaceswithouttherisk oflegalliability
foruser-generated content.458 Underthisprovision, Congresspro-
vided broad immunity forwebsitesthathostuser-generated con-
tent.459 Potentialliabilityforonlinepostingshingesuponwhether
TECH. L. & POLY 123, 151 (2010)(discussing how CDA immunity effectively
balancesfreeexpression underFirstAmendmentandabilityofuser-generated
websitestocreatecontentstandardsreflectingcom munitystandards).
458 47 U.S.C.S. §230. In itsfindingsoffact, Congressstateditsreasonsfor
permittingbroadimmunityforICPs.
(a) Findings. TheCongressfindsthefollowing:
(1)TherapidlydevelopingarrayofInternetandotherinter-
activecomputerservicesavailabletoindividualAmericans
representan extraordinary advancein theavailability of
educationalandinformationalresourcestoourcitizens.
(2)Theseservicesofferusersagreatdegreeofcontrolover
theinformationthattheyreceive, aswellasthepotentialfor
evengreatercontrolinthefutureastechnologydevelops.
(3)The Internetand otherinteractive computerservices
offer a forum for a true diversity ofpoliticaldiscourse,
uniqueopportunitiesforculturaldevelopment, and myriad
avenuesforintellectualactivity.
(4)The Internetand otherinteractive computerservices
haveflourished, tothebenefitofallAmericans, withamini-
mum ofgovernmentregulation.
(5)IncreasinglyAmericansarerelyingon interactivemedia
fora variety ofpolitical, educational, cultural, and enter-
tainmentservices.
(b) Policy. It is the policy of the United States  
(1)topromotethecontinued developmentoftheInternet
and other interactive computer services and other inter-
activemedia;
(2)to preserve the vibrantand competitive free market
thatpresentlyexistsfortheInternetandotherinteractive
computerservices, unfetteredbyFederalorStateregulation;
(3)to encourage the developmentoftechnologies which
maximize usercontroloverwhatinformation isreceived
byindividuals, fam ilies, and schoolswhousetheInternet
andotherinteractivecom puterservices;
(4)toremovedisincentivesforthedevelopmentand utili-
zation ofblockingandfilteringtechnologiesthatempower
parentstorestricttheirchildrens access to objectionable 
orinappropriateonlinematerial;and
(5)to ensure vigorous enforcement ofFederalcriminal
lawstodeterand punish traffickingin obscenity, stalking,
andharassmentbymeansofcomputer.
47 U.S.C.S. §230 (ab).
459 See 47 U.S.C.S. §230(f)(2).
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the website is classified as an interactive com puter service 
(ICS)460 or an inform ation content provider (ICP).461 AsICPs,
userswhocreateand upload onlinecontent, such asconsum ers
posting reviews or ratings, may be held liable for their own
speech.462 Courtshavebroadlyinterpreted CDA imm unity, even
ifICSsdonotundertakecontentfilteringorm onitoring.463 User-
generated contentsites, likecrowdsourced review websites, are
typicallycategorizedasICSsandhavebeen foundim munefrom
liabilityforthirdpartypostings.464
Forexam ple, in Reit, a dentistchallenged negative reviews
on Yelp thathe alleged defam ed and harmed his business.465
Reitobjectedtoanallegedlydefamatoryreview thatassertedthat
Reits office was small, old, and smelly, and that the equip-
ment is old and dirty.466 Reitcontendedthatseveralpatientscan-
celed theirappointmentsand hisdaily scheduleoften tofifteen
appointm entsperdayfelltofourtofiveperdayafterthisnega-
tivereview.467 Reittried tohaveYelp rem ovethenegativepost,
butitrefusedtodoso.468 ThecourtdeterminedthatYelpwasan
interactive com puterservice, and im munefrom defamation lia-
bilityforthesethirdpartyposts.469
460 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(f)(3). An interactive com puter service is defined as 
any inform ation service, system , or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specificallya serviceorsystem thatprovidesaccesstotheInternetand such
system s operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
461 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(f)(3). Under the CDA, an inform ation content 
provider m eans any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, 
forthecreation ordevelopmentofinform ation provided through theInternet
or any other interactive com puter service. 
462 See 47 U.S.C.S. § 230 (ab); see supra textaccompanyingnote457.
463 See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers Com m. For CivilRights Under Law, Inc., v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 67172 (7th Cir. 2008); Carafano v. Metro-
splash.com , Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 112324 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. America 
Online, 129 F.3d 327, 33031 (4th Cir. 1997); Blum enthal v. Drudge, 992 F. 
Supp. 44, 5051 (D.D.C. 1998). 
464 See Reitv. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d at 41214; see infra textaccom-
panying notes 47781; see, e.g., casescitedsupra note463.
465 Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2dat412.
466 Id.
467 Id.
468 Id.
469 Id. at 41314. 
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However, som ecourtshavedeterm inedthatawebsitecan be
bothanICP andanICS andcanbeheldliableformaterialsdevel-
oped and posted as an ICP.470 Forexample, in Roommate.com,
theNinth Circuitdeterminedthatthedefendantwebsiteoperated
a subscription servicewebsitedesigned tom atch peoplerenting
outspareroom swith peoplelooking fora placetolive.471 Using
drop-down menus, subscriberswererequired todevelop profiles
including basiccontactinformation, and todisclosepreferences
ofgender, sexualorientation, and interestin allowing children
intoa household.472 Thesitealsoallowed subscriberstosubmit
additionalcomm entsaboutthemselvesand desired characteris-
ticsofpotentialroommatesin an open-ended essay.473 Further,
Roommate.com establishedan e-mailalertandsearch enginethat
facilitatedalertsandsearchesbasedon discriminatorycriteria.474
TheFairHousingCouncilsoftheSan FernandoValleyand San
Diego (Councils) sued Room mate.com in federalcourt, alleging
that Roommate.coms business violated federal and state fair hous-
ingrequirements.475 ApplyingSection 230 immunity, thedistrict
courtdismissed the case againstRoommate.com asan ICP be-
causethesubscriberscreatedtheirown profilecontent.476
On appeal, theNinth Circuitdecided thatawebsiteoperator
can beboth an ICS and an ICP.477 Thecourtdeterm ined thatif
an ICS passivelydisplayscontentcreatedentirelybyothers, then
itm aintainsICS imm unity with respectto thatcontent.478 For
example, Room mate.com wasnotliable forusercontentposted
in thefree-form essaysection ofthatsite.479 However, iftheICS
created the challenged content or is found to be responsible, in 
470 See, e.g., FairHous. CouncilofSan FernandoValleyv. Roommate.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008); Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. QIP 
Holders LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14687, *66, *6869 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 
2010);MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *2836 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004). 
471 Room m ate.com , 521 F.3d at 116162. 
472 Id. at 116566. 
473 Id. at 117374. 
474 Id. at1162, 1167.
475 Id. at 116465. 
476 Id. at1162.
477 Id. at 116263. 
478 Id. at 116263. 
479 Id. at1174.
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whole or in part for the content, then the site is acting as an ICP 
andmaybeheldlegallyliableforthatcontent.480 Inthisinstance,
Room m ate.com could beheld liableforitsdiscrim inatoryprofile
questions, drop down m enus, and search and alertvehiclesthat
aidedinthecreationofwebsitecontent.481
Applyingthisapproach couldspelltroubleforsites, likeYelp,
thatrelyupon broadim munity. Somecrowdsourced review sites
maydirectem ployeestocreatereviews482 andmayencourageand
compensate specific users who are popular influencers to post
theirassessm ents, creating a m ixed picture ofliability and im-
munityforsuch sites.483 Asidefrom certainjudicialdecisionsthat
limitICS immunity, Section 230 isunderpressure due to legit-
imateconcernsaboutcyberbullying, hatespeech, defamatorygos-
sip sites, and revenge porn on web sitesthatencourage and/or
financiallyprofitfrom thesetypesofonlinespeech.484 Som elegal
comm entatorshave criticized courtsforapplying imm unity too
broadlyand fornotrequiringwebsitestoundertakesubstantive
monitoring effortsin ordertom erittheretention ofSection 230
imm unity.485
480 Id. at 116263. 
481 Id. at 116567. 
482 See supra notes 21619 and accompanying text. 
483 See supra note198 andaccompanyingtext.
484 Schorr, supra note 163, at 73738; see Jones v. Dirty World Entm t Re-
cordings, LLC, 2013 WL 4068780 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2013)(findingwebsitelia-
bleforthirdpartycontentasitencouragedthesubmission ofsalaciousgossip
and made rude remarks aboutcontent);but see EricGoldman, Should the
Dirty Website Be Liable for Encouraging Users to Gossip?, FORBES (Nov. 25,
2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/11/25/should-the
dirty-website-be-liable-for-encouraging-users-to-gossip/.
485 SOLOVE, supra note 163, at 15254; Schorr, supra note 163, at 75657; 
Short, supra note 3, at 46667, 470. On the issue of self-monitoring, Ms. Schorr 
addresses instances ofcampus gossip websites actively soliciting m aterial
thatislikelydefamatoryofordinaryindividuals. Shestates:
When websites engage in intentionalsolicitation, they are
undermining one ofthe two reasons forenacting § 230:en-
couraging self-policing. In fact, providing immunity to those
whosolicitsalaciouscontentdoestheexactopposite. Thecur-
rentpolicysuggeststhatthereisnodifferencebetween those
whomakeagoodfaith efforttoself-police, therebyworkingto
maintain a high quality standard asto the inform ation they
disperse, and those who refuse to remove objectionable con-
tentbecausetheylikestirringupcontroversy. Asaresult, the
140 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
ProposalsarebeingdiscussedtoreviseSection 230 tofurther
limitICS immunity, andtoholdwebsiteslegallyliableforencour-
agingpostingsthataredefam atory, offensive, orillegalspeech486
orfor failing to rem ove such illegalthird party m aterialafter
notice.487 Otherexpertsarepushing back againstproposed Sec-
tion230 changes, arguingthatexpansiveimmunitybestcomports
with FirstAm endmentvaluesandthedem ocratization ofspeech
through onlineplatforms.488 Some comm entatorsare looking to
self-regulation asthebestwaytodealwith concernsaboutweb-
sitecontent, andtoencourageservicestoadopttheirown content
standardsin responsetocom munityconcerns.489
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELF-REGULATORY OPTIONS
Whilethedebaterageson aboutthevalueand scopeofSec-
tion 230 im m unity, an emphasison self-regulation m ay be the
bestway to dealwith online contentissues.490 Furthermore, it
wouldbeverydifficultforregulators, individuals, andbusinesses
tobalancetheconcernsofallstakeholderswith regard toadhe-
sive consum ernondisparagementclauses, and to police the ex-
pansiveconsumerblogosphere. Considering theexplosivegrowth
ofsocialm edia, a betterapproach toadhesiveconsum ernondis-
paragementclauses may be to focus on website and business
self-regulation, ratherthan amendingSection 230 immunityand
relyingtooheavilyonregulatoryauthorities.491
Internethasbecomea safe-harborforthosewhowish topro-
motecontentthatwouldbeunacceptableifbroadcastthrough
a differentmedium. Atthispointin tim e, unlikewhen §230
wasenacted, the Internetisan expansive and thriving net-
work. Therefore, itismoreimportanttoreestablish thepolicy
encouraging self-policing and to establish a policy discourag-
ingdevelopmentofmaliciouswebsites.
Schorr, supra note163, at75657.
486 See supra note483;Bluebond, supra note 4, at 68485; Schorr, supra
note 163, at 74849, 75558. 
487 SOLOVE, supra note 163, at 15254; Bluebond, supra note 4, at689;
Schorr, supra note 163, at 75657. 
488 See Kosseff, supra note 457, at 12728, 13435. 
489 Malbon, supra note 9, at 15051; see Ponte, supra note 23, at 495508. 
490 See Godell, supra note362, at217.
491 Malbon, supra note 9, at 15051; Ponte, supra note 23, at 495508. 
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Thereareanumberofself-regulatoryoptionsfordealingwith
adhesivenondisparagementclauses. Someoptionsmayfocuspri-
marilyoncrowdsourcedreview sites, whileothersmayemphasize
changingbusinessconduct.492 A num beroftherecom mendations
requirecooperation between thesesitesand impacted businesses
to help reduce unnecessary tensionsand festering m istrustbe-
tween businessesand thesewebsites.493 In turn, theseideascan
help decreaselawsuitsoverratingsand reviews, saving wasted
time, effort, andexpensesforallparties. Theseself-regulatorypro-
posalsmayalsohelptoimprovethecustom erexperience.
A. Revise Content Guidelines on Nondisparagement Issues
Crowdsourcedreview sitesmayhelpbluntthenegativeeffects
ofnondisparagementclausesbyaddressingthem directlyin their
sitepoliciesandratingscontent. Assomealreadydo, crowdsourced
websitescan clearlyflagoridentifybusinessesandprofessionals
whoutilizeadhesivenondisparagem entclauses.494 Thisnotifica-
tion couldoccurin anumberofways, includingcolor-coding, spe-
cialnotation, orsymbols. In thisway, consumerswillbeeducated
about a merchants policy and determ ine how they m ight view or 
even devalue consumerassessm ents in lightofthis policy. The
sitecouldadoptandim plementaformalpolicyofuniform reduc-
tion in an overallrating ofa businessorprofessionalthatuses
suchclauses.
In addition, sitescan makeitcleartobusinessesand profes-
sionalsthattheywillrefusetohonortakedown noticesandcease
anddesistlettersgroundedin adhesiveconsumerclauses. These
provisionscouldbeplacedinthetermsofuseforallwebsiteusers,
aswellasin advertisingagreementswith theirown sponsors, who
areoften businessesbeing rated on theirsites. Similarly, credit
ratingbureausmayalsorefusetopostdebtentriesin consum er
credithistorybasedon clausespenalizingconsumerspeech.
Tocomplem entthesebusiness-centricpolicies, itisim portant
forcontentguidelinestoaddressconsumerandcompetitorabuses,
as well.495 Many crowdsourced review sites forbid users from
492 Ponte, supra note 23, at 50307. 
493 Malbon, supra note9, at151.
494 Dohse, supra note 3, at 364, 39091. 
495 Id. at 38990. 
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posting fake, false, ordefamatory reviews.496 Despitethesepro-
visions, itisunclearhow many ofthese sitesmake meaningful,
consistenteffortstoenforcetheseprovisions.497 Somesites, such
as Yelp and Edm unds.com, have begun to bring legalactions
against com panies that post fake reviews.498 Other sites may
wish todothesam etotampdownon fakereview cam paigns.
Outsideoflitigation, review sitesshould enforcetheirterm s
ofuseastofalseordefam atoryreviewsagainstindividualusers
whom eetsom ethreshold amountofimproperreviews.499 Sim i-
lartosafeharborpoliciesforcopyrighted materials, review sites
maydeterminethatausercan nolongerpostduetorepeatedvio-
lations oftheir content guidelines. Alternatively, some crowd-
sourced review sitesonly allow userswho actually purchased a
productorservicetoposttheirreviewson thesite.500 Othersites
m ay allow any usertopost, buthighlightreviewsfrom verified
purchaserstoletconsum ersdecidewhatweighttogivetonon-
verified reviews.501 A verification processhelpsto reduce faked
reviews, both positiveand negative, which benefitsboth consum-
ersand businesses.502 To lim itsuspiciousorrepetitive ratings,
websitetermsofusecan limitthenumberofreviewsacustomer
may createregarding a given business503 and establish waiting
periodsbetween reviewsandupdatesofpostings.504
496 Id. at389.
497 Short, supra note 3, at 45253. 
498 Dave, supra note17.
499 Dohse, supra note 3, at 37778; Short, supra note3, at467.
500 Dohse, supra note3, at389;Short, supra note 3, at 467, 47071. Som e 
retailers m ay link purchases to an individuals ability to post on their web-
sites or could link ones purchase history to ones online accounts. Short, supra
note3, at470. See, e.g., Verified Purchase Reviews, AMAZON.COM [http://perma
.cc/87WQ-PVU3](onlineretailerwith verified purchaserreviewsnoted);Press
Release, Expedia.com, ExpediaOverhaulsHotelReviews, ConsumersCanNow
Sort Verified Reviews by Shared Interest (Mar. 8, 2012), http://viewfinder
.expedia.com/news/expedia-overhauls-hotel-reviews-consumers-can-now-sort-veri
fied-reviews-by-shared-interest[http:/perma.cc/E7CZ-BP3R];REEVOO.COM (UK-
based aggregatorofconsumerreviewsfrom verified purchasersofproducts
and/orserviceswhich areneithermanipulatednoredited), http://www.reevoo
.com/our-difference/[http://perma.cc/7SPU-2BRR].
501 See Ponte, supra note 23, at 50405; Tushnet, supra note455, at722,
75456, 760. 
502 Short, supra note3, at467.
503 Dohse, supra note 3, at 38990. 
504 Id. at379.
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Thesecrowdsourcedsitesshouldalsoeducateconsumersabout
their content guidelines. Many users do not read a sites term s of 
use, sofew mayabidebyitscontentrules.505 Itisuptothesiteto
providesimpleFAQsand videotutorialswhen a userissetting
up a profile to give them  a basic understanding of that sites con-
tentguidelinesand notionsoftruthfuland/orprotected opinion
speech.506 Thetutorialsshouldalsoadviseconsumersabouttheir
potentiallegalliability forfalse ordefam atory statem ents. Ifa
sitedecidestoremoveapostingorshiftittoasecondarypage, the
consum ershouldbeadvisedandgiven an opportunitytodispute
thischange, sim ilartowhatisdoneforposted copyrighted ma-
terialson otheruser-generated sites. Sitesm ayalsowanttoes-
tablish a policytodenyaccesstothesiteforrepeatoffendersof
theircontentguidelines.
With such policies in place, m any businesses m ay be more
willingtoabandon such clausesascounterproductivein improv-
ing their ratings and harm ful to their business reputations.
Some businessesm ay also com e to recognize thatthe negative
viralimpactofheavy-handed nondisparagementclausesiscaus-
ingextensivedamagetotheirbrandimageandhurtingtheircus-
tomerrelationships. Further, firmsmay wantto avoid services
prom ising to rem ove negative postings507 orwrite positive ones
that may violate the FTCs Endorsement Guidelines. Besides, most 
consumerreviewsare positive, and userstend tobe distrustful
ofbusinessratingswith too many positive businessreviews.508
Allowing a more balanced picture to em erge and engaging in
post-transaction dialoguewith consumersmayincreasecustomer
loyaltyandbrandvaluein thelongerterm.509
505 Id. at390.
506 See id. at 38990. 
507 Id. at387. Dohse noted thatbusinessesshould be wary aboutonline
reputation managers who promise to make allnegative reviews disappear.
Thesefirm sm ightsilencethevoicesofgenuineconsum erswhocan provide
helpfulfeedbackorvaluablewarningsaboutproductproblems. Id.
508 Malbon, supra note 9, at 14445. Although some consumers believe they 
caneasilydetectfakereviews, ithasbecomeverychallengingtodecipherreal
from fakereviews. Id. at145.
509 Dohse, supra note 3, at387. Dohse indicates the importance ofcon-
tinuingconsumerdialogue:
Beyond technologytrickstodisplacenegativereviews, reputa-
tionm anagerscanhelpbusinessesplaydefensebymonitoring
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B. Improve Website Filtering and Communication Programs
Businesses have often challenged filtering systems for dis-
missingtruthfulpositivereviewsand highlightingnegativepost-
ings.510 Improvedtechnologicalfiltersandstatisticalanalysescan
helpsitestorecognizean influxofsuspiciouspositiveornegative
reviews.511 Sitescan alsoprovideadequatestaffingtohelpquickly
review and rem oveevaluationsthatthey discoverorthatbusi-
nessesshow arefalse, defamatory, orinaccurate.512 In addition,
businessesshouldnothavetopayexcessivefeestohavesuchma-
terialsprom ptlytaken down.513
Concernsaboutprioritized assessm entshavealsobeen raised
with regard to the influence of so-called elite reviewers who have 
establishedacommunityfollowing, aswellasthepracticeofhigh-
lightingreviewswritten bysiteemployees.514 Itmaym akesense
forsitesto allow postingsto flow naturally, perhapsby dateof
review, ratherthan m anipulating the review rankingsthrough
otherartificialmethods. Thisnew methodologyallowscustomers
consumer-generatedcontentaboutthem and counselingthem
on how to respond. Knowing how to communicate with cus-
tomersonlinecan helplessen theblow ofnegativereviewsand
develop sustainable social media policies for the business.
Thism ethod may also prove smarterin the long run asop-
posed tofloodingtheWeb with positivereviewsorconcealing
negative reviews, which are usually quick fixes rather than 
permanentsolutions. ReputationRanger.com encouragesbusi-
nesses to respond to both positive and negative criticism.
ReviewPush also suggestsmaking the review requesta per-
m anent feature of the businesss website or a link included in 
the businesss em ails. 
Id.
510 Malbon, supra note9, at144;Dohse, supra note3, at387.
511 Dohse, supra note 3, at 38889; Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38990; 
Ponte, supra note 23, at 50304. One study determined that filtering 
algorithms could be successful90 percentofthe time in weeding outfake
reviews. Ottetal., supra note13, at309, 316. See CDT Complaint, supra note
53, at8 (discussing discovery ofrepeated useofIP addressesasway tosort
outfakereviews).
512 Russelletal., supra note11.
513 See Dohse, supra note 3, at 37475; Short, supra note3, at470.
514 See, e.g., MichaelLuca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of
Yelp.com (Harvard BusinessSchoolWorkingPaperNo. 12-016, 2011), http://
www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=41233 [http:/perma.cc/76HM-NSLW].
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toconsiderthemostrecentassessments, allowinguserstofeelthat
theirviewsaretreated equally, ratherthan beingsubjugated to
whatisessentiallyapopularitycontest.
Itm ay also be helpfulto allstakeholders forsites to allow
businessesto highlightrecentim provementsm ade in response
to custom erreviews. Mostmerchants and professionals do not
wish torem ain static515 and should havea noorlow-costwayof
advisingcustomersthattheirfeedback hasbeen heard and effec-
tivelyrespondedtothrough businessim provementsorsitepolicy
changes. Manysitesalreadyallow businessestoresponddirectlyto
consumers, and othersshouldoffersimilaroptions.516 Businesses
should take advantage ofopportunities to create dialogue and
buildrelationshipswiththeircustomerbaseon ratingssites.517
Crowdsourced review sites may also wish to partner with
m obileapplication developerswhoarecreatingnew avenuesfor
directcustomer-to-businesscontactpriortoapostedreview. With
thisapproach, businessesmayhaveachancetohandlecustomer
problem sbefore they resultin a deluge ofnegative postings.518
Forexample, Chattback isan app thatfacilitatesmobilecommu-
nicationsbetween businessesand consum ersbeforereviewsare
posted.519 Theappallowsuserstoventtheirconcernsthrough an
anonym oustextingprocesswith m erchantsandprofessionals.520
Thesebusinessescan learnaboutandtrytoresolvecustom erex-
perienceissuesbeforeangrypostsappearonline.521
Lastly, sites need to be m indfulthatthey address internal
conflictsofinterestby linking advertising to preferentialtreat-
mentofreviewsandratings. Forexample, anumberofbusinesses
accused Yelp ofhighlighting negative ratings and subordinating
positiveonesin an efforttoextortadvertisingdollarsoutofsmall
businesses.522 Businessownersfurtheralleged thatadvertising
staff m ade prom ises about rem oving negative reviews, som e
written by Yelp em ployees and elite reviewers, in exchange for 
515 Marciarille, supra note15, at394.
516 See, e.g., Chang, supra note148;Dohse, supra note3, at391.
517 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
518 Id.
519 Dave, supra note17.
520 Id.
521 Id.
522 Chang, supra note148.
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purchasing advertising from the site.523 Yelp deniesthese alle-
gations, buttheperception persistsamongsom em erchantsand
professionals.524 Anycrowdsourcedreview siteneedstobemind-
fulthatitsconsumerreviewsshouldnotbeutilizedasleverageto
promote site advertising sales.525 Crowdsourced sites need to
adoptclearconflictofinterestpoliciesandprovideappropriateem-
ployeetraining and supervision toavoid the kindsofdam aging
perceptionsthatonlyincreasebusinessmistrustofreview sites.
C. Expressly Address Nondisparagement Clauses in Ethics Codes
and Best Practices
Much like the enactmentoflaws, ethics codes for licensed
professionalsm ay often seem slow toreacttochanging circum-
stances. Professionalorganizationshavebeen somewhathesitant
torecognizetheimpactofsocialmediaontheirethicaldutiesand
standards.526 Attorneys,527 doctors, dentists, and otherlicensed
professionals528 m ustoften awaitcase-by-casedeterminationsby
licensing bodiesabouttheirethicalobligationstonewly emerg-
ingissues.529 Someorganizationsmaytrytostretchexistingrules
on conflictsofinteresttosocialmediaissues.530 However, itmay
523 Id.
524 Id.
525 Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note175.
526 Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36667, 37172. 
527 Tushnet, supra note 455, at 74042; Stephanie Francis Ward, Grade
Anxiety, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2010, 5:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/maga
zine/article/grade_anxiety/[http://perma.cc/R73M-B97U];Reginald F. Davis
& Joe Dysart, Brag Busters: Discipline is on the way for social media mal-
efactors, panel says, 97 A.B.A. J. 28 (2011).
528 Michelle Andrews, Consumer Reports Extends Its Ratings to Doctors,
NPR:SHOTS (July 3, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012
/07/02/156136361/consumer-reports-expands-its-ratings-to-doctors [http:/perma
.cc/PH6L-BUE5].
529 See Tushnet, supra note 455, at 741 (South Carolina bar requires
attorneyswhouseonlinedirectoriestomonitorpostingstoensurecompliance
with ethics ruleson lawyeradvertising and FTC disclosure rules);Joan C.
Rogers, Truthfully Bashing Other Lawyers in Blogs Doesnt Count as Conduct 
Harmful to Justice, 80 U.S.L.W. 1532 (2012)(New Yorkbarassociation deter-
m ined that lawyers truthful, public criticism s in blog of opposing counsel not 
violationofethics).
530 Marciarille, supra note15, at402.
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bemoreappropriatetoofferexplicitguidancetolicensed profes-
sionalsbyam endingexistingethicscodestoaddressnondispar-
agementclauses, in addition tootherspeech suppression efforts,
likeproblematiclawsuitsagainstratingswebsitesorunfounded
defam ation claims againstconsum ers.531 While lawyers are al-
ready ethically obligated toforegofrivolouslawsuits,532 otherli-
censedprofessionalcodesneedtomakeclearthatsuch conductis
unethicalandm ayresultin form alsanctions. Industryorganiza-
tionsm ayalsoofferbestpracticestotheirm em bersthataddress
theseconcernsinbusinesseswithoutaform allicensingscheme.
Professionals and industry mem bers m ay also wish to con-
siderwaystocollaboratewithratingsandreview sitestodiscover
emergingissuesin consumerexperiences, andtomoreeffectively
monitorissueswith theirm em bership. Forexample, Consumer
Reports participatedwith primarycareandpediatriccareprovid-
ersin a jointprogram in which patientsreviewed theirm edical
experienceson a scale ofone (low)to four(high).533 These sur-
veysexaminedavarietyoffactors, includingeffectiveanduseful
information, respectfuland courteous interactions, and timely
appointm ents.534 Thereportwasmadepublicly availableonline
toinform patientsanddoctors.535 Somemedicalprofessionalsused
this survey data to assess the quality oftheir practices and to
makeappropriateimprovementsbasedon theseratings.536 Busi-
nessesand professionalsm aywanttoconsiderwaystoimprove
theirconsumerexperiencesby working with, ratherthan fight-
ingagainst, crowdsourcedreview sites.
531 See Ponte, supra note 23, at 50203. 
532 Id. Underthe ABA ModelCode ofProfessionalResponsibility, attor-
neysaretoavoidundertakingfrivolousactionsunderboth theethicalcanons
andthedisciplinaryrules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4,
DR 7-102(A)(1)(1980).
533 See MASS. HEALTH QUALITY PARTNERS, HOW DOES YOUR DOCTOR
COMPARE?, CONSUMER REPORTS/MHQP HEALTH INSERT 2 (July 2012), http://
consumerhealthchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MHQP2012.pdf[http://
perma.cc/8EWS-YR9B][hereinafterMASS. HEALTH].
534 Andrews, supra note528;Ponte, supra note23, at503;MASS. HEALTH,
supra note533, at2.
535 MASS. HEALTH, supra note533, at2.
536 See id. at5 (discussingadoctorwhodisputednegativesurveyoutcomes,
but improved his practice after his own survey showed similar results);
Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38082 (discussing doctor concerns about 
negativereviews, someofwhichmayleadtopracticeimprovements).
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CONCLUSION
In thefree-wheeling world ofcrowdsourced reviewsand rat-
ings, every consum ermay expresstheircandid perspectiveson
businessinteractions, service offerings, orproductexperiences.
Customerreviewshavebecomean essentialinformation resource
for consum ers seeking advice on selecting goods and services.
Businesseshaverecognized thatpositivereviewstranslateinto
increased revenues, whilepoorratingscan hurtthebottom line
and potentiallydoom new orsmallbusinesses. Som ebusinesses
haveresorted tocensoring consumerspeech with nondisparage-
ment or gag clauses that squelch bad ornegative reviewsby
relying on dubiousintellectualproperty claim s, threateningliq-
uidateddam agesclauses, andotheronerousfinancialpenalties.
Certain merchantsandprofessionals, especiallystart-upsand
smallbusinesses, justify thesegag clausesaslegitimateactions
neededtoprotecttheirbrandandgoodwillin asocialmediaenvi-
ronmentpermeated with bogusreviewsfrom unfaircompetitors
anddeviousconsumers. Often battlingforbrandimageandbusi-
nesssurvival, thesecompaniesmaylacktheresourcesandexper-
tiseofsophisticated m arketing strategiesto dealwith negative
consumerreviews. In addition, some smallbusinesses contend
thatreview sitesemploy faulty system sand are shaking them
down forexpensiveadvertisingto bury negative and sometimes 
fraudulent reviews. In this contentious environment, it is no 
wonderthatsilencinganynegativemessagesseem slikethemost
cost-effectiveandexpedientapproachtosomebusinesses.
Yet nondisparagement clauses may be challenged under a
hostofcontractprinciples, including lack ofconsideration, the
doctrineofunconscionability, violation ofpublicpolicy, overreach
on privityofcontract, orexceedingtheboundsofreasonableness
in theirrem edies. Judicialsupervision oftheseclauseswillgen-
erate a slow case-by-case and state-by-state process thatm ay
yield furtheruncertainty aboutthe legality ofthese provisions.
Proposedfederaloptionsunderexistingornew federallawsm ay
provideamoreuniform waytohandlenondisparagementclauses
in consumercontractsofadhesion. Itisunclearwhetherandhow
quicklyfederalauthoritieswouldbewillingtoaddressthisissue.
Inaddition, consideringtheexpansivegrowthofcrowdsourcedre-
view sitesandotherformsofsocialmedia, itm aybedifficultfor
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regulatorstoeffectively safeguard both robustconsumerspeech
onlineandthelegitimateconcernsofbrandowners.
A numberofself-regulatory optionsmay provide fasterand
moreeffectivealternativesforthefuture. Contentguidelinescan
berevised toincreaseawarenessaboutonlineobligationsand to
dealwith theabuseofboth businessesand consumerson crowd-
sourcedreview sites. Technologicalfiltersandexpandedcustomer-
businesscommunicationoptionscan helpsiftoutfakereviewsand
prom otegreaterfairnessinonlineinteractions. Inaddition, ethics
codescan directly addressconcernsaboutthepropriety ofnon-
disparagem entclausesin orderto help guide professionalsand
im provetheirconfidentialrelationships. Although itm aybevir-
tually impossible to preventallfake reviews or unfair evalua-
tions, efforts to develop and apply self-regulatory options m ay
im provetheoverallquality, fairness, and inform ationalvalueof
crowdsourcedreviewsforconsumersandbusinessesalike.

